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rebellion (to be followed a month later by Operation “Restore Hope”), neither Saudi leaders nor those of the other Gulf oil monarchies had lifted a finger to slow the march of the “Shia” Houthis on Sanaa. Rather, they saw the rebellion as having the advantage of weakening the power of the Muslim Brotherhood—albeit to the benefit of their traditional Shia rivals. 20 The Brotherhood, as embodied in Yemen’s al-Islah party, had more often been opponents than partners of the Saudis’ traditional ally Ali Abdallah Saleh. Since the outset of the Arab Springs, they had become
situation that amounted to a threat to peace. 81 The ensuing operations are also fraught with disagreement on their legal merits. They can lead to different constructions since these actions had their own configuration which can be revealed and appreciated only after understanding their constituents. Operation ‘Restore Hope’ for Somalia is marked by the disagreements between the United Nations and the
794 84 which authorised Operation ‘Restore Hope’ in Somalia, is also indicative. Whereas the effects of the humanitarian disaster were felt in the region 85 the resolution characterises internal issues such as the magnitude of the human tragedy and the obstacles in the distribution of humanitarian assistance as a threat to peace, vowing also ‘respect for the
The Saudi-led military intervention into Yemen called ‘Operation Decisive Storm’ was announced on 26 March 2015 (renamed to ‘Operation Restoring Hope’ in April 2015). It came after a tumultuous period in Yemen following widespread protest in 2011/2012 that succeeded in forcing the long-time president Ali Abdullah Saleh to hand over the presidency to his vice president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. The subsequent transition process was initially accentuated by the United Nations (UN) as a positive example of a negotiated
US presence in Somalia during the 1992–1994 Operation Restore Hope, the US government froze the assets of all Al Barakaat offices in the US and pressured other countries around the world to follow suit. Although in 2002 Al Barakaat was absolved of any connection with AQ, asset seizures forced the company into bankruptcy and provoked an economic crisis in Somalia ( Passas 2006 ). In the following decade, the AQ-allied Somalian organisation Al Shabaab became a prominent presence in the country. Further to their harmful impacts on basic services provision and