industrialism and democracy’ and ‘nationalism represents the attempt to actualise in political terms the universal urge for liberty and progress’ (p. 2). However, this ‘liberal’ view of the nation repeatedly comes up against a dilemma: how can nationalism also facilitate illiberal movements and regimes which created internecine violence, political crises and civil war? Chatterjee points out that there is a conflict right at the heart of nationalism which he calls the ‘liberal dilemma’: nationalism may promise liberty and universal suffrage, but is complicit in
them in order to confront the commentary and platforms that they believe to
be demeaning. Equally, a reflection on liberal nationalism would also take
note of how a strong defensive assertion of liberalism precipitates a raft of
ostensibly illiberal programmes; the extreme version of this being a suite
of coerced integration injunctions alongside draconian counter-security
programmes whose entire remit rests on Muslims, once rendered a ‘suspect
community’, being stripped of certain liberal protections, not least the right
Much of this will
on the populist bandwagon and channel illiberal views. 10 This has led to the phenomenon
dubbed ‘contagion of the right’. 11 Established political parties,
notably in France, Switzerland and the Netherlands, have mimicked the
tactics of challenger parties in the hope of retaining the votes of
citizens who might otherwise be tempted to defect.
Socio-economic and political change in the UK
understanding of autocracies’ management of emigration and diaspora.
This section introduces Hollifield's ( 2004 ) concept of the ‘liberal paradox’ as a starting point. It argues that its expansion to illiberal contexts would make it more suitable for cross-regional comparisons that depart from Western liberal democratic norms. By placing Hollifield's work into conversation with Hirschman's seminal work on ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ (1970), it offers a useful framework in order to understand migration policymaking in authoritarianism. Almost twenty years ago
Defenderism, and religious
antagonisms were permitted to grow apace.1
Similarly, Curtin asserts:
The inclusive, secular, national consciousness forged by Tone, Drennan,
Neilson and their colleagues in Dublin and Belfast in the early 1790s collapsed before it had ever neared its goal…Irish Protestants, particularly
those radical Dissenters in Ulster who felt threatened by what they saw
as an illiberal, intolerant, popish menace, retreated from the principals of
1791 into a closer identiﬁcation with Great Britain.
Moreover in Curtin’s eyes, the United Irishmen inadvertently
the complex and often contradictory workings of the EU’s opaque system of
multi-level governance. Otherwise, the EU will be a transitory force even in
its own neighbourhood, in different parts of which deeply illiberal forces are
already capable of challenging its increasingly brittle authority.
1 See the speech of Jonathan Scheele made in Iaşi on 26 May 2006 on the occasion of
his being made a doctor honoris causis. The speech is reproduced in the Appendix
and can be found at http://ww.infoeuopa.ro/under ‘Presa’.
2 Jurnalul Naţional, 2 February 2005.
but also of politics. There seems no dispute that the narrative of a lurch
to the Russian illiberal model of democracy and even charges of ‘Putinisation’ in Hungary has merits. Yet when it comes to reasons for opposition
to sanctions, statements in favour of close economic ties with Russia, and
bilateral economic cooperation activities, the sheer importance of economic links with Russia clearly suggests a pragmatic reflex. In addition,
close political ties usually follow in the footsteps of close economic and
trade ties. It should be mentioned that
– individual liberty, human rights, and so on – and that the West can be defined as synonymous with these values. However, the struggle against ideas that run counter to these Western values continues, as demonstrated by recent political developments on both sides of the Atlantic. As one observer has noted, “The source of the West’s evolutionary power has been its openness, its equality of rights, and its social trust.” 2 All of those attributes have been called into question by the recent resurgence of illiberalism.
This, of course, is not the first time that such a
hope and optimism, would have predicted the populist wave which has engulfed Europe, the United States, and other parts of the world over the last decade and which has become a major challenge to our political system? History, instead of “ending,” apparently has come back with a vengeance.
Claiming “more democracy” and pretending to represent “the people,” populist leaders are attacking the liberal foundations of our societies. Despite their differences populist movements share two characteristics: their illiberalism and their authoritarianism. And one might well
From orthodox ‘populism studies’ to critical theory
Paul K. Jones
‘extremism’ and ‘radical right’. For Mudde, extremism is opposed to democracy in toto while ‘radical’ positions are anti-liberal but still accept a minimalist understanding of democracy as election-based procedure. Mudde's populist radical right here coincides with contemporary understandings of ‘illiberal’, often applied to figures like Viktor Orbán in Hungary.
Mudde proposes instead a ‘paradigm shift’ to ‘pathological normalcy’ that would acknowledge that populist radical right