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, is the most modern citizenship-by-investment program. The IIP is one of the most exclusive citizenship-by-investment portfolios worldwide. It offers clients the opportunity to acquire citizenship in a country that has one of the strongest, most stable economies of the EU and Eurozone. … The combined upfront financial requirement, including applicable government charges and citizenship application fees, is just under EUR 900,000. These costs will increase slightly depending on the family size. (Henley & Partners, 2019) At the time of writing, there are no IIPs for
Mediterranean countries of Western Europe relied on this new labor to gain acceptance into the Eurozone. This is clearly evident in Greece, where Albanian migrants bolstered the economy and (unexpectedly) allowed the country to meet the qualification criteria (see Katsoridas 2003). It is possible to claim that, after 1990, Europe saw the largest production and renewal of the built environment since the reconstruction following WWII. Consider, for example, the reconstruction of East Berlin; the mass building of summer houses in Spain; Dublin’s new satellite “suburbs” (now
nature of institutions has been at the centre of Jill Rubery’s research (Bosch, Lehndorff and Rubery, 2009: 2). The possibility of spillover or domino effects from employment to welfare, family and the production spheres increases the scope of change and suggests the need for a multifaceted approach involving macroeconomic, labour and social reproduction objectives (Rubery, 2015). The Eurozone crisis has rekindled the debate on how to respond to shortand long-term change and to the hardships that it produces. The countries worse hit by the sovereign debt crises, in
knowledge of the past were undermined by utilitarianism and a fundamentally flawed model of modernity and of twenty-first-century Ireland. This chapter considers some of the circumstances that permitted a motorway to be built through such a historic landscape. It argues that its context was the illusion of an ahistorical, of-the-moment modernity that arose during a ‘perfect storm’ when the sudden availability of cheap money from the creation of the Eurozone encountered a political landscape of soft regulation, clientelism and ideological torpor; in short, an
market-friendly governance’ (Peck, 2010b :7). They came with major costs from which the market was shielded. A rapid turn to retrenchment followed in almost all other areas of state expenditure (for early examples, see Chapters 10 and 11 ). After Greece, Ireland’s fiscal adjustments of 18 per cent of GDP between 2008 and 2014 are the largest in the Eurozone. In the post-crisis neo-liberal orthodoxy Ireland is upheld as a country redeeming itself of its reckless past with pain and determination, bearing ‘proof’ of austerity as ‘growth friendly fiscal consolidation
crisis, whether about taxation, immigration and the national debt in the United States and the United Kingdom, or about structural reform, banking regulation and austerity in the Eurozone. Countries with their own currencies (Sweden, the United States, the United Kingdom) are as polarized as countries which share a currency (Spain, France, Finland, Germany). The long decline in the level of trust in government has sunk to new levels. To summarize, states are worse off than before: they face the bill to repair the damage measured in deferred education, lost experience
microaggressions for a more nuanced assessment (Huc-Hepher, 2019 ). 3 I favour this terminology over the usual ‘online/offline’ dichotomy, which, I consider, illogically prioritises digital practices. 4 This is somewhat unexpected given the visible presence of well-established Italian (see Scotto, 2010 and Sprio, 2013 ) and Spanish communities in London. The figures may, therefore, be suggestive of a phenomenon of first-generation return migration (the intent of many), coinciding with euro-zone growth at the turn of the twenty-first century (leading to increased