the elite’ (Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, 1999). And, despite
being developed in a particular context, its architects contend that it offers a
‘norm appropriate to all countries, not just South Asia. It remains an ideal even
in mature democracies of the developed countries’ (1999: 28). The Humane
Governance approach calls for a three-pronged strategy to address the needs
of: political governance, economicgovernance and civic governance. Good
political governance, therefore, emphasises the rule of law, accountability and
transparency and is designed to
system itself as a
broader tool of socio-economicgovernance and not just a
communists constructing capitalism
system of m
icroeconomic intermediation with macroeconomic
implications opens up scope for reinterpreting the institutional
foundations of the connection between the financial system, the
real economy, and the political system. Notwithstanding the
specific combination of state or market actors within the institutional dynamics of a financial system, its capacity to intermediate
capital effectively is dependent upon systems of trust, expectations, and
(accessed 12 January 2017).
DAR ( 2015 ) Diário da Assembleia da República . I Série’, n.° 4, 11 November, 32.
EC (European Commission) ( 2016a ) ‘ Economic and social affairs: policy and surveillance ’, Portugal.
. These events inspired debate about labour movements. Not only was there controversy concerning the achievement of wage moderation by German unions, but division among social democrats was observed; parties in core countries were sometimes accused of indifference to conditions in the periphery. Certain optimists have even revised their positions. In a 2015 work, Erne argued that the technocratic form of European economicgovernance diminished the likelihood of successful resistance.
Literature concerning the Eurozone crisis provides clues as
financial speculators. The search for a new centralising framework meant to establish economicgovernance occurs at a sometimes glacial pace because it has to accommodate the perspectives of the various interest groups entrenched in the EU power structure.
The impression is given of an oligarchy of interests scrambling to stabilise a project that has badly lost its way. A prominent casualty has been the European values that are supposed to provide solidarity for members in difficulty, but that are now increasingly rhetorical ones. In order for such a nadir to be reached
the irresponsibility of many financial institutions had not been checked by those regulating the eurozone’s financial affairs. The language of political union and economicgovernance for the eurozone used by Merkel and Draghi (despite his lack of any kind of political mandate) masked the fact that EU decision-makers had no viable strategy for reviving stricken economies.
The financial sector had not become a protected zone of the eurozone overnight. Ever since the passing of the Single European Act in 1986, its perceived needs had come to shape the concerns of EU
EU member states coordinating policies and positions on a new European
architecture on economicgovernance and the future of the single
currency on an informal basis. 1 This potential new relationship is discussed
by Tonra (Chapter 2), Gallagher et al. (Chapter 3) and Killian (Chapter
The Brexit crisis is also examined specifically in the
context of Northern Ireland in the latter chapters of the
centre of an ambitious agenda for comprehensive
reform of social and economicgovernance. The SCS provides an
insight into the novel mechanisms of ‘algorithmic governance’
(Campbell-Verduyn et al. 2017) that will play an increasingly
significant role in underpinning the political-economic stability of
China’s authoritarian capitalism.
The preliminary plan for a comprehensive SCS was announced
in 2014 (PRC State Council 2014) and forms the overarching blueprint of the broader plan of upgrading both social and economic
supervision through technological innovation. The
member state retain its independence in managing its economic matters?
Prior to the Greek crisis, efforts to formulate a new regulatory framework had
not been effective. Discourse within the Union had for quite some time revolved
around some notion of common ‘economicgovernance’, but the discussion
was limited to vague aspirations, and no concrete action had been taken. The
immediacy of the Greek problem, therefore, required a solution from within
the existing framework. However, any response faced structural challenges in
the current acquis communautaire, and risked
the fighting stops, and their legacies run deeply in the
societies affected by them. Mark Duffield and other scholars have argued
that the experience of conflict is less about social breakdown and more
about the emergence of alternative – generally non-state based
– patterns of political and economicgovernance. 15 In this context,
the binary division between ‘war’ and ‘peace’
that the transition