The post-September 11 world is one which has revealed a
serious chasm in transatlanticrelations. Much has been made of the
differences between the Bush Administration and the EU, with many urging
the transformation of the EU into a global actor that can either counter
US hegemony or at least balance it or influence it in a positive manner.
US unilateralism has serious implications for the
Pivot to Asia: Towards New Trilateral Partnerships. Washington, DC: Center for TransatlanticRelations, pp. 109–24.
Yeo, Lay. (2010). “The EU as a Security Actor in Southeast Asia”, in Panorama:
Insights into Asian and Political Affairs. Singapore: Regional Programme Political Dialogue Asia, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.
Yeo, Lay. (2016). “EU Strategy towards Southeast Asia and ASEAN”, in Changing
Waters: Towards a New EU Asia Strategy. London: LSE Ideas, pp. 6–12.
Yeo, Lay Hwee. (2014). “The EU’s Role in Security and Regional Order in East
Asia”, in Peter Shearman (ed
– which transformed transatlanticrelations in the middle of the century
helping to narrow and circumvent the space between America, Britain,
and therefore its European neighbours – was used by spiritualists as a
metaphor for the ways in which communications from the other world
could be understood. The medium John Murray Spear explained the
signiﬁcance of electricity and telegraphy within his spiritual cosmos in
the following way:
Between the Grand Central Mind and all inferior minds there subsists a connection, a telegraphic communication, by means
Centres. The EU Centre was initiated in the middle of 1990s to
strengthen transatlanticrelations under the “New Transatlantic Agenda”
(European Council, 1995) between the EU and the US, as “bridges across
the Atlantic”. In order to enhance neutrality and credibility, the EU Centre
initiative is incorporated into existing universities. As a result, twelve EU
centres were established in American universities and three in Canadian
universities in 1998. The establishment of EU centres is not only as a kind
of promotion in education, but also as a complement to the work of
. Their entry was – as often is the case – more
based on their readiness to supply rather than meet Afghanistan’s
needs ( Peters et al ., 2018 ). When the
United States increased deployment around 2006, moreover, the EU faced a
dilemma: not sending any forces (and damaging transatlanticrelations)
or launching a civilian EU mission ( Peters et
al ., 2018 ).
urbi et orbi , that he was, after all, a morally responsible
statesman. They have included the United States’ wish to reassert
its position in transatlanticrelations in the wake of the Amsterdam
Treaty and the arrival of the EMU; the desire of EU member states to
prevent the influx of 1 million Kosovar refugees; the interests of the
military industry and the interests of technology.
In the world of
Furthermore, German policy-makers are always much more keenly
aware of the implications that a deepening process of foreign policy
integration may have on transatlanticrelations. The German government
favours a more cohesive European actor capacity to shoulder a greater burden
of security, thereby becoming a more equal partner to the US. Nonetheless,
this must not jeopardise the continued presence of American involvement in
Background Papers, available at: www.unidir.org/pdf/EU_background_
papers/ EU_BGP_01.pdf (accessed 11 October 2011).
Chamorel, P. (2006) ‘Anti-
Europeanism and Euroskepticism in the United
States’, in T.L. Ilgen (ed.), Hard Power, Soft Power and the Future of
TransatlanticRelations, Aldershot: Ashgate.
Cornish, P. and Edwards, G. (2001) ‘Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The
Beginning of a European Strategic Culture’, International Affairs, 77 (3):
Cornish, P. and Edwards, G. (2005) ‘The Strategic Culture of the European
Union: A Progress Report
Christopher called “the problem from hell.” 50
Transatlanticrelations over Bosnia policy were also troubled by the fact that the United States saw and understood the conflict largely as one involving an aggressor—the Bosnian Serbs, supported by Serbia—against the much weaker Bosnian Muslims. The Europeans, for the most part, believed the conflict should be seen as a civil war in which all parties were to blame. These two different interpretations of the conflict produced divergent policy preferences. The approach to the conflict favored by many members of the US Congress
the face of congressional skepticism. The United States and France continued through much of the alliance’s first 70 years to pursue different visions for the future of transatlanticrelations, but into the second decade of the twenty-first century new leaders in Washington (President Barack Obama) and Paris (Presidents Nicolas Sarkozy and then François Hollande) narrowed the gap between American and French attitudes. In Europe, France still worries about Germany, but now it is a reunited Germany’s “soft” power and its pacifistic tendencies that trouble Paris the