In 1858 the first Maori King was installed. Although Europeans commonly depicted the Kingitanga (the Maori King movement) as a challenge to British sovereignty over New Zealand, supporters saw nothing incompatible between allegiance to their own indigenous monarch and ongoing adherence to the person of Queen Victoria (colonial governments were another matter). For Maori the relationship was a deeply personal bond, cemented through the Treaty of Waitangi that had established Victoria as a great chief of New Zealand. Long after the British government had ceased to have any meaningful role in the governance of New Zealand, Kingitanga supporters continued to look to the monarch to honour the undertakings entered into on Queen Victoria’s behalf at Waitangi in 1840. This belief in a special relationship with the British royal family survived war and land confiscations in the 1860s and endures today, giving rise to Queen Elizabeth II’s unprecedented involvement in a 1995 apology to the Kingitanga for past Crown actions.
The British vote to leave the EU is frequently explained with reference to the effects of immigration, the rise of populism, the country’s imperial past, memories of the Second World War, its attachment to parliamentary democracy, and its special relationship with the United States. Relevant as all these issues are, to fully understand Brexit it is also necessary to pay attention to the strong cultural forces that have driven the vote to leave. To put it simply, many people in Britain are literally Eurosceptic in the sense that they do not feel European, but instead see Europe and ‘the Europeans’ as the Other. Chiefly drawing on literature, and connecting the discourse of traditional anti-Catholicism with contemporary anti-Europeanism, this chapter explores the origins, nature and consequences of British cultural exceptionalism.
Introduction Introduction T his book is a study of Britain’s diplomatic, military and security policy during the Korean War as seen from the perspective of the British Government. This subject has attracted a limited, albeit, significant interest, among historians in contrast to what may be regarded as the defining event of the 1950s UK–US ‘special relationship’: the Suez crisis of 1956. Essentially, at various times, critics have argued that, in Danchev’s description, the ‘special relationship is not what it was, nor what its fervent believers would like it to
in the Outer Banks directly echo the official diplomatic rhetoric that British and American leaders have consistently employed to describe the Anglo-American special relationship in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 3 The monuments and associated services in Ocracoke and Hatteras are not unique; rather they fit a much broader pattern of Anglo-American memorials and commemorations on both sides of the Atlantic. When analyzed cumulatively, this pattern reveals the existence of a distinct Anglo-American identity as well as a version of history that depicts
1 Introduction American leaders saw it [to be] in their self-interest to obtain British advice before taking major decisions. It was an extraordinary relationship because it rested on no legal claim; it was formalized by no document; it was carried forward by succeeding British governments as if no alternatives were conceivable. Britain’s influence was great precisely because it never insisted on it; the ‘special relationship’ demonstrated the value of intangibles. Henry Kissinger’s assessment of the US–UK ‘special relationship’1 Introduction The above quote
In 1969 Pakistan was experiencing two separate insurgencies: in East Pakistan a democratic uprising was in full swing; and in Baluchistan separatists were engaged in a violent war against the Pakistani army. The government regularly implemented media blackouts to keep the nation in the dark about the country’s troubles. That year, Pakistan’s popular ‘Lollywood’ film industry released Zarqa, a feature film about the Palestinian cause that tells the story of the violent and unjust Israeli occupation of Palestine and rise of the Palestinian liberation movement.
Zarqa became a mega-hit and became the first film in the country showing in cinemas for over one hundred weeks straight. Across the country, Pakistanis were singing the Urdu language revolutionary Palestinian anthems composed for the film. During this period the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) held a special relationship with Pakistan, the PLO’s leader Yasser Arafat visited often, and student solidarity groups were active on campuses. Throughout the 1970s, thousands of Pakistani civilians volunteered as fida’iyeen fighters with the PLO, ready to die for Palestine. This chapter uses original testimonies from former Pakistani fida’iyeen and those who knew them. Despite representing different ethnicities, geographies, education and social classes all expressed they were motivated by a popular ethical imperative. This chapter explores the narrative and political imaginary of the film in terms of how it created the context for widespread solidarity and Palestine as a popular movement in Pakistan, and strategically redirected the national gaze away from domestic politics and towards Palestine as the central moral conflict.
‘thought his friendship with Johnson was harmony itself’. 4 John Dickie maintains that ‘Even the most ardent Atlanticists were surprised at the sudden cooling of the Special Relationship so soon after the end of the Kennedy– Macmillan era’. In particular, Wilson’s prime ministership ‘set the scene for a decline which continued for fifteen years until Margaret Thatcher rekindled the special warmth of the partnership with Ronald
Introduction Janet Beer and Bridget Bennett The celebrated description of Britain and America as two nations divided by a common language suggests the limits, at both ends, of the relationship between the two countries. It is a relationship that has received a good deal of critical attention, yet the collaborations, collisions, friendships, mutual admiration or hostilities between individual British and American writers and their cultural preoccupations has not been an area of much study. The idea of a special relationship between the United States and Great
Always far more special in London than in Washington, the so-called Anglo-American (i.e. UK–US) special relationship has greatly influenced British foreign policy for at least seven decades, and it continues to influence it under the conditions of ‘Brexit’ and the radical presidency of US president Donald Trump. This is most clearly evident in Britain’s strategy and operations in security and military matters, including the British nuclear deterrent, intelligence, and counter-terrorism. How do we explain this phenomenon? In a recent study, I have argued that
World War, required. On Korea this was essential as, unlike other issues, here was a real war with the potential to evolve from a limited military engagement, in a far away place, to Armageddon for the compact British Isles. The intensity of the US–UK ‘special relationship’ ebbed and flowed but remained a constant because of the common interest of both Powers to resist the threat of Soviet expansionism. The key aim of British strategy towards to the United States was the desire to be ‘consulted’ on matters of major policy: this might take various forms but the