commitment that is affective in character and generated by a great deal more of our personality than calculation or moral reasoning. It is all of one that tends to be loyal.
(Shklar 1993a , p. 184)
Loyalty is a powerful motivation in politics. Indeed, our loyalties sustain us in our everyday obligations, but they do so only up to a point:
Unreflective citizenship is often habitual and not really an expression of
assumption that nation-states are the most fundamental and important political actors in international politics, the development of the ‘Euro-polity’ has significant implications for existing theories of the state, sovereignty, social welfare, democracy, and citizenship, all of which are plagued by an inherent ‘methodological nationalism.’ Building on collective memories of a nightmarish past to create a better future, the EU has served as ‘the theoretical proving-ground of contemporary liberalism.’ 2
Despite its many achievements – a list that includes the fact that
On mediated unity and overarching legal-political form
and the movement of refugees across the world. That means breaking with
the conservatism inherent in plan-versus-market and nationalisation-versus-
privatisation approaches to the economy. But it also means re-examining, in
more general terms, the premises that continue to inform prevailing notions
of democratic statehood and citizenship, starting with the central theme of
The term mediated unity expresses the idea that, if there was no way
to bridge the political distance between citizens and the state through intermediary instances of public and
concepts, such as governmentality, resistance, parrhēsia, critique , and the like. It will also permit an understanding of the care of the self as constituting the educative precondition for maturity and politically effective citizenship, as Foucault did intend. A meta-ethic of life continuance will thus provide a framework to normatively regulate the arts and techniques of self-formation that Foucault charts in his genealogies of Greek and Roman antiquity in the sense that it will specify worthwhile and culturally valid techniques of self-formation as against
of justice … [that] make it compatible with a more just social democratic model of society.’ 33 In addition to its anti-trust cases against Google, another example of this is the development and passage into law of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which seeks to give individuals control over the use of their private online data. Because it applies to any enterprise that deals with subjects located within the EU regardless of citizenship, it has had a profound effect on global data-sharing practices.
Despite its successes, the basic problem is that
power predates our modernity. It is, genealogically speaking, a Christian phenomenon. In a well-known pair of lectures, Foucault sketched the ways in which Christianity modified the Hebraic notion of the pastorate and then welded this conception on to the Greek notion of citizenship. 44 The Christian pastorate was a form of knowledge and conduct that mutated into a form of power – our modern ‘political rationality’ of the State – that is both individualising and in a sense totalitarian, a government of all and of each. Its object is at once the life of the
of property is the most sacred of all rights of citizenship, and even more
important in some respects than liberty itself because it affects the
preservation of life’ [‘le droit de propriété est le plus sacré de tous les droits
des citoyens’] (III: 263). Indeed, in Emile he even adopts the same
justification of property rights as Locke had developed in his Second Treatise
(Locke 1988: 99). Locke had argued that ‘though the earth and all inferior
creatures are common to all men, yet he has property in his own person
… the labour of his body and the work of his
among friends. She is consistent in her mature work in claiming that political freedom is not possible under tyranny. To be faced with such a division is to lose a great deal. To renounce citizenship is to give up ‘half of a full life’ (Shklar 1998 [1987c] , pp. 16–17). But the argument of her mature work is that tyranny forces us to renounce citizenship, and to fall back on a restricted sphere of freedom.
To understand this line of argument we need to focus more closely on what Shklar says about freedom. Her mature (monist) argument is that
Jurisdictions ( Cambridge : Cambridge University Press , 2001 ).
20 See W. Kymlicka , Multicultural Citizenship ( Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1995 ).
21 Philip Pettit has made this point in a number of writings, including ‘ The Consequentialist Perspective ’, in M. Baron, P. Pettit and M. Slote, Three Methods on Ethics ( London : Routledge , 1997 ).
22 Susan Okin ’s book Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? ( Princeton : Princeton University Press , 1999 ) has been an important font for this kind of thinking.
23 On this issue see J
1991: 5). He sang the praises of the rural life, but did not settle in Geneva.
The city of Geneva reinstated his citizenship in 1755 – after the publication of his Discourse on Inequality (which contained a preface which
praised the city). Rousseau, however, did not seem anxious to practice
what he what he had preached in his Discourse. Further, he later noted
that he was upset that the city of his birth had admitted Voltaire to live in
Geneva. ‘I knew’, wrote Rousseau, ‘that this man would cause a revolution
that I should find again in my own country