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-intro/talk-radio/ . 59 Hendershot, What's Fair on the Air?: Cold War Right-Wing Broadcasting and the Public Interest ; Jones, ‘Demagogic Populism and US Culture Industries: A Long Tradition’. 60 All the primary information in this paragraph is drawn from: Hendershot, What's Fair on the Air?: Cold War Right-Wing Broadcasting and the Public Interest . However, I have placed it in the interpretative
logic of the processes structuring the unfolding of FD in the period from the Industrial Revolution until 1945, or from 1945 to the end of the Cold War in 1989. There is certainly no single categorisation capable of accurately capturing the predominant logic defining the period from 1989 until today: neoliberalism, globalisation, bio-political governance, modernisation, transnational constitutionalism, and the like only describe part of the story. Moreover, in the absence of an overarching legal- political form to unify state and civil society, the applicability of
conceptualize and experience objects. As a result, a key distinction is drawn between today’s avowedly post-critical, non-humanist ontologists on one side, and the critical proto-humanism that motivates the early Frankfurt School on the other. Chapter 4 explores the affective politics of hope. I begin by surveying the ways in which historical events and their narrativization –both on the right and on the left –have (re)produced certain ideological positions and affective dispositions. The post-Cold War triumphalism of many on the right, accompanied by claims of the ‘end
, see Thomas D. Zweifel, International Organizations and Democracy: Accountability, Politics, and Power (London: Lynne Rienner, 2006) and Grimm, Die Zukunft der Verfassung II, pp. 330– 42. For a brilliant discussion of the contradictory imperatives facing states since the end of the Cold War, see Udo Di Fabio, Der Verfassungsstaat in der Weltgesellschaft (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), pp. 50– 6 and pp. 129– 30, and Helmut Willke, Ironie des Staates: Grundlinien einer Staatstheorie polyzentrischer Gesellschaft (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992), chapter 4. Willke
–6, but the real political battle over the format of European cooperation only emerged with the outbreak of the cold war.’ 5 Building a union of European peoples based on community institutions with autonomous decision-making powers was not the only solution to Europe’s problems after the Second World War. Both the traditional approach of dismembering Germany and a confederal model, which sought to weave Germany into the fabric of international society through intergovernmental institutions like the interwar League of Nations, had greater historical precedence and
postwar era sought to uncover the complicity of their parents and grandparents in the sufferings and atrocities of totalitarianism. The growing interest in collective remembrance that accompanied the fall of the dictatorships in Spain, Portugal, and Greece in the 1970s and 1980s was given further impetus by the events of 1989 and ‘the resurfacing of suppressed national concerns among subjugated European peoples on both sides of the Iron Curtain,’ which allowed issues of collective memory that had been repressed by the bipolar narrative of the Cold War to re-emerge. 3
from the career of each man. Mitchell’s travel in Europe in the early 1960s contributed to creating a Cold War warrior with outspoken, anti-communist liberal political views. For example, when he was in office he was happy to be identified as ‘one of the sensible ones’ by Margaret Thatcher when he was invited to Britain on an official visit. He reminds his readers regularly that he rubs shoulders
imperatives which inculcate widespread psycho-pathologies, such as alienation or clinical anxiety (as discussed by Erich Fromm, see Chapter 6 ), Have self-perpetuating negative dynamics, such as being involved in a cold-war nuclear arms race (see Chapter 6 ), Have socialisation structures which encourage subjects to spend
2012 , p. 260); or indeed it is a Cold War ‘anti-utopianism’ arising from her opposition to ‘ideological extremism’ (Thaler 2017 , p. 6). It is an example of ‘negative morality’, in that it does ‘not add up to a moral system or decision procedure’, and instead tells us merely ‘what to think about’ rather than ‘what to think’ (Misra 2016 , p. 86), and, in this light, it inspires Williams's ‘realist’ political theory (Sagar 2016 , p. 381). Although not a perfect consensus, there does seem to be broad agreement that her scepticism stands opposed
( New York : Cornell University Press , 2001 ); S. N. Kalyvas , The Logic of Violence in Civil War ( New York : Cambridge University Press , 2006 ), 401 –411 ; J. J. Mearsheimer , ‘ Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War ,’ International Security , 15 : 1 ( 1990 ), 5 –56 . 51 A. J. Zurcher , The Struggle to Unite Europe, 1940–1958: An Historical Account of the Development of the Contemporary European Movement from its Origin in the Pan-European Union to the Drafting of the Treaties for Euratom and the European Common Market