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to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic or religious group or a racial group (Article 6); crimes against humanity: widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population with knowledge of such attack (Article 7); war crimes: acts against persons or property protected under the
, Nuremberg and After: The Continuing History of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, University of Reading, Reading 1984, p. 13. 1 01 Crimes Against Humanity 001-031 3/12/10 10:10 Page 2 CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY In the history of political thought, conceptions of natural law and natural right constitute an obvious source here, pointing as they do beyond local specificity and variety towards general principles valid for all humankind. In the textbooks of international law as well, from Grotius and Vattel onwards, the view has been widely supported that there are
The difficulties Like other branches of international law, the law of armed conflict has, as such, no permanent means to secure its observance. However. the International Criminal Court established by treaty in 1998 has, for parties to its Statute, 1 jurisdiction over war crimes. Moreover, since it is generally accepted
head of the British mission in Tokyo, Alvary Gascoigne, and the Foreign Office were annoyed that Patrick refused MacArthur’s offer without prior consultation.21 MacArthur’s appointment of the Australian, Webb, softened the image of American dominance of the deliberations. However, Webb’s appointment was regrettable in several ways. The principal legal objection was that Webb had already been involved in investigating alleged Japanese war crimes, including cannibalism, in New Guinea on behalf of the Australian government. Surely this alone should have disqualified
, lost or untold histories of war crimes tribunals that occurred beyond the shores of the transatlantic world. 4 In the following chapter, I would like to address why and how twentieth-century Germany became something like a model case and a cautionary tale for international humanitarian law. By discussing selected writings and debates of Anglo-American international lawyers and TJ experts, it will be argued that international humanitarian law was construed discursively by means of a dualistic narrative that distinguished – either synchronically or chronologically
reoccupation of Malaya in September 1945, the British military administration launched investigations to gather evidence to bring war crimes charges, not only against Japanese army personnel but also against civilian collaborators. These took the form of identity parades and public displays of photo line-ups of potential war criminals, the gathering of testimonies and affidavits from survivors and witnesses, as well as several exhumations at known killing sites. The authorities were compelled to proceed with the impending trials quickly, influenced in part by the need to
trial, however, for what today would be equivalent to war crimes is that of Peter von Hagenbach in 1474 at Breisach in Austria. Hagenbach was charged with instructing his troops to commit atrocities against civilians and combatants in his attempt to subjugate the city of Breisach. The accused was arraigned and tried by a multinational tribunal, 19 and convicted of crimes such as rape and murder
internal and international armed conflicts led to a belief that violations of the laws of war in a non-international armed conflict were wrongful but not criminal. Hence, the term ‘war crimes’ was generally reserved for international conflicts. 36 A particular act or omission evolves into an international crime only when it is so prescribed, whether expressly or implicitly, by a
initiatives in the defence sector, for four main reasons. The first of these was the continuation of General Nebojša Pavković in his position as Chief of General Staff. Pavković was widely perceived to be a compromised figure; implicated in war crimes and a product of the old Milošević regime. Close cooperation with a VJ still commanded by him, and under only questionable civilian
and commentators. Some European diplomats also aligned themselves with the interventionist perspective – in particular during the early stages of negotiations about the ICC. This applies especially to political actors from France and the UK, both of which traditionally engaged in military interventions abroad. For instance, the French proposal of a sevenyear opt-out provision for war crimes, which was eventually included in the Rome Statute, echoes an interventionist perspective.1 However, as soon as the French concerns were accommodated at the Rome Conference and