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UN, and prominent commercial and national leaders, to discuss and promote such norms (e.g. clarifying red-lines and rules to enable restraint and tacit bargaining in the digital domain) remains of critical importance. 52 Important questions need to be considered: if a machine (e.g. a drone swarm or automatic target recognition system) violates IHL and commits a war crime, for example, who will be held responsible? Is it the systems operator or designer, the civilian authority who gave the order, or the commander who
Israel’s violence as excessive, even to call it a ‘war crime’, but not to question the Israeli narrative that it is responding to Hamas rockets and acting in self-defence. It endorses the aggressor, which merely has to moderate its ‘response’. As Nimer Sultany argues, ‘International law does not prevent the powerful from crushing the weak, if it is done legally, that is’. 47
were introduced to collect the NLA’s armaments, and implementation of the deal was to be roughly synchronised with the arms-collection process, though in practice the constitutional amendments’ ratification was delayed for two months by hardline Macedonian leaders. In implementing the deal, the most controversial issue turned out to be a provision for an amnesty for NLA fighters who had not committed war crimes: Macedonian hardliners did not want to let these ‘terrorists’ off the hook. Neither Macedonia’s approach to war nor its subsequent move towards peaceful
end to the crisis early, and welcomed Kuwait's mediation efforts. In Yemen, Indonesia's neutral response was initially conditioned by the number of expatriates, mainly students, living there. Jakarta declined to participate in the war in Yemen, focusing its efforts on the repatriation of its nationals. It then modified its stance, from abstention to voting in October 2021 against a measure in the UN Human Rights Council to extend the independent war crimes investigation in Yemen. Riyadh is alleged to have warned Indonesia that if it did not do so, it would create
’ rather than ‘pre-emptive’ war. The distinction is crucial because pre-emptive strikes are legal under international law, whereas preventive attacks are a recognised war crime. In any case, the potential for the further destabilisation of the international system is obvious, especially given the large number of insurgencies and terrorist campaigns presently under way around the globe. For instance, it is
2016 very little is reported on any of the dyads. Son Sann was already dead, and Sihanouk died in 2012. Khieu Samphan was facing a war crimes tribunal and was sentenced in 2014. Ranariddh had been ousted from Funcinpec, and he made various attempts to work with other political parties before returning to Funcinpec in 2015. Ranariddh's political comeback is described in BBC reports as being due to his reconciliation with Hun Sen (BBC News 2018a ). During 2017, however, Ranariddh explicitly expresses a refusal to be dominated by Hun Sen. This was
. 217 Ibid., p. 179. 218 Kerr, The Military on Trial , pp. 24–25; BMInq, transcript, Mendonça, 12 February 2010, p. 5. 219 R. Kerr, A force for good? War, crime and legitimacy: The British Army in Iraq’, Defence and
thousands of emails from Palestinians and oppositional Israelis. On 6 January 2009 as Israel shells a UN-run school, killing 50 and injuring 55, and as horrific photographs rush in from all media, official Israel says the bombardment of civilians will continue because ‘Hamas chooses to use civilians as human shields’ (an argument refuted by the UN Goldstone inquiry, released in September 2009, which has found evidence that war crimes and possible crimes against humanity were committed by Israel and Hamas, McCarthy 2009).The state is supported by its leading intellectuals
against humanity of murder and of torture, war crimes and gross violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including unlawful killing, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, sexual violence, indiscriminate attacks, pillaging and destruction of property. (In Blake and Mahmud, 2013 : 247–8) At the time of
after Assad’s accession to the CWC. Assad’s actions have been labelled ‘industrial-scale killing’ and likened to the acts uncovered by war crimes prosecutors at the Nuremberg trials (in O’Toole, 2014 ). At one level this is an issue of targeting. There has been a significant expansion in regime troops’ targeting of civilian areas, including medical facilities, schools and school