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-funded broadcasting, in the 1920s until the defeat of McCarthy in 1954. Yet modern demagogy became less noticeable for the following forty years. Certainly, prominent demagogues arose within orthodox political institutions, most notably the campaigns by Alabama Governor George Wallace in the 1960s, but the dialectic with the culture industry was not as critical. Such figures did not rely on commodified demagogic speech. What had changed? In the wake of the Coughlin period, moves were made in the USA to restrict the opportunities for broadcast demagogic speech
might understand (Claussen, 2008 : 161). The one option that might be possible would be to go into some form of internal exile, in an attempt to cut oneself off from the doleful pressures of existing society, and doing the minimum one could to contribute to the reproduction of those circumstances. Adorno's scepticism with regard to the progressive possibilities in late capitalist society attracted the criticism both of more conventional Marxists, and of his late 1960s students (Finlayson, 2015 ). Elsewhere, Adorno is slightly more optimistic
politics. 23 Carl Boggs, the political scientist who is credited with coining the term, traces the phenomenon to early anarchist and syndicalist reactions to early industrialisation, through the Paris Commune of 1871, and on into the council movements and soviets of revolutionary movements across Europe. 24 The worker control and participatory democracy movements of the 1960s provide further examples, as do the more recent practices of the democratic movements, including but not only Occupy, that emerged in the wake of the 2008–9 global financial crisis. 25 In all of
. Such sensibilities extended from the diverse politics of counter-colonialism and decolonization that began in the 1940s through to the events of the 1960s entailing critiques of imperialism and racism – embodied, for example, in the dramatic moment of 1968 – and the continuation of these struggles into the 1970s across different parts of the world. Together, postcolonial and subaltern studies were
the US and mainstream Western Liberal feminism, the idea of the intersection of different oppressions … is rarely applied when it comes to Romani women in Serbia’, far less to Romani lesbians, the position from/about which she was writing (Kurtić 2013 : 6). Bojan Bilić and Sanja Kajinić, editing a volume on LGBT activist politics in Croatia and Serbia, grounded intersectionality in 1960s–80s African-American (and Chicana) traditions of feminist theory and activism, encouraging activists in the Yugoslav region to recognise their own structural positions through
whole country's difficult economic conditions at war's end, their acuteness in Split (a large port and naval base which had been on the front line) and the sense of lost future (often alleviated by heavy drug use) many young people felt in Split (Lalić 2003 ). 10 In Serbia, meanwhile, mid-1990s ‘turbo folk’ also updated 1960s–80s practices of incorporating fashionable or newly possible sounds, instruments, rhythms and styles into Yugoslav ‘newly-composed folk music’ (see Rasmussen 2002 ) by adapting arrangements, style and
In Chapter 4 we saw how the Gramscian tradition developed its interpretations of populism from its analyses of fascism. While Gramsci himself came close to such an understanding in his conception of the national-popular, it was the sociological variant of ‘structuralist Gramscianism’, developed from the late 1960s by Poulantzas, that established the theoretical terrain for Laclau's first innovations in theorizing populism. However, whereas Gramsci and Poulantzas recognized the risks of quasi-demagogic leadership, most obviously so for
. 15 Who in addition to the first debate of the 1920s and 1930s, and the second debate of the 1950s, include the inter-paradigm (realists versus liberals versus Marxists) of the 1960s. 16 Jack Levy ( 1988 : 662) famously wrote that the ‘absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything to an empirical law in international relations
its value monism. A guide to political practices In the essay on utopianism that she wrote in the mid-1980s, Shklar makes clear how much her theorising has changed since the 1950s and 1960s. She is now calling for a normative, even prescriptive, approach to political thought, although one that is opposed to transformative, prophetic utopianism. She says that there has been ‘a revival of normative thought’ in the era after ‘the decline of the great ideologies of the nineteenth century’ (Shklar 1998 [nd1], p. 188). Of great
likely consequences of distinct variants of populism is surely not outdated. In fact, the spectre of ‘democratic’ populism looks more menacing in the second decade of the twenty-first century than it did in the years immediately following the widespread collapse of parliamentary government in the interwar period of the twentieth century. Important questions are thereby raised about long- term causes, effects, symptoms, and discernible patterns involved in crises of democratic statehood.6 The supposedly peaceful 1950s and 1960s are closer, in strict chronological