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Richard Parrish

preferred although sensitive to the need for socio-cultural integration. Policy core beliefs: Acknowledgment that sport is not above the law. Nevertheless, sport possesses social and cultural characteristics which merit a soft touch application of law. Secondary aspects: Belief in the socio-cultural model of sports regulation. Differences over the precise relationship between sport and the EU exist, indicating that the coalition is a ‘coalition of convenience’. Actors Actors Pragmatic Single Market regulators: Competition Policy Directorate and the ECJ are primary

in Sports law and policy in the European Union
Jarle Trondal, Martin Marcussen, Torbjörn Larsson, and Frode Veggeland

the EU, of course, sticks out as being the extreme example of a hard law producer on an international level, the OECD is not a regulator in the traditional sense (Marcussen 2004a). It is primarily by producing regular country reviews (process supervision) and by producing data and comparative analysis in the form of ‘outlooks’ and ‘at a glance’ reports that the OECD makes a difference (Table 4.1). 3436 Unpacking international organisations:2833Prelims 22/3/10 14:56 The OECD Secretariat Page 69 69 Figure 4.1 Accumulated OECD legal acts in force Source: OECD

in Unpacking international organisations
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Foundational matters

concerned to promote competition. At the same time, managers and fund investors were engineering cash extraction so that in the privatised UK water industry, for instance, the regulator allowed all the profits to be distributed as dividends, while investment was financed by adding debt. If we turn to outsourcing of public services in areas like health, justice or welfare administration, this is complicated by the involvement of large conglomerates, under financial market pressure for growth. In search of revenue growth, they move into new activity areas until their luck

in Foundational Economy
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Routes away from crisis
Tom Gallagher

national lines. National regulators in 2013 were seeking to impede the transfer of banking funds because of fears that this leakage would further underscore the fragility of the financial industries that they were supervising. 10 Distrust over the impartiality of any super-European regulator is also easy to find. It stems from awareness of how bigger national players have used their weight to influence the opaque rules shaping the single currency before and during its time of crisis. Still, at the apex of EU decision-making, a greater sense of urgency is badly needed

in Europe’s path to crisis
Aeron Davis

, advised on the technologies introduced in Big Bang, and gone on to be a non-executive director in several big City firms. He was welcoming, friendly and blokey. He knew everyone and was happy to name drop and gossip. He didn't stop talking for two hours. The discussion began with the decline of traditional stockbroking but, because of his experiences, soon spread to investment banking, the Bank of England, top quoted companies and their CEOs, big pension funds, regulators and Gordon Brown. The topics changed but similar themes emerged

in Reckless opportunists
Denis O’Hearn

.4 shows clearly that the main drivers of private debt in Ireland were developers and speculators, with business lending in construction and real estate rising 800 per cent between 2000 and 2007. By contrast, mortgage lending rose less than half as quickly and GDP rose by only 80 per cent in current prices. The resulting crisis was inevitable. Property values fell in 2007 as the interbank market froze up and the Irish banking system went into crisis. One major Irish bank was nationalised and two were bailed out. Regulators and bankers were forced to resign. A ‘golden

in Are the Irish different?
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Joe McGrath

reports also highlighted extensive problems with the structure, content and enforcement of company law. International corporate scandals, resulting in hundreds of millions of euros in losses for investors, kept public attention focused on corporate wrongdoing. The interplay of changed social, political and economic conditions produced a new generative structure of company law. Specialist agencies were established to police and prosecute corporate wrongs, colonising functions formerly held by government departments and conventional crime fighters. These regulators were

in Corporate and white-collar crime in Ireland
Joy Y. Zhang and Saheli Datta Burton

differentiated implementation of policies and the disciplining of its research force so as to maximise potential socio-economic benefits while maintaining control (Ong, 2006 : 18–21; Ong, 2012 ). But tangible socio-economic rewards aside, at least in governing the life sciences, there is another key factor underlying Chinese and Indian researchers’ and regulators’ ambivalent attitude in fully adopting and enforcing Western standards in practice: a subaltern anxiety to advance and to be recognised. The term ‘subaltern’ in this book refers to a social actor's perceived

in The elephant and the dragon in contemporary life sciences
Claudio M. Radaelli and Fabrizio De Francesco

and obligations • Are regulators required to use standard criteria (e.g., cost–benefit analysis) to determine whether government action is appropriate? • Is there a requirement to consider the impact of regulatory/legislative action on the functioning of the internal market and the effects on companies operating from other Member States? • Are regulators required to consider alternatives to regulation? • Are regulators required to calculate/estimate compliance costs for new rules? If yes: ­ Do regulators use a standard methodology by which compliance costs are

in Regulatory quality in Europe
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(Mis-)selling for return on equity
Andrew Bowman, Ismail Ertürk, Julie Froud, Sukhdev Johal, and John Law

 Rate Source: Bank of England Overdraft fees contribute most of the rest of the revenue for banks from a standard PCA, 25% and 21% respectively for unarranged and arranged overdraft facilities. Regulators hoping for lower costs to the consumer are playing a Retail banking  97 60% 50% 48% 40% 42% 30% 29% 20% 21% 10% 13% 7% 9% 5% 0% Net credit interest Net debit interest 9% Arranged Unarranged overdraft fees overdraft fees 2007 Packaged account fees 7% 10% Interchange fees 2011 Exhibit 4.5  Retail bank revenues from PCA accounts by source (%), 2007 and 2011

in The end of the experiment?