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discussed human rights: The rights of power can only be understood on the basis of respect for the objective and inviolable rights of man. The common good that authority in the State serves is brought to full realization only when all the citizens are sure of their rights. The lack of this leads to the dissolution of society, opposition by citizens to authority, or a situation of oppression, intimidation, violence, and terrorism, of which many examples have been provided by the totalitarianism of this century. Thus the principle of human rights is of profound
the one hand, by Afro-optimism and by a conviction that Britain, as a pivotal power, could make a difference in Africa. It was also, however, characterised by a desire to build the capacity of African states and institutions to help them (and, by extension, the UK) ward off the risks to international stability associated with issues such as ethnic and religious conflict, population and environmental pressures, competition for resources, terrorism and transnational crime (Dodd and Oakes, 1998 ). It thus ‘anticipated continuing and perhaps growing calls for
Soviet Union (Brown, 2004 ; 2007 ). This support was offered, alongside that of the US and other Western states, regardless of the democratic credentials of the regime in question and became a key element of regime maintenance strategies of leaders such as Hastings Kamuzu Banda of Malawi and Daniel arap Moi of Kenya. The post-9/11 Global War on Terror has led to similar dynamics, albeit with the threat of communism exchanged for that of Islamic terrorism (Abrahamsen, 2005 ). Counter-terrorism imperatives, it is argued, have dominated UK Africa policy under Blair
give rise to transnational refugee flows (Department for International Development, 2005a : 5, 10; 2015b ). Embedded within this discourse, then, is a strong assumption that through terrorism, international crime and refugee flows, insecurity and underdevelopment in the South have the potential to erode national security in the UK. The third belief is that development aid can be used to enhance national security (i.e. the securitisation of development aid) (Her Majesty’s Treasury and Department for International Development, 2015 : 3
/11. The dramatic focusing event of 9/11 drew immediate attention from all political actors and initiated the War on Terror, initially against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In line with PET, this represented a unique window of opportunity for these policy entrepreneurs to redefine the Iraq issue and impose their alternative policy image. Mazarr shows how the “terrorism frame” was used to qualify Iraq as a threat to US national security due to its possession of weapons of mass destruction and support of international terrorism. Decision-making quickly moved from the
its Department for International Development (DFID). The fight against Ebola in Sierra Leone was but one way of demonstrating this military might and developmental capacity. 2 The UK also has other tangible strategic and economic interests in Africa. The most obvious areas are immigration, crime and counter-terrorism – particularly in relation to those countries from which the UK already has large immigrant (and until recently emigrant) populations, such as in Nigeria, Somalia and Zimbabwe. These issues have been discussed elsewhere (see Vines, 2011 : 26); 3 by
terms of advancing UK national interests. ‘What happens in Somalia’, Cameron said, ‘if it’s a good outcome, it’s good for Britain, it means less terrorism, less migration, less piracy; ditto South Sudan’ (Mason, 2015 ). Moreover, Defence Secretary Michael Fallon, stated in 2016 that ‘it’s part of our effort to tackle the instability that leads to mass migration and terrorism. It will help keep Britain safe while improving lives abroad’ (Ministry of Defence, 2016b ). Terrorism also plays a significant role in the UK Government’s justification for the deployment of up
in the foreign policy domain the more intense the fear and the longer it persists in conditions of high issue salience, complexity, and preference inconsistency (Zahariadis 2015 ). The approach is deemed appropriate not only for a state’s foreign policy but also for the analysis of agenda-setting patterns and policy change in the formulation of EU counter-terrorism policy (Bossong 2013 ). Policy entrepreneurs come assertively into play to pave the way for foreign policy change (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2012 ). This lack of extensive
concern in such examinations are issues of Middle East instability caused by a shifting balance of power. Such instability is viewed as a result of the US invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraq War and the Arab Spring, Iran's support for terrorism and the alteration of power dynamics in the international system that would occur if Iran achieved nuclear weapons status. The perception that states exist in an anarchical international system and are driven by self-interest and a desire for power above all else is limiting. Realist explanations fail to grasp
implementations of alternative policy options to sanctions and the breaking of diplomatic ties between the two states. On the Iranian side, these representations arguably contributed to mistrust of the US and the prolongation of the Hostage Crisis. Iranian representations of the US as a hypocritical bully construct its support of terrorism against the US as permissible. This in turn has resulted in Iran remaining on the ‘state sponsors of terror’ list and subject to increasingly harsh sanctions. Similarly, positive representations deployed by both sides have been implicated in