Generational change and new justifications for Europe
The founders of the European Communities consistently credited their transnationally shared collective memory of the past for helping them to imagine, motivate, and justify the creation of Europe as a community-based project. For early postwar leaders such as Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, and KonradAdenauer, the European Communities were born out of the rupture of 1945 and the confrontation with totalitarianism in both its fascist and communist forms. Ever since the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, the narrative of
that went far beyond merely colonial policy (Egypt, after all, was not a colony in the first place). French anger at the botched expedition along the Nile led their Fourth Republic to abandon a policy of co-operating with Britain in diplomatic and extra-European matters, and teamed up instead with the West Germans in a goal of continental unification.
One underestimated factor here was the strong dislike of the then chancellor of the Bundesrepublik, KonradAdenauer, for the innate tendencies perceived in British policymaking; according to one British ‘insider’ of
European integration as a system of conflict resolution in the Franco-German relationship (1950–63)
institutionalised through the Versailles Treaty (Frevert 2005 ). One of the architects of post-Second World War
Franco-German peace, KonradAdenauer, had argued, in the wake of the
First World War, that the relationship between France and Germany was a
pillar to European unity. In a speech to the National Assembly on 1
February 1919 and later at the University of Cologne (12 June 1919),
Adenauer discussed the reconciliation issue as a
–3). Of course, all this has to be seen against the background of the German population’s experiences of the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich, the Second World War and the occupation regime instituted at the end of the war. Such passive attitudes suited Chancellor KonradAdenauer, who was able to govern in a patrician, even authoritarian, style without much criticism from the electorate, and without any great need to explain and defend his decisions in the mass media or in election campaigns.
The period of the ‘grand coalition’, with its student demonstrations, its
, KonradAdenauer. Importantly, this new united organisation involved both Catholics and Protestants who might have otherwise stayed apart in a similar way to the Dutch political system. This broad-based coalition is what has always characterised the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and the party has been highly successful in pursuing moderate centrist policies that at times defy too much ideological categorisation. Admittedly, back in the early days of the CDU in the late 1940s and 1950s, it had been primarily conservative organisations on the whole such as the German
. Steinberg, ‘Right-wing historian Ernst Nolte receives the KonradAdenauer Prize for Science’, 17 August 2000, www.wsws.org/articles/2000/aug2000/nolt-a17.shtml .
64 Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust , p. 213.
65 Ibid., p. 210.
66 R. Braun, ‘The Holocaust and problems of representation’, in Keith Jenkins (ed.), The Postmodern History Reader (Routledge, 1997), p. 421.
67 M. Kustow, interview with Richard J. Evans, Red Pepper , 72, June 2000. Quoted in T. Helms, ‘Holocaust Day must be scrapped says Muslim leaders’, Daily Telegraph , 12 September 2005.
., Report, Holmes to Cremin, The Border in Germany, 12 October 1959.
40 Political Correspondent, ‘Aiken to pay Official Visit to Bonn’, Irish Times, 13 August
1960, p. 1.
41 KonradAdenauer Stiftung, Sankt Augustin, Pressedokumentation,file: Staaten, Irland,
1951–83, Bulletin, Bulletin des Presse und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung,
No. 159, August 1960, pp. 1553–4.
42 ‘Aiken’s Visit to Germany ends’, Irish Times, 29 August 1960, p. 7.
43 ‘Aiken’s Visit: Bonn Promises to Support Industry’, Irish Times, 26 August 1960, p. 1.
44 Kennedy, “ ‘Persuade an
Pivot to Asia: Towards New Trilateral Partnerships. Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, pp. 109–24.
Yeo, Lay. (2010). “The EU as a Security Actor in Southeast Asia”, in Panorama:
Insights into Asian and Political Affairs. Singapore: Regional Programme Political Dialogue Asia, KonradAdenauer Stiftung.
Yeo, Lay. (2016). “EU Strategy towards Southeast Asia and ASEAN”, in Changing
Waters: Towards a New EU Asia Strategy. London: LSE Ideas, pp. 6–12.
Yeo, Lay Hwee. (2014). “The EU’s Role in Security and Regional Order in East
Asia”, in Peter Shearman (ed
Reconstruction and reconciliation; confrontation and oppression
Kjell M. Torbiörn
, lest it be able to carry out its ‘“Trojan Horse”
mission of transforming the Common Market into an “Atlantic Community”’
(Gladwyn, 1969, pp. 32 and 63).
15 German Chancellor KonradAdenauer was firmly Western-oriented, keen
on German membership of the Council of Europe, NATO, the European
Coal and Steel Community and the EEC. See e.g. Ash (1993, Ch. 1).
16 Even the name the ‘Federal Republic of Germany’ indicated this, just as the
name the ‘German Democratic Republic’ showed an admittance by that
country that it was only German, not Germany.
17 The High Authority, a
had existed since 1976: something that Tory activists could not stomach.
Third, many party members opposed the proposals because they would
break-up the Conservative Party and there was a general feeling that the
Bavarian wing had jumped the gun on party reform at the Scottish and UK
levels. The fact that the Bavarian wing sought financial support from the
KonradAdenauer foundation to institute a study of the CSU’s political and
organisational autonomy,13 with the intention of setting up a Scottish CSU
as a rival to the Conservatives only enflamed