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four specific threats of terrorism, immigration, the economy, and environmental degradation at the global, national, community, and personal levels – and political attitudes and behaviours. While there are other reasons to understand the origins of perceptions of security threats, the issue becomes of less political import if these perceptions do not lead to the kinds of compromises in democratic
War. 1 The Russian leaders seized the opportunity finally to gain an audience for their analysis of the global security situation. All leaderships declared their moral aim to be to protect the whole of civilised mankind – or the ‘principles of humanity’ – against the evil of terrorism. 2 They emphasised that terrorism emanated from particular geographical areas located beyond
4 A question of commonality In the TEU, the main features of the new internal security arrangements – including counter terrorism – were labelled as ‘matters of common interest’. While this label has been reproduced in both official and academic analysis on the subject since, there has been little examination of what this term actually means. Although it conjures up connotations of solidarity and shared interests, it remains to be seen whether this is actually the case. By considering both the empirical scale and the nature of the developing terrorist threat
The two preceding chapters focused on public understandings of anti-terrorism policy and the implications of these for the status and practice of citizenship. As we saw, and perhaps as we might expect, there is no unidirectional relationship between these entities. While many people in the UK feel that their experience of citizenship has been adversely affected by developments
2002 when then Persson government radically altered the text of Sweden’s security doctrine (discussed in detail below). The EU’s external dimension has also gathered pace in light of the ‘war on terror’, with the introduction of new measures to combat international terrorism. The ‘war on terror’, combined with the EU’s economic strength and role in the process of globalisation has a dual consequence
7 Looking back, looking forward Although referring to a different area of EU security co-operation, namely the CFSP, Richard Whitman, in concluding that ‘all the bricks are added together, but they are not structured in a way that bears much weight’,1 has raised similar concerns to those highlighted in this volume. In considering in a structured fashion the first fifteen years of internal security co-operation, both within the Third Pillar more widely and more specifically in terms of developments in police co-operation and counter terrorism, it is difficult to
ONE OF THE MOST NOTICEABLE and ubiquitous features of the language of counter-terrorism is its invariable appeal to identity: terrorists are endlessly demonised and vilified as being evil, barbaric and inhuman, while America and its coalition partners are described as heroic, decent and peaceful – the defenders of freedom. The clear implication of this language is
Terrorism is a form of human sacrifice. It treats humans not as ends in themselves but as means to a political goal. It asks no permissions of those whose lives it takes or mars; they are sacrificed to a cause that they may never have heard of. Ritual human sacrifice is found in societies that have an erroneous notion of the instrumentality of this procedure and suppose that the gods or other influential entities are appeased or sated by slaughter. For a society afflicted by terrorism, the easy choice is to suppose that the deaths and traumas inflicted by
Introduction Why should educators need to know about policies aimed at countering terrorism, radicalisation and (violent) extremism, and how do these policies shape educational practice? The UK’s ‘Four P’ (Protect, Prevent, Pursue, Prepare) conceptualisation of the work-strands of the counter-terrorist strategy (CONTEST), together with the Dutch Information House’s development of countering violent extremism (CVE) as ‘soft interventionism’ ( Kundnani and Hayes, 2018 , p. 6), have shaped wider European and global landscapes in respect of countering (violent
Under Vladimir Putin, the Russian leadership has consistently sought to shape a strategic agenda. This book discusses the strategy planning process and the legislative and policy architecture that has taken shape. It explores the nature of the agenda itself, particularly Putin's May Edicts of 2012, which set out Moscow's core strategic agenda. The book examines the questions raised by the numerous problems in planning and the extent to which they undermine the idea of Russian grand strategy. It explores what the Russian leadership means by a 'unified action programme', its emphasis on military modernisation, problems that Russian observers emphasise, strategy undermining, and the relation of mobilisation with the Russian grand strategy. The book argues that Russian strategy is less to be found in Moscow's plans, and more in the so-called vertical of power. The broader picture of Russian grand strategy, and the leadership's ability to implement those plans, is examined. The book discusses patriotic mass mobilisation often referred to as the 'Crimea effect', and the role of the All Russian Popular Front in the implementation of the leadership's plans, especially the May Edicts. It talks about the ongoing debate in the Russian armed forces. Finally, some points regarding Russian grand strategy are discussed.