This chapter summarises the core observations of the book and their meaning in reference to the broader current theoretical debates on Europeanisation, Communitarisation, and the European integration processes. It compares the conclusions of the book to those of similar studies in other policy sectors and concludes that the EU became an active regulator in the cultural sector as it did across a broad range of policy areas. European institutions' ‘creeping competence’ extends to new policy areas through the application of economic principles to new issues where no Treaty competence otherwise exists.
Raj Chari, John Hogan, Gary Murphy, and Michele Crepaz
-wing governments may use the laws as a means to make their electoral base – which may have been demanding to see how corporate interests lobby ministries – happy. And both the left and right may seek transparency to help stop certain public bodies from being captured by private interests if this has historically been the case, as seen when some countries’ financial regulators were captured by banking interests and helped trigger the recent financial and economic crisis. A case in point in this regard is Ireland, whose financial services regulator was captured by major banks
, but it is still only
governed by a contract with Facebook, which Facebook can change
Politicians and telecoms executives who now claim to be in
favour of net neutrality are in fact conceding that blocking and
throttling users is no longer acceptable to politicians and therefore
regulators. They largely only concede ‘negative’ net
neutrality. ‘Positive’ net
This book explains the direct link between the structure of the corporation and its limitless capacity for ecological destruction. It argues that we need to find the most effective means of ending the corporation’s death grip over us. The corporation is a problem, not merely because it devours natural resources, pollutes and accelerates the carbon economy. As this book argues, the constitutional structure of the corporation eradicates the possibility that we can put the protection of the planet before profit. A fight to get rid of the corporations that have brought us to this point may seem an impossible task at the moment, but it is necessary for our survival. It is hardly radical to suggest that if something is killing us, we should over-power it and make it stop. We need to kill the corporation before it kills us.
decision-making processes, greater public availability
of information, more open conflict and complex manoeuvres involving
The change of governance and regulation 27
ministers, the DGs, former monopolists, new entrants, consumer bodies
and the MMC (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, UK). (1997: 139 in
Moran 2003: 109)
The impact of emerging regulators has been significant. With a
wide range of regulatory institutions emerging from privatisation, this
growth created a new community of regulators (who tended to share
bureaucratic concerns), and the development of
IAPs (and much less often generic ISPs),
though when I quote regulators such as CRTC (Canadian Radio-television
and Telecommunications Commission), BEREC (Body of European Regulators
of Electronic Communications) and Ofcom (Office of Communications
Regulation), I will not correct their use of the more generic term
‘ISP’ even though they are specifically referring to IAPs.
So why do they use this term
Over more than thirty years of reform and opening, the Chinese Communist Party has pursued the gradual marketization of China’s economy alongside the preservation of a resiliently authoritarian political system, defying long-standing predictions that ‘transition’ to a market economy would catalyse deeper political transformation. In an era of deepening synergy between authoritarian politics and finance capitalism, Communists constructing capitalism offers a novel and important perspective on this central dilemma of contemporary Chinese development. This book challenges existing state–market paradigms of political economy and reveals the Eurocentric assumptions of liberal scepticism towards Chinese authoritarian resilience. It works with an alternative conceptual vocabulary for analysing the political economy of financial development as both the management and exploitation of socio-economic uncertainty. Drawing upon extensive fieldwork and over sixty interviews with policymakers, bankers, and former party and state officials, the book delves into the role of China’s state-owned banking system since 1989. It shows how political control over capital has been central to China’s experience of capitalist development, enabling both rapid economic growth whilst preserving macroeconomic and political stability. Communists constructing capitalism will be of academic interest to scholars and graduate students in the fields of Chinese studies, social studies of finance, and international and comparative political economy. Beyond academia, it will be essential reading for anyone interested in the evolution of Chinese capitalism and its implications for an increasingly central issue in contemporary global politics: the financial foundations of illiberal capitalism.
principal–agent regulation and competition in markets as key tools. In
ICT regulation, the intensified use of principal–agent regulation has
emerged with the rise of the MPT/MIC as a key regulatory ministry. In
anti-monopoly regulation, it has come to light with the enhancement of
Elsewhere, the analysis of the case studies has revealed the core
executive’s path-dependent view of regulatory independence, in which a
significant reluctance to establish flexible independent regulators within
the traditional political tradition was evident in ICT
Raj Chari, John Hogan, Gary Murphy, and Michele Crepaz
At its heart lobbying regulation revolves around the idea that lobbyists must register with the state, usually through an independent regulator, before they can engage with elected representatives and high-level civil servants. The rationale behind this is to impose some degree of transparency as well as a certain level of ethical standards and behaviours with which lobbyists are expected to comply. Such regulation will define which lobbyists are regulated and which organisations may be exempt from having to register with the state. The amount of
The well-being of Europe’s citizens depends less on individual consumption and more on their social consumption of essential goods and services – from water and retail banking to schools and care homes – in what we call the foundational economy. Individual consumption depends on market income, while foundational consumption depends on social infrastructure and delivery systems of networks and branches, which are neither created nor renewed automatically, even as incomes increase. This historically created foundational economy has been wrecked in the last generation by privatisation, outsourcing, franchising and the widespread penetration of opportunistic and predatory business models. The distinctive, primary role of public policy should therefore be to secure the supply of basic services for all citizens (not a quantum of economic growth and jobs). Reconstructing the foundational has to start with a vision of citizenship that identifies foundational entitlements as the conditions for dignified human development, and likewise has to depend on treating the business enterprises central to the foundational economy as juridical persons with claims to entitlements but also with responsibilities and duties. If the aim is citizen well-being and flourishing for the many not the few, then European politics at regional, national and EU level needs to be refocused on foundational consumption and securing universal minimum access and quality. If/when government is unresponsive, the impetus for change has to come from engaging citizens locally and regionally in actions which break with the top down politics of ‘vote for us and we will do this for you’.