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eloquent commentary on this issue, see Ashley Lavelle, The Death of Social Democracy: Political Consequences in the 21st Century (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), Part I, chapters 2–4; and Colin Crouch, The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), chapters 3 and 5. 21 For a very incisive analysis of this tendency within recent social and political thought, see Michael Thompson, The Domestication of Critical Theory (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), especially chapters 1 and 5. 22 Karl Marx, ‘Theses on Feuerbach’, in R. Tucker (ed.), The
, Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1998) 529, esp. at pp. 616–619. 62 C. Tomuschat, “Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will,” 241, Recueil des Cours (1993) 195, p. 211. 63 J. Waldron, “The Rule of International Law,” 30, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy (2006) 15, p. 17. 64 A. Peters, “Global Constitutionalism,” in M. Gibbons (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Political Thought (Wiley, 2015), 1484, pp. 1485–1486. 65 J. Waldron, “Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of Law?” 22 (2), European
, especially France. 16 However, in the interwar years Adenauer’s commitment to economic cooperation with the west and to the reconciliation of France and Germany seem to have been mainly rhetorical. Despite the fact that the basic themes of Adenauer’s political thought began to emerge in the interwar period, he was not yet prepared to act upon his ideas in the aftermath of the Great War. While Monnet, Schuman, and Adenauer had begun to think of alternatives, they all accepted the return to traditional politics and diplomacy after the failure of the ‘utopian moment
. 79–110 . 10 This pervasive, “meta-geographical” projection appears elaborated in several ways, from the evidently aggressive to the seemingly benign, embedded of course in “modernization” theory, yet also long lodged within the interstices of Western social and political thought. The way all this
desire is backward looking and punishing.6 A similar criticism of this leftist tendency, albeit with different political and philosophical motivations, can also be found in the later work of the pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty. In his survey of leftist thought in twentieth- century America, Rorty rehearses a familiar complaint about the supposedly damaging influence of ‘postmodern’ theorists (and their legions of interpreters) over the terrain of social and political thought and practice. For Rorty, the dominance of ‘High Theory’ has sapped all belief in the
supposed argument and philosophy, can never be part of a wise magistrate. (Hume 1985: 512) As would be expected, historians of the ideas have rightly seen traces of this dichotomy throughout the history of Western political thought. Plato, Augustin, Descartes, Hobbes, di Campanella, Voltaire, Marx and Comte were – in various degrees – ‘constructivists’, whereas Aristotle, Cicero, Locke, Burke and Hume could be categorised in the opposite camp. Rousseau has hitherto been unequivocally placed among the former. Hayek, to mention but one writer, thus sees a chain of ‘design
order to clarify which principles and modes of reasoning are valid and which are not. Such thinking reflectively and deliberatively generates both norms that regulate collectively, and reasons that frame action for individuals and groups in day-to-day life. Both guide policies and structure the field of the normative according to standards of correctness that are democratically mandated. Scanlon is a social contract theorist, a tradition of political thought that in the twentieth century reformulated the social contract tradition of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant
Political Thought (Ashgate: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). Paul Mason discusses the Gramscian dimension of the June 2017 parliamentary elections in Paul Mason, ‘Corbyn’s victory was not supposed to happen: but to disrupt logic is the first step in defeating Britain’s ruling elite’, Guardian (13 June 2017), G2, pp. 10–11. 2 This theme is examined in detail in Darrow Schecter, Beyond Hegemony: Towards a New Philosophy of Political Legitimacy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005). 3 These links are analysed and subjected to a thorough critique by Christoph Menke
social and political thought, as when he writes: ‘Without psychology, in which the objective constraints are continually internalized anew, it would be impossible to understand how people passively accept a state of unchanging destructive irrationality.’96 (Such an understanding of how internalization of capital’s ‘destructive irrationality’ persists is of significant import for any critique of ideology.) However, in the very same paragraph, Adorno goes on to note that such psychological motivations cannot be strictly read as causes. Rather, such psychological effects