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leadership at the founding conference in 1963 were pivotal to African states reaching an agreement on the OAU Charter. Several presidents who would have a profound impact on the OAU also came into power during this period or emerged as more prominent continental leaders. Colonel Muammar Al-Gaddafi came to power in Libya in 1970 after a 1969 uprising. 3 Gaddafi was staunchly opposed to the west and was active in both the pan-Arab and pan-African movements. Kenya became independent shortly after the 1963 OAU founding conference, and Jomo Kenyatta was named Prime Minister
-indifference wherein the ideas that formed the foundation of the OAU were delegitimized over time. The de-legitimization occurred through a combination of the repercussions of African conflicts and atrocities on the security and interests of the region, advocacy by respected leaders, and shifting interpretations of pan-Africanism. Stage three followed in the late 1970s and 1980s where there were attempts to reform the OAU by creating new institutions and through the adoption of policies and practices that embrace a more holistic vision of regional security. However, new ideas that
’ national identities of ancient origin in their struggle with the Europeans. Nevertheless, colonial powers and their colonial boundaries moulded even their national identity. Appeals were made by some African and Arab politicians to identities that cut across nations, such as Pan-Africanism , Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism , often with little, or at most temporary, success. Usually ‘traditional’ nationalism was too powerful a
’ (Carmichael and Thelwell, 2003: 668). In Africa he organised the All-African People’s Revolutionary Party and insisted that ‘Black power can only be realized when there exists a unified socialist Africa’ (Ture and Hamilton, 1992: 199). His marriage to Miriam Makeba the South African activist and singer symbolised his developing Pan-Africanism (Carmichael, 2007: 221–7). His journey also, of course, symbolised the union of Black radicalism internationally and no doubt presented the nemesis of White Power – a synthesis of Black liberation movements at home and abroad across
Arab countries were vying for influence on the continent. Mazrui argues that ‘black radical identification with the Arabs’ was because Israel was considered too much a part of the Western world and was connected with White-dominated southern Africa. The pan-Africanism movement had always been inclusive of North Africans, in particular Algerians. Furthermore, Arabs had been major players in movements for Third World liberation and anti-imperialism. 20 Mazrui makes a strong case for African countries breaking off
political dialogue that was far-reaching, a partnership that was global and people-centred (beyond institutions), and that treated Africa as a single entity. Pan- African in its membership and its comprehensive coverage of issues that were relevant to both regional partners, the attempts to involve all levels of society (and not just the supranational institutional actors on both sides) marked the concern to ensure ‘ownership’ of the strategy. In this regard, the strategy aimed at the socialisation of all actors in a very normatively 104 Actors and contexts framed
the Rev. Leon Sullivan 1922–2001’, Rolling Stone (July 2001), pp. 87–98, quote on p. 88. 9 V.P. Franklin, ‘Pan- African Connections, Transnational Education, Collective Cultural Capital, and Opportunities Industrialization Centers International’, Journal of African American History, 96:1 (2011), 44–61. 10 Dick Gregory quoted by Mike Sanger in ‘A Tribute to the Rev. Leon Sullivan 1922– 2001’, p. 95. 11 ‘The Black on GM’s Board’, Time magazine (6 September 1976), pp. 54–5. 12 L.H. Sullivan, Moving Mountains, p. 26. 13 L.H. Sullivan, Moving Mountains, p. 27. 14
institutionalising information exchanges and dialogue with destination countries is considered necessary for better management of migration flows. A commitment towards developing the migration–development nexus is clear at the continental, regional and national levels. At the all-ACP level, the 2006 Brussels Declaration and Plan of Action outlined ACP commitment to developing a migration dialogue with the EU, as well as identifying the need for developing a holistic approach to migration (ACP, 2006). At the pan-African level, since 2006 the African Union (AU) has started to
the delegations there is still a tendency to think of poverty reduction in a more narrow sense while neglecting the social dimension as such (Interviews, July 2010). 290 Policies and partnerships Budgetary commitments While the JAES sets an overarching framework for EU–Africa relations, it does not have a separate budget and continues to rely on existing financial frameworks. Discussions on a Pan-African financial support programme and the alignment of existing instruments to the JAES have barely made progress (Bossuyt and Sherriff, 2010: 7). Since 2001, the
coalition group the Unión del Pueblo Canario taking control of the archipelago. In the wake of the 1982 elections, however, the Europeanist promise of modernisation relegated the pan-African discourse to the status of historical curiosity, the PSOE governing in coalition with the newly formed Agrupaciones de Independientes de Canarias, which absorbed many ex-members of the UCD and whose ‘mix of populism and island mentality’ 106 provided a conducive environment for the carnival to expand, with its beauty pageants and floats becoming mass-televised spectacles by the end