Search results
which banks lend to each other and to their customers, and thus have some control over the amount of money in the economy. Higher interest rates would mean less people would want to borrow money and less money would be created; lower interest rates would mean that more people would want to borrow and more money would be created. However, Lee and Werner 30 draw on empirical evidence from the US, the UK, Germany and Japan to show that rather than determining or controlling credit, interest rates follow credit
interest rates. In fact, firms assumed that they would be able to roll over their loans easily when they fell due – after all, this is what they had done for several years before the crisis. Foreign lenders also complied, often not undertaking adequate appraisal of their investments. Radelet (1999) aptly notes that Indonesia’s vulnerability was all the greater because its largest creditors were Japanese banks, which provided about 40 per cent of the total credit from foreign banks. The underlying weaknesses of Japanese banks made them more likely to try to pull their
evolution of LIBOR, after conducting extensive consultation over 18 months. Roundtable meet ings were hosted by the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the Banque de France, the Swiss National Bank, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Board of Governors of the US Federal Reserve. Based Reforming benchmarks219 on the feedback that ICE Benchmark Administration Limited (IBA) received from all the consultations, the benchmark administrator has developed and strengthened the reliability of LIBOR as the benchmark. ICE LIBOR is the benchmark published under that
high level of investments necessary for 71 The Asian financial crisis rapid growth. Second, there was the appreciation of the yen vis-à-vis the weakening US dollar after the 1985 Plaza Accord, during which time the baht was effectively pegged to the dollar at a rate of roughly 25 baht per US dollar.14 Third, as Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan faced sharply rising labor costs and protectionist barriers, this increased the cost advantage of exports from Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Fourth, and most importantly, export expansion was fueled by massive
.6 ** n.a. 30.3 29.4 51.8 49.6 58.4 49.8 Japan 2.2 3.7 12.3 * 19.9 20.8 29.6 35.4 37.5 36.6 UK 26.5 26.0 71.7 32.5 37.6 53.1 53.8 47.5 46.2 US 4.2 10.0 45.7 18.0 30.0 36.6 39.9 40.6 39.0 * 1946 ** 1934 Much state intervention could also still look remarkably Keynesian. The Volcker Shock, lifting interest rates to induce recession, can indeed be seen as radically anti-Keynesian (although Keynes continued to defend similar measures taken in the early 1920s). Some
disillusionment with fixed-rate bonds. Borrowers could not raise more than $25 million in one issue. Despite the fact that FRNs allowed borrowers easier access to the bond market, they were less flexible than syndicated loans and did not make any progress during the 1970s. Before 1982, banks provided half the funds raised by FRNs. However, after the collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt and the price increases in the interbank bank market, the importance of long-term funding for banks without easy recourse to dollars became clear. Banks in France and Japan, for example, were obliged by
high or low depending on the shape of their book or loan portfolio at any given point in time’. Representatives of JP Morgan stated that ‘GBP and the USD LIBOR are higher than the true position but everyone in the market knows this and prices accordingly. Do not want the BBA to attempt to “correct” this.’ In June 2005, both the Bank Manipulation abounds55 of Japan and the Japanese Ministry of Finance had ‘made it clear’ that ‘“they don’t want to see negative BBA YEN LIBOR rates being set even if this would be reflective of reality”, Citigroup representatives
‘undermine economic value’) while clusters are good (‘open’, ‘facilitating’, 1998a, p. 227). The best kinds of clusters are to be found mostly in the USA, where the greatest number provide the greatest synergies arising from overlapping clusters, whereas in developing countries clusters tend to be too centralised around a few dominant players, are often state supported, and are ‘hub-and-spoke networks’ (1998a, p. 231). Japan is castigated for following such a model, exacerbated by a metropol-centric and overdirected bias. Given this fusion of the empirical and the
centres of 18.9% in the US, 5.66% in Japan and 5.7% in Singapore. The magnitude of these flows indicates that the trading in currency in the UK is far greater than that warranted by trade flows into and from the UK, thus demonstrating the importance of London as a world financial market. A second feature revealed by the surveys is the very fast rate of growth in the volume of transactions. This far
less than a quarter of cumulative emissions. By contrast, the remaining occupants of the Top 10 emitters list – Russia, Germany, the UK, Japan and Canada – account for nearly 40% of cumulative emissions, despite collectively being home to just 10% of the world’s population. 11 Looking instead at cumulative per capita emissions, the list changes significantly, with the top five spots occupied by New Zealand, Canada, Australia, the United States and Argentina. But while Carbon Brief’s analysis is as robust as they