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and values from far right political parties? A sixth issue is about the notion of a knowledge economy. Is there more than one knowledge economy (Shore and Wright, 2017)? Are there knowledge cultures as well as knowledge economies? Is higher education for a knowledge economy a good or a bad thing? What has happened to knowledge for its own sake –is that an unrescuable property? Should lifelong learning move well away from notions of knowledge economies? Finally, where do research and interdisciplinarity fit into lifelong learning? Is research only for the privileged
increasingly pervasive due to advancing living standards. This latter approach is not really pertinent to the Balkan region – if it is discussed, this is only due to pressure being brought by the international community that forces these issues to the forefront, despite the considerably lower standard of living in the Balkans vis-à-vis Western Europe (WE).1 The socioeconomic approach and modernization theory are based upon the structure of society and consider Far Right politics to be the outcome of rapid social and cultural change in modern societies, which try to head off
thus not the wolf that is like the migrant but the migrant who takes on similar meanings to the cipher of the wolf. In far-right politics, the wolf thus serves as a figure to construe a (predominantly) rural population as vulnerable to infiltrating populations of predators who have been invited in by urban dwellers who remain luxuriously far removed from the consequences of their decisions.
-terrorism on the far right. Until recently, groups and individuals associated with this ideology were not given priority within the CONTEST strategy, but they are now seen as a much more pervasive and organised threat. It might be that many critics of Prevent who saw the policy as racist and discriminatory might have greater anxiety about the influence of far-right politics and the threat of violence from that quarter. And for groups who have decried safe spaces while backing Prevent’s safeguarding, the long-standing issue of the conflation of extremism with violence might
Nazi past would work as a political ‘handicap’ for far-right political agents. 33 Now, however, the stigma is used as a resource for far-right parties. ‘Germany – Never again!’ In Eastern Germany there has been a historically different understanding of the ‘problematic’ German nation that has led to a greater attention to the governance of problematic ‘leftist’ nationalisms. In particular, during reunification, a left-wing political movement called the Antideutsche Bewegung (Anti-German Movement) emerged that rejected every form of German nationalism per se
they make it possible for far right political forces to channel popular discontent with the status quo in a reactionary direction. This is not the only lesson that the left and humanity have to draw from recent history. The rise of neoliberalism has laid to rest the illusion, stemming from capitalism’s brief golden age immediately after World War II, that it is possible to humanize capitalism by subjecting it to democratic controls. The Cold War context of that period contributed to this illusion in a number of ways. On the one hand, it put pressure on capitalist
affiliation—and some had links to anarchist and leftist groups—a few bands found their voice on the right. Incorporating fascist, anti-immigrant, and racist motifs into their lyrics, they exhorted rebellion against the same enemies the National Front targeted—elite politicians, non-whites, and foreigners. 31 Skinhead culture and far right politics found common ground via an aesthetic of hypermasculine violence. Yet the skinhead scene did not simply breed fascists or neo-Nazis. Rather, neo-Nazis and fascists sought it out to build grassroots support. The far
many people became unemployed, tens of thousands, practically overnight. If you go to Eastern Saxony today, right at the border to Poland and the Czech Republic, you’ll find a lot of abandoned houses, inner city centres which are empty, and only older people on the streets, because most of the young people left. We lost two generations actually here in the last twenty years. 56 A narrative of depopulation and ‘empty villages’ without any women left to reproduce becomes prone to being exploited by far-right politics and filled with anxieties about the future. As the
fallback will become the position from which we shall sally forth to kick off the reconquista. 21 For these far-right political agents, ‘national rebirth’ has a time and a place: it is set in former Eastern Germany. Teleologically, the narrative ends not in the catastrophe of the Germans dying out but in salvation from the brink of catastrophe. These narratives of ‘great replacement’, ‘national resistance’ and ‘national rebirth’ were not invented by the AfD. In fact, most of these ideas date back to the nineteenth century, and today, with the rise of the right we
election, there were outstanding questions concerning the MNR’s ability to benefit electorally from its entrenchment at the local level. The presidential and legislative contests both illustrated the bitter setback of the MNR in challenging Le Pen’s monopoly over far-right politics in France. The share of the extreme-right vote secured by the MNR in the presidential and legislative election represented only 11.9 and 8.9 per cent of the total vote for the far right respectively, as opposed to 36.2 per cent in the June 1999 European election. At the 2002 presidential