Search results
witnessed the crisis of democracy and the failure, by and large, of the Dada and surrealist movements to achieve their most important political objectives. The risk of repeating those failures was clear to Guy Debord and the Situationist International, as Debord himself realised well before Situationism actually unravelled at the end of the 1960s. See Guy Debord, ‘Report on the Construction of Situations and on the International Situationist Tendency’s Conditions of Organisation and Action’, in Ken Knabb (ed.), Situationist International Anthology (Berkeley: Bureau of
deepening of the European project into new areas of political life. However, due to the rise of leaders like Charles de Gaulle, who denied that the European rupture of 1945 necessitated new thinking, integration stagnated in the 1960s and 1970s. This period of Eurosclerosis was highlighted by the attempt to change the European Communities into a ‘Europe of the nation-states.’ This return to more traditional modes of politics was followed by what I call the ‘second phase of integration’ (1985–2003), which was driven by a new constellation of leaders that mirrored Monnet
Europe. The result was the foundation of the European Communities in the 1950s. In this early period, the European movement received vocal philosophical support from individuals like Max Horkheimer in Germany and Jean-Paul Sartre in France. Both of these philosophers and public intellectuals believed that the European experience of wartime resistance should play a role in the revival of democratic values on the continent. 20 By the late 1960s this temporal grouping was replaced by the Flakhelfer-Generation (‘anti-aircraft helper generation’), which draws its name
difference. In this context, the selfsacrificial aspect of agapic love that Valerie Saiving so clearly identified in gendered terms in the 1960s has been thoroughly disclosed by later feminist thinkers to have been little more than an instrument of oppression for women. It is women who have historically been the ‘special’ subjects of the demand for self-sacrifice. It is women whose relations to love and the beloved have been idealised in the absence of a self to do the loving. And the theological justification for this demand can still be traced, in part, to the misogynist
labour. Studies of other destinations also show how South Slav migrants, stratified by both ethnicity and class, have been accommodated within and altered those countries' formations of race. They did so as refugees in Nordic countries negotiating boundaries of whiteness, autochthony and immigration status (Cederberg 2005 ; Grünenberg 2005 ; Huttunen 2009 ; Valenta and Strabac 2011 ); as guest-workers in 1960s–70s West Germany, socio-economically similar to Turks and Kurds but racialised by white Germans somewhat differently (Molnar 2014 ); 16
New Left in the late 1960s, it had grown into a respected ‘Western Marxist’ framework that complemented the rise of the Eurocommunist ‘democratic road’ to socialism in the political sphere, chiefly in Italy and France. 3 This was remarkable because, unlike most other prominent figures usually categorized as ‘Western Marxist’, Gramsci remained a key organizational, and later inspirational but imprisoned, figure in a Leninist communist party during his lifetime. In many ways he was constituted as the Frankfurt School
‘totalizing theory of the culture industry and the post-liberal society of total marketization’. Offe so finds almost inexplicable the evidence from the 1950s and 1960s of Adorno's positive views of aspects of the USA. The possibility that perhaps this is because his view of the culture industry and ‘post-liberal society’ in the 1940s was not ‘totalizing’ but dialectical, does not arise. Instead, Offe charges, ‘Adorno the dialectician here forgoes the intellectual effort that might have clarified why both these positions are valid’. 83
snobbery towards the culturally well-off. And so on. There is something in this view. In Bourdieu’s work, taste is shown to be, in any case, basically a weapon of class differentiation. In liking golf, red wine, sports cars or orienteering we are not just signalling something about our own lifestyle preferences but rejecting others – we are distinguishing ourselves, engaging in strategies of distinction. Distinction itself is based on a massive empirical survey on taste in everyday life and culture conducted in the late 1960s. Bourdieu would have disliked the
system having its own political logic was that it was resistant to the intrusion of ideas or policies from the unit level. In other words, there were no reasons not to pursue a liberal agenda in international relations, providing it did not clash with the exigencies of the structures of the international system. Michael Williams ( 2011 ) pursues a similar line of argument when he assesses Waltz's work in relation to discussions regarding the links between democracy and foreign policy. During the 1950s and 1960s, Williams argues, there was a marked
includes the future in terms of the present as the locus of responsibility and as the basis for judgement. Obligations and duties do not issue from a specific goal, as yet unrealized in the future; neither do they sacrifice the present for a future ideal society or state of affairs. Foucault’s ethic based on life continuance is, in this sense, non-utopian, non-messianic, and non-teleological. One interesting question, given that Foucault is critical of Marxism, is how and why interviewers and many in the reading audience over the 1960s and 1970s thought that he was in