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Previously, it was demonstrated that norms up until Tampere had evolved in two dimensions. Firstly, on the axis of whether the EU should be legislating at all in the AFSJ, where the normative debate had been structured between those wishing to preserve national sovereignty and those wishing to pool sovereignty at the EU level. Secondly, on the axis of what the aims and the purpose of such legislation would
the threat posed by ‘terrorism’ to the problems associated with ‘globalisation’ and to an ‘open’ society. In the pre-September 11 period, the construction of the ‘migrant’ other as a potential threat to European society was a central theme of the EU’s internal security policy. The Tampere Milestones, released in November 1999, set out a series of policy priorities that would be central to the completion of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). Drawing upon and reaffirming the identity of the EU, the document stated that 116 The European Union
for the AFSJ, who claimed that ‘one cannot divide, by region or country, the security of such a Union’. 27 Yet, how else can you explain the implicit process of ‘burden shifting’ rather than burden sharing that has taken place over illegal immigration and asylum? On several occasions, as with the Chinese winkle pickers in June 2000, states have effectively ‘dumped’ asylum seekers across
absorbed into the consolidated union structure under the guise of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ). The formulation of EU counter-terrorism policy has historically occurred across all areas of internal and external security policy. Although external security concerns have featured strongly in the formulation of EU counter-terrorism policy, in terms of the ‘fight against terrorism’, the EU has framed its counter-terrorism effort as predominantly an ‘internal security’ concern best dealt with through criminal and judicial measures. The Introduction 13
the EU’s wider output in counter terrorism and police co-operation. In Chapter 2, when considering general aspects of JHA co-operation, as part of the analysis of efforts to establish the AFSJ, it was noted that, rather than demonstrate solidarity, member states tended to view such problems through the prism of their own national security concerns – ‘members see the problems of their own province writ large … clearly they tend not to see other problems at all’.7 Complementing this analysis, the focus here will be more specifically placed on the key issue of counter
with future members such as Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, as well as Norway, Iceland and the US. The following year, a brief reference is made to ‘the information flow from member states and also for the first time from non-EU states improved’83 (emphasis added). Additionally, Europol developed an even greater focus on the likely consequences of enlargement on the development of the AFSJ, with specific projects launched on Eastern European Organised Crime detailing its likely impact on crime levels. In the 2003 report, Europol noted ‘an overall increase in
EAW – and outside, as in the chap5.indd 113 26/05/2010 09:26:45 114 The European Union, counter terrorism and police co-operation case of the Council of Europe’s European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. In 1999, at the Tampere European Council, calls were made to put legislative flesh on the agreed principle of mutual recognition – claimed to be the cornerstone of any genuine AFSJ – by agreeing that ‘the formal extradition procedure should be abolished among the Member States in respect of persons who are fleeing from justice … and extradition