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Abstract only
The politics of Europe in the UK and Ireland
Scott James

25 per cent to 39 per cent (above the EU-27 average of 30 per cent) (European Commission 2007). However these figures disguise the fact that the Irish have undoubtedly become far more sceptical about the need for further treaty reform. It is the Ahern government’s failure to address this underlying grievance that helps to explain the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty in the 2008 referendum held just a month after his departure from office. Conclusion This chapter set out to outline the broader political landscape

in Managing Europe from home
Scott James

appointed to represent the department in Brussels. Despite the creation of a permanent president of the European Council in the Lisbon Treaty, the management of the rotating presidency of the Council continues to impose its own additional obligations – not least responsibility for chairing ministerial meetings and working groups, and driving forward the six-presidency strategic programme. Second, the coordination of national policy preferences and departmental negotiating positions is an essential prerequisite for positive participation in the

in Managing Europe from home
Nora Siklodi

built on a mutual understanding – rather than a proven fact – that their fellows have the same identity. This is why some scholars have proposed that a shared identity defines an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983; Risse, 2010): a ‘we’ feeling among the members of a community. While often cited by political actors and scholars (see, for example, European Commission, 1993 and Risse, 2010), there is very little evidence that a community of EU citizens and, more broadly, a community of Europeans exists. The Lisbon Treaty has made an important alteration to the previous

in The European Union and its eastern neighbourhood
Abstract only
Identity politics and reticent Europeanisation
Dimitris Tsarouhas

same period, namely the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and the strong backlash that Europe’s leaders experienced at the time (Startin and Krouwel, 2013). The long institutional crisis, resolved through the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, left a 136 Country/Area studies bitter legacy and enlarged the (fictitious or real) divide between Europe’s peoples and its leadership. Instead of being a sought-after prize for geopolitical influence, larger markets and a more assertive foreign policy, Turkey’s EU membership bid now appeared as an unpredictable

in The European Union and its eastern neighbourhood
The case of the South Caucasus
Kevork Oskanian and Derek Averre

principles of order, with many conflicts frozen rather than resolved and others rekindled. This comes at a time when the EU faces material and ideational constraints as an international actor stemming partly from the continuing internal problems of the model of European integration – the financial crisis, a broader crisis of legitimacy, a lack of institutional coherence and of political/ administrative capacity. The strengthening of the remit of the High Representative and creation of the European External Action Service provided by the Lisbon Treaty might bring

in The European Union and its eastern neighbourhood
Paul Flenley

signals from the EU as to priorities. Different institutions in Brussels, such as the Parliament or Commission, will emphasise different issues – for example, human rights or trade. This is compounded by the different priorities of the member states. Member states tend to upload value issues – such as human rights and democracy – in dealing with the neighbourhood to the EU level institutions while they pursue interests – such as security and commerce – on a bilateral basis. The main attempt to develop greater coordination of policy came with the Lisbon Treaty (2009

in The European Union and its eastern neighbourhood
Applying a theory of multi-level governance
Mary C. Murphy

. In these instances, the EU serves as an obstacle to regional empowerment. Nevertheless, across a variety of non-controversial policy issues – including, most notably, agriculture – Northern Ireland has recorded some success in pursuing policy objectives.30 The EU backdrop against which the Northern Ireland conflict, and later the peace process, played out is about to disappear. The UK decision to leave the NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE EU 159 EU will shortly lead to the triggering of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty and the formal process of negotiating exit

in Theories of International Relations and Northern Ireland
Abstract only
Mary C. Murphy

early 1990s onwards has revealed volatile public support for the continued widening and deepening of the EU. The rejection of the Treaty of Nice in 2001 by the Irish electorate was followed by the French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and, more recently, the Irish no vote on the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. The global economic crisis of the late 2000s has also tested the capacity of the EU to deal with unprecedented developments. The wider UK political environment has also changed in recent years. Following the 2010 general election, a hung

in Northern Ireland and the European Union
The external dynamics
Mary C. Murphy

lifted in May 2007). A number of subsequent meetings were cancelled in 2008 and 2009 due to pressures in the Republic of Ireland around the Lisbon Treaty refer- 146 Northern Ireland and the European Union Table 6.2  Meetings of the NSMC in SEUPB sectoral format Date In attendance 7 Nov. 2007 Minister for Finance (ROI), Brian Cowen Minister of Finance and Personnel (NI), Peter Robinson Minister for Social Development (NI), Margaret Ritchie 8 Sept. 2009 Minister for Finance (ROI), Brian Lenihan Minister of Finance and Personnel (NI), Sammy Wilson Junior Minister

in Northern Ireland and the European Union
Steven Kettell

the universal values of democracy and human rights, the Foreign Secretary averred that in order to pursue ‘an active foreign policy’ it was essential to have ‘a strong relationship with the leading global power’.56 But despite such reassertions, any hopes that the Brown administration may have harboured about reviving a Blairite transatlantic bridge approach were rapidly imperilled. Though signing up to the EU’s Lisbon treaty in December, Brown’s refusal to adhere to a long-standing Labour commitment to hold a referendum on the matter created an air of mistrust

in New Labour and the new world order