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The view from New Delhi
Rajesh Rajagopalan

Two decades after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, international concern about nuclear stability in the region has subsided significantly. Early concerns about a nuclear arms race in the region and resultant instability, as well as expectations about nuclear escalation, have largely been shown to be unfounded. Both India and Pakistan have continued to expand their nuclear arsenals, but at a measured pace. And though there is an action–reaction dynamic even in nuclear arms between the two sides, it

in The future of U.S.–India security cooperation
Stephan Frühling and Andrew O'Neil

Nuclear weapons have been central to US alliance management in the post-1945 world. Successive administrations in Washington have sought to use nuclear weapons as a means of bolstering the credibility of US global security commitments. Yet, rather than simply being passive recipients of US nuclear reassurances, US allies in Europe and Asia have actively bargained with

in Partners in deterrence
James Johnson

How can we best conceptualize AI and military technological change in the context of nuclear weapons? Despite being theoretically and politically contested to this day, the notion of ‘strategic stability’ has proven a useful intellectual tool for analyzing the potential for new, powerful, and technically advanced weapons to undermine stability between nuclear-armed adversaries. 1 The concept entered into the nuclear lexicon during the early 1950s and is inextricably connected to the strategic thinking and

in Artificial intelligence and the future of warfare
Regional strategic dilemmas and U.S. policy approaches toward India
Frank O’Donnell

The global nuclear order appears to be under significant pressure as of early 2020. This order is defined as the web of international arms control agreements anchored around the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and supported by norms against use of nuclear weapons and nonproliferation. At seemingly every stage in its history, the order has featured scholarly assessments that it is in some form of crisis. 1 However, the simultaneous converging developments since 2017 are jeopardizing the system

in The future of U.S.–India security cooperation
Conventional and alternative security scenarios
Roland Bleiker

on threats, such as nuclear brinkmanship, to gain concessions from the international community. The latest such attempt began in the autumn of 2002, when Pyongyang admitted to a secret nuclear weapons programme and subsequently withdrew from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). From that point the situation rapidly deteriorated. By early 2003 both the US and North Korea

in Critical Security in the Asia-Pacific
Stephan Frühling and Andrew O'Neil

power differential between the US and its junior partners, and because nuclear weapons are regarded by major powers as the jewel in the crown of their military capabilities, realist theory would predict that an alliance has negligible influence over the nature of nuclear weapons cooperation. By contrast, institutional theory sees alliances as independent phenomena that shape not only the structures within

in Partners in deterrence
James Johnson

Will AI-augmented technology increase the risk of military escalation between great military rivals? 1 This chapter argues that the fusion of AI-enhanced technologies with both nuclear and conventional capabilities will be destabilizing, and that this problem will be exacerbated by the fact that China and the US have divergent views of the escalation risks of co-mingled (or ‘entangled’) nuclear and conventional capabilities. 2 From what we know about the advances in military AI today, AI

in Artificial intelligence and the future of warfare

for government that is prevalent in more than just the agriculture domain. The same frustrations appear perennially across Whitehall but there is no cross-government remedial action plan. In the absence of avenues for a genuinely open, influential debate on nuclear policy, it is striking that, as far as I can establish, no British prime minister has ever made a major speech on nuclear deterrence outside Parliamentary debate. Every French president since De Gaulle has made a keynote speech on ‘their’ nuclear deterrence policy

in Supreme emergency
Terry Macintyre

Chapter 5 NATO nuclear strategy and the adoption of ‘flexible response’ B y 1964, the debate within NATO over nuclear strategy, of which nuclear sharing (Chapter 2) was but one element, was in full swing. At issue was the question of deterrence and how, should it break down, the Alliance would respond to any Soviet incursion into Western Europe. In this context, it is worth recalling the basic mission of the Alliance as set out in the Three Wise Men’s 1956 NATO report: ‘the foundation of NATO … is [and remains] the political obligation that its members have

in Anglo-German relations during the Labour governments 1964–70
Matthew Grant

v 5 v The imaginative landscape of nuclear war in Britain, 1945–65 Matthew Grant The prospect of nuclear destruction was a central, defining part of the British experience in the years following the Second World War. Fighting the Cold War was not solely the task of diplomats, spies, or even ‘cultural front’ organisations. Fighting a third total war in the lifetime of many in Britain seemed a very real prospect. At the heart of Britain’s Cold War was the risk of being attacked with nuclear weapons. The diplomatic and military strategy of Britain throughout the

in Understanding the imaginary war