European Integration , 38(7): 791–806.
Hamilton, D., 2014. ‘The Transatlantic Pivot’, in Roy, S., Cooper, D. and Murphy, B. M. (eds), TransatlanticRelations and Modern Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Examination (New York: Routledge), p. 81f.
Ikenberry, J. and Inoguchi, T. (eds), 2013. Reinventing the Alliance: US – Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).
Midford, P., 2010. ‘Historical Memory versus Democratic Reassurance: The Security Relationship between Japan
administration under President Trump that caused the tensions in transatlanticrelations, the UK's decision to leave the EU that reduced its role as a transmission belt of EU states’ interests, and an increase in competition within the international system, a reduction in the strength and coherence of the transatlantic coalition in the Security Council lowered the political cost of opposing the US's proposals for Russia and China.
Sponsorship of draft resolutions on
: TransatlanticRelations and Global Governance. London : Springer , pp. 1–18 .
Pinheiro , L.
Gaio , G.
( 2014 ). “ Cooperation for development, Brazilian regional leadership and global protagonism ”, Brazilian Political Science Review
8 ( 2 ), 8–30 . Epub September.
. Their entry was – as often is the case – more
based on their readiness to supply rather than meet Afghanistan’s
needs ( Peters et al ., 2018 ). When the
United States increased deployment around 2006, moreover, the EU faced a
dilemma: not sending any forces (and damaging transatlanticrelations)
or launching a civilian EU mission ( Peters et
al ., 2018 ).
Christopher called “the problem from hell.” 50
Transatlanticrelations over Bosnia policy were also troubled by the fact that the United States saw and understood the conflict largely as one involving an aggressor—the Bosnian Serbs, supported by Serbia—against the much weaker Bosnian Muslims. The Europeans, for the most part, believed the conflict should be seen as a civil war in which all parties were to blame. These two different interpretations of the conflict produced divergent policy preferences. The approach to the conflict favored by many members of the US Congress
the face of congressional skepticism. The United States and France continued through much of the alliance’s first 70 years to pursue different visions for the future of transatlanticrelations, but into the second decade of the twenty-first century new leaders in Washington (President Barack Obama) and Paris (Presidents Nicolas Sarkozy and then François Hollande) narrowed the gap between American and French attitudes. In Europe, France still worries about Germany, but now it is a reunited Germany’s “soft” power and its pacifistic tendencies that trouble Paris the
ongoing eurozone crisis, the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, the migration crisis as well as the uncertain development of European integration and transatlanticrelations after ‘Brexit’ and the Trump presidency have pushed ‘German foreign policy into an international leadership role’, although Germany had not ‘actively sought such a role’. 97 Germany did not seek ‘greater responsibility in Europe after reunification’; rather, it emerged as a central player ‘by remaining stable as the world around it changed’. 98 However, the growing international demands on German
critical mechanism for the advancement of other aspects of the EU–Latin American relations agenda, and a cornerstone defining the evolution of transatlanticrelations.
Context of negotiations: geo-economic balancing
President Obama's administration (2008–16) pursued an intense trade agreement policy, with a particular focus on setting the rules of trade through ambitious mega-regional agreement negotiations: the TPP with eleven other states in the Americas, Asia and Australasia, and the TTIP with the European Union. Billed as game
1990), pp. 47–67; and Gary Goertz, Contexts of International Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 75–81.
Eurasian security governance
22 See Jervis, ‘Theories of War’; and John Duffield, ‘TransatlanticRelations after the
Cold War: Theory, Evidence, and the Future’, International Studies Perspectives,
2:1 (2001), pp. 93–115.
23 Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 30:2
(1978), pp. 167–214.
24 Cited in Duncan Snidal, ‘Relative Gains and the Pattern of