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Hyangjin Lee

This chapter discusses the cultural identity of contemporary Koreans by analysing five films based on a popular traditional folk tale, Ch’unhyangj ŏ n. 2 Three of the five films were made in South Korea: Shin Sangok’s S ŏ ng Ch’unhyang (1961), Pak T’aew ŏ n’s The Tale of S ŏ ng Ch’unhyang (1976) and Han Sanghun’s S ŏ ng Ch’unhyang (1987). The other two films are from

in Contemporary Korean cinema
Abstract only
Amy Levine

Introduction Key fields, sites of historical importance, and praxes (hyeonjang) An activist who worked for a major civil movement organisation based in Seoul was bitingly critical of nearly every US policy in South Korea. Upon first learning that I am American, she remarked: ‘at least that means you’re practical (siryongjeok)’. She went on to say that unless Korean civil movement organisations got more practical and engaged in ‘the field, site of historical importance, and praxis (hyeonjang)’ then they would become obsolete. Meanwhile her boss similarly worried

in South Korean civil movement organisations
Abstract only
Thomas Hennessey

Introduction Introduction T his book is a study of Britain’s diplomatic, military and security policy during the Korean War as seen from the perspective of the British Government. This subject has attracted a limited, albeit, significant interest, among historians in contrast to what may be regarded as the defining event of the 1950s UK–US ‘special relationship’: the Suez crisis of 1956. Essentially, at various times, critics have argued that, in Danchev’s description, the ‘special relationship is not what it was, nor what its fervent believers would like it to

in Britain’s Korean War
Abstract only
Thomas Hennessey

Epilogue Bermuda Epilogue: Bermuda I n the wake of the Armistice attention turned to an anticipated political conference on the future of Korea. As the British POWs returned home an odd distraction from the norm occurred with the release of Lieutenant Colonel Carne: as far as the British authorities he was released to were concerned, at this stage, it was assumed that he had been: ‘subjected to treatment by the Communists including drugs, which made his brain as he put it, like a sponge capable of absorbing anything.’ After this process and after the Armistice

in Britain’s Korean War
Popular responses to the outbreak of war
Grace Huxford

30 v 1 v No woman wants any more war: Popular responses to the outbreak of war In July 1950, MO surveyors questioned people across London about the outbreak of the war in Korea. This questioning followed the decision that month to dispatch 27 Brigade, then based in Hong Kong, to support the UN Force. Amid concerns over the scale of British involvement, the prospect of nuclear warfare and general distrust of both the United States and Soviet Union, another concern emerged. One fifty-​year-​old woman in Victoria noted that: All the women round our way are

in The Korean War in Britain
Popular opposition to the Korean War
Grace Huxford

127 v 5 v How to bring the boys home: Popular opposition to the Korean War In June 1951 popular debate about the Korean War concentrated around one rather unlikely figure:  the chair of the Stevenage Development Corporation (SDC), Dr Monica Felton.1 In 1951 Felton was invited by the British Section of the Women’s International Democratic Foundation (WIDF) to undertake a ‘fact-​finding’ mission in North Korea. Felton later argued that she had accepted the invitation to find out more about Korea, both on her own account, but also for the Labour Movement and

in The Korean War in Britain
Abstract only
Thomas Hennessey

Conclusion Conclusion B ritain’s Korean War demonstrated both the limits and opportunities for influencing the United States’ policy during the early Cold War. The disagreements, during the conflict, between the United Kingdom and the United States, were merely one aspect of a series of difficulties between the two Powers: Persia, Germany, and Egypt remain the glaring examples. But disagreement did not equate with powerlessness to influence the Americans. And this – influence – was what the British, conscious of their real decline in power since the Second

in Britain’s Korean War
Amy Levine

-liberal governance in South Korea. This was particularly true during the Roh Moo Hyun administration, which remade relations between government and civil organisations. While some critiqued this pragmatic demand, others took it as an invitation to pragmatically change. Lawyer Park (Pak Byeonhosanim) is an exemplary figure of the latter. He necessitates a chapter rather than a short history because of the scaled up figure he cuts in Korean law and politics. Lawyer Park is a prominent ‘first generation’1 civil leader who elicited deep passions and large aspirations among the civil

in South Korean civil movement organisations
US nuclear weapons and alliances in Europe and Asia

From the start of the Cold War to the presidency of Donald Trump, nuclear weapons have been central to the internal dynamics of US alliances in Europe and Asia. But cooperation on policy, strategy, posture and deployment of US nuclear weapons has varied significantly between US alliances and over time. Partners in Deterrence goes beyond traditional accounts that focus on deterrence and reassurance in US nuclear policy, and instead places the objectives and influence of US allies at the centre of analysis. Through a series of case studies informed by a rigorous analytical framework, it reveals that US allies have wielded significant influence in shaping nuclear weapons cooperation with the US in ways that reflect their own, often idiosyncratic, objectives. Combining in-depth empirical analysis with an accessible theoretical lens, Partners in Deterrence provides important lessons for contemporary policy makers and makes an essential contribution to existing scholarship on alliances and nuclear weapons.

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China’s first intervention
Thomas Hennessey

3 Enter the dragon China’s first intervention Enter the dragon: China’s first intervention T he same day as the Franks-Rusk meeting, news was received in London that the South Korean 3rd and Capitol Divisions had crossed the 38th parallel near the coast, that they had now advanced 30 miles to Kansong against only slight resistance, and that it was believed the North Koreans would not offer strong opposition before the important centre and port of Wonsan was reached. Wonsan was 80 miles further north, and was east of the Northern capital of Pyongyang.1 As this

in Britain’s Korean War