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nature of institutions has been at the centre of Jill Rubery’s research (Bosch, Lehndorff and Rubery, 2009: 2). The possibility of spillover or domino effects from employment to welfare, family and the production spheres increases the scope of change and suggests the need for a multifaceted approach involving macroeconomic, labour and social reproduction objectives (Rubery, 2015). The Eurozone crisis has rekindled the debate on how to respond to shortand long-term change and to the hardships that it produces. The countries worse hit by the sovereign debt crises, in
Mediterranean countries of Western Europe relied on this new labor to gain acceptance into the Eurozone. This is clearly evident in Greece, where Albanian migrants bolstered the economy and (unexpectedly) allowed the country to meet the qualification criteria (see Katsoridas 2003). It is possible to claim that, after 1990, Europe saw the largest production and renewal of the built environment since the reconstruction following WWII. Consider, for example, the reconstruction of East Berlin; the mass building of summer houses in Spain; Dublin’s new satellite “suburbs” (now
, which dominated the news for months, had been anticipated in 2008. By the time the depth and duration of the crisis became apparent, the opportunity for radical reform, either of creditdriven housing markets in the United States or of Eurozone governance, had passed. Structural reforms that worked in the 1990s became more difficult to launch, and less likely to show short-term results. Clearly something outside previous experience happened. Macro-economic and fiscal policies have yet to build a sustainable recovery. The loss of wealth and confidence will take years to
the problems of the Eurozone demonstrates, constitutional considerations weigh heavily when designing and implementing measures that reduce risks. Institutional frameworks and legal traditions vary from one jurisdiction to another, but the challenge remains, to arrive at roughly similar outcomes using different means, taking account of the fact that compliance at the sub-national level is critical. Conflicts over who does what, between existing and proposed regulations, and about whether government has acted within the rules or arbitrarily are likely to go to the
this order of magnitude are usually associated with other, dramatic events and geo-political crises. This is why the combination of the global crisis which has lifted uncertainty to unprecedented levels, and the demonstrable incapacity of the post-Cold War state system to cope with more instability than we have seen in a generation is so pregnant for the future. The lack of co-operation among nations on new financial regulations, the frustrations of the Eurozone torn between deficit-reduction rules and supply-side strategies to develop infrastructure and investment
microaggressions for a more nuanced assessment (Huc-Hepher, 2019 ). 3 I favour this terminology over the usual ‘online/offline’ dichotomy, which, I consider, illogically prioritises digital practices. 4 This is somewhat unexpected given the visible presence of well-established Italian (see Scotto, 2010 and Sprio, 2013 ) and Spanish communities in London. The figures may, therefore, be suggestive of a phenomenon of first-generation return migration (the intent of many), coinciding with euro-zone growth at the turn of the twenty-first century (leading to increased
crisis, whether about taxation, immigration and the national debt in the United States and the United Kingdom, or about structural reform, banking regulation and austerity in the Eurozone. Countries with their own currencies (Sweden, the United States, the United Kingdom) are as polarized as countries which share a currency (Spain, France, Finland, Germany). The long decline in the level of trust in government has sunk to new levels. To summarize, states are worse off than before: they face the bill to repair the damage measured in deferred education, lost experience