recalling elected individuals (Chapter 4). Later in the book we
look at the more practical side of direct democracy, like the courts and
direct democracy (Chapter 8), as well as looking at the practical rules
governing the process in Chapter 9.
In between these chapters we consider case studies of citizen politics, ranging from the British AV Referendum (Chapter 7) to the Irish
Referendum on the LisbonTreaty (Chapter 6) and consider if citizens
are likely to understand the issues put before them (Chapter 5). So, all
in all, a pretty full menu!
The political consumer and
member states regarded as pro-Atlanticist or neutral, and thus the
number of EU crisis management operations skyrocketed between 2003 and
2010. The (self-)declared success of the crisis management operations
deployed by the EU and the ratification of the LisbonTreaty, which
promised to increase the effectiveness of the CSDP, served to raise
expectations again (Menon, 2011b ). However, the
impact of the
Does European integration contribute to, or even accelerate, the erosion of intra-party democracy? This book is about improving our understanding of political parties as democratic organisations in the context of multi-level governance. It analyses the impact of European Union (EU) membership on power dynamics, focusing on the British Labour Party, the French Socialist Party (PS), and the German Social Democratic Party (SPD). The purpose of this book is to investigate who within the three parties determines EU policies and selects EU specialists, such as the candidates for European parliamentary elections and EU spokespersons. The book utilises a principal-agent framework to investigate the delegation of power inside the three parties across multiple levels and faces. It draws on over 65 original interviews with EU experts from the three national parties and the Party of European Socialists (PES) and an e-mail questionnaire. This book reveals that European policy has largely remained in the hands of the party leadership. Its findings suggest that the party grassroots are interested in EU affairs, but that interest rarely translates into influence, as information asymmetry between the grassroots and the party leadership makes it very difficult for local activists to scrutinise elected politicians and to come up with their own policy proposals. As regards the selection of EU specialists, such as candidates for the European parliamentary elections, this book highlights that the parties’ processes are highly political, often informal, and in some cases, undemocratic.
, the Constitutional
Treaty and the LisbonTreaty. The emphasis will be on such developments
as the new state of affairs in the executive involving the introduction of the
ofﬁce of a long-term Union President and High Representative, the new role
for national parliaments as guardians of subsidiarity, new provisions for
openness in the Council, the issue of simpliﬁcation, and others.
The concluding chapter will summarise ﬁndings in Chapters 3, 4 and 5
and will attempt to provide answers to the following questions: to what
extent are accountability, identiﬁability and
capitalism, according to the
Financial Times (Murray Brown, 2009), into ‘Dire Land’ as tax revenue
from property transactions halved between 2006 and 2008 and the government began the introduction of the ‘most severe austerity programme’ since
the foundation of the state. Against this economic background, José Manuel
Barroso, the president of the European Commission who celebrated the EU
as a ‘non-imperial empire’, urged voters in the 2009 Irish referendum on
the LisbonTreaty to be pragmatic and vote yes, not least to boost investor
confidence. In a similar vein, the
people simply did not feel any effects of that recovery, and there are suggestions that it is simply repeating the policies that caused Ireland's problems in the first instance (Ó Riain, 2017 ).
The left and European integration
This section evaluates how the crisis affected the attitudes of the Irish left to integration, looking particularly at the 2009 LisbonTreaty referendum,
the 2012 referendum on the Fiscal Compact Treaty and the 2014 European Parliament elections
-NATO members). NATO formally endorsed European defense cooperation at its fiftieth anniversary summit (25 April 1999). In June 1999, at the Cologne summit, the EU heads of government announced their decision to absorb the WEU into a new ESDP, renamed by the LisbonTreaty the ‘Common Security and Defense Policy’. The former NATO general secretary, Javier Solana, was appointed Secretary General of the WEU and High Representative for the CFSP. At the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, it was then agreed that by 2003 the EU would be able to deploy up to 60,000 troops
By far the most eye-catching and savvy example of the party’s deployment of guerrilla media tactics was its appropriation of John Gilroy’s eradefining mid-twentieth-century Guinness advertising for use in the
campaign against the LisbonTreaty referendum in 2009, which coincided
with the 250th anniversary of the founding of the brewery. The birthday
had spawned a year-long series of events to celebrate the beer which had
so long been a pervasive symbol of Ireland throughout the world. The
famous 1930s and 1940s posters of Toucans bearing the slogan
,000 applications were recorded. In 2015, Ireland received 3,276
applications for asylum, 0.2% of the EU total ( Eurostat 2015 ).
Europeanisation of migration and asylum policies
The LisbonTreaty of 2007 was
heralded as a game changer for EU migration and asylum law. Firstly, the
treaty was seen as the moment when EU migration and asylum law became a
policy field in its own right, freeing itself from being presented
need to contain the politicised Englishness that had been mobilised around the issue of EU membership and associated concerns about sovereignty and immigration. English discontent was contained at the very moment when it was used by Brexiteers to justify a major shift in British policy.
As Theresa May explained in an open letter to Donald Tusk when triggering Article 50 of the LisbonTreaty on 31 March 2017, ‘the referendum was a vote to restore, as we see it, our national self-determination’ (May, 2017 ). That restored self-determination was underwritten by