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exception for small IAPs, or to permit further analysis of the type indulged in by the French regulator when analysing the Level3/France Telecom and YouTube/Free disputes. Finally, ‘[NRAs] should be required, as part of their monitoring and enforcement function, to intervene when agreements or commercial practices would result in the undermining of the essence of the end-users’ rights.’ Powers must
and the regulators missed a series of opportunities to act. 17 The same year, a Greater Manchester nurse, Victorino Chua, was convicted of murdering two patients and poisoning twenty others by injecting insulin into saline bags. 18 These so-called ‘scandals’ reflect poorly on individuals, but also on the NHS, which promises to ensure a safe service of the quality that patients and their families are entitled to expect. 19 That the crisis at Stafford Hospital occurred at all is bad enough. That it occurred post-Bristol Inquiry indicates systemic failure. The
interact, and can lead to adverse outcomes for clients. The evidence collected by the regulators shows that this is what happened. Manipulating the foreign exchange market 165 Final notice to Barclays issued by the FCA, 20 May 2015 Barclays was the first to admit wrongdoing but was nevertheless fined by the FCA. In its final notice, issued on 20 May 2015, the FCA stated that over the five years between 1 January 2009 and 15 October 2013, Barclays failed to control its London voice trading operations in the G10 spot FX market.1 Barclays put its interests ahead of the
process, as we saw in the case of the UK in Chapters 2 – 3 . While regulator Ofcom has been groundbreaking in its research into traffic management measurement, it has tried to solve neutrality problems with co-regulation. This process needs a brief definition, and while I have written extensively on the matter, here I use the term defined by Lord Justice Leveson in the 2,500-page report into ‘phone hacking’. He states
CSPL is not however a direct ethics regulator, still less an ‘anti-corruption’ agency. Its role is to recommend strategies to improve standards of ethics and propriety. It has no power to impose them. It is non-statutory and has relatively modest resources. There is a small secretariat of three or four seconded civil-service support staff, so, as with parliamentary select committees, most of its ‘input’ comes from hearings of expert witnesses, though there is also a small research advisory board to supervise a modest amount of public-opinion survey work.3 Recently
Chapter 5 Who knew what when? In this chapter, I shall focus on the comments and claims made about LIBOR prior to the beginning of the formal investigations by the FSA and the CFTC. As usual, after any scandal, the question immediately arises as to why the regulators had not discovered the wrongdoing earlier and taken action against those involved. Market rumours had swirled around LIBOR at the very beginning of the financial crisis (and, some would claim, before that), but had apparently been ignored. Regulators should never overlook the possible significance
for the FRBNY announce that since the Barclays deal had failed, Lehman had to file for bankruptcy by midnight. Miller argued: ‘You don't realize what you're saying. It's going to have a disabling effect on the markets and destroy confidence in the credit markets. If Lehman goes down, it will be Armageddon.’ 5 He was right. Later in the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, he stated that he believed that the regulators could have stepped in, not necessarily to save Lehman, but to head off the meltdown that followed: ‘They totally missed it.’ He added: ‘When
analysis of competition law suitability to regulate net neutrality by Maniadaki. Having analysed regulatory tools with little chance of success, I then examine what communications regulators actually do: regulating telecoms access based on the UK case study. This provides insights into how difficult net neutrality regulation will prove in practice, a subject to which we return in Chapter 6 and the concluding Chapter 8 . I then
Chapter 9 Our international guardians With national regulators caught – as the last chapter related – in the midst of change brought on by forces of financial innovation and integration beyond their control, attention shifts to the possibilities of internationally negotiated systems of control. Finance is not, of course, the only policy area where social and economic problems have outgrown the limits of state authority. Global warming, forestry management, enforcing competition over monopolies, property rights and the political rights of dissidents are some
sound, had been thoroughly reviewed and enabled a reconstruction of what the borrowing rate should have been, based on the default-insurance figures, which showed that the LIBOR was lower for Citigroup by 0.87%, 0.7% for WestLB, 0.57% for HBOS and 0.42% for UBS between late January and 16 April, the date of the first report of doubts. Early warnings When the regulators finally released the results of their investigations, it became clear that early warnings from a variety of sources had been overlooked. Evidence given at the trial of Tom Hayes (a trader standing