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6 MacArthur goes MacArthur goes O n 28 January, MacArthur was reported to have stated: ‘This is exactly where I came in two months ago to start this crusade. The stake we fight for now, however, is more than Korea – it is a free Asia.’1 The implication was that his ‘crusade’ extended beyond Korea. The Cabinet discussed the statement, the ‘latest of a series of unauthorised statements by the United Nations Commander-in-Chief, which gravely embarrassed the Governments which had contributed to the United Nations forces in Korea.’ Moreover, a statement of this
From the start of the Cold War to the presidency of Donald Trump, nuclear weapons have been central to the internal dynamics of US alliances in Europe and Asia. But cooperation on policy, strategy, posture and deployment of US nuclear weapons has varied significantly between US alliances and over time. Partners in Deterrence goes beyond traditional accounts that focus on deterrence and reassurance in US nuclear policy, and instead places the objectives and influence of US allies at the centre of analysis. Through a series of case studies informed by a rigorous analytical framework, it reveals that US allies have wielded significant influence in shaping nuclear weapons cooperation with the US in ways that reflect their own, often idiosyncratic, objectives. Combining in-depth empirical analysis with an accessible theoretical lens, Partners in Deterrence provides important lessons for contemporary policy makers and makes an essential contribution to existing scholarship on alliances and nuclear weapons.
as social scientists and theorists have sought an empirical or material way to know people’s ideas, beliefs, and commitments, activists have sought the same. Amanda Snellinger writes, ‘Hardship reconfirms the nature of selflessness and devotion to the country that people exercise through political struggle’ (2007: 354). Thomas Yarrow theorises sacrifice as a kind of ‘currency’ among activists to demonstrate morality and commitment (2005: 55). Beyond college and lucrative jobs, activists in South Korea have sacrificed filial well-being, normative social connections
fieldsites, Korean studies, and in anthropological and social theory more broadly. However, I have approached crisis as the ground and pragmatism as the figure, so as to refigure ethnographic analysis as an anticipatory process rather than a pragmatic response to an always already emergent world. In this approach, I follow colleagues in Seoul who stretched the limits of anticipation and rescaled agency as well as theory. Many faced obviation and/or anticipated it in order to avoid obsolescence or irrelevance. There was both analysis and reanalysis as semantic and pragmatic
11 The Norwegian Mobile Army Surgical Hospital: Nursing at the front Jan-Thore Lockertsen, Ashild Fause, Christine E. Hallett and Jane Brooks ‘Why I did go to Korea? I guess it was the same reason that I left my home and travelled 1,000 kilometres to train as a nurse. I was young and adventurous.’1 The Korean War is ‘the forgotten war’, the war ‘in between’ the Second World War and the Vietnam War. Margot Isaksen was one of the 111 nurses who served as a ward nurse or theatre nurse at The Norwegian Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (NORMASH) in the period during
This chapter aims to investigate the political theology of development in South Korea through an analysis of trends in popular and media culture in the context of its unique circumstances vis-à-vis modernity. It focuses on the cultural production of a particular form of citizenship – development citizenship, which I suggest, serves as the subjective basis for what I have in other work called ‘spiritualised nationalism’ (Han, 2017 ). The chapter takes cues methodologically and conceptually from media-focused cultural studies (Fiske, 1992 ; Kellner, 2003
that characterised Obama government diplomacy. On the one hand, his approach had the advantage of keeping opponents (like China) as well as allies and partners on the defensive in dealing with the new President. Trump came to see the wisdom of abandoning his earlier cavalier treatment of allies Japan, South Korea and Australia. He built cordial personal ties with most important regional leaders. On the other hand, American engagement in the region remained episodic, featuring intense pressure beginning in 2017 to prevent North Korea’s nuclear weapons development
5 Divisions January 1951 Divisions: January 1951 I n Korea the Chinese launched another offensive, this time on New Year’s Eve. As UN forces fell back to the 38th parallel, Seoul was captured for the second time by the Communists. On 2 January 1951, Kenneth Younger fired off a minute, to Bevin, warning: ‘It looks as if the Americans will try to force our hand by putting forward a condemnatory resolution in the General Assembly at a very early date. It is this move we must try to postpone for the time being’. Younger did not think – as Jebb had seemed to
similar and partly different. Both sets of leaders have been deeply involved in economic connections in the recent past, and there is now some breathing space and a golden opportunity to build on past successes. As India has boomed in recent years, both Russian and American leaders have increased the number of their visits there and have been building a foundation for a more concrete economic relationship. There is also common concern for both sets of leaders in the continuously shifting threat that North Korea and its leader, Kim Jong Un, present. However, in some
7 The long war The long war I n October 1951 the Conservatives returned to power: Winston Churchill was, once more Prime Minister and Anthony Eden his Foreign Secretary. One of the many issues – and potential divisions with the Americans – remained Korea. In mid-November, Churchill’s concern was expressed to Eden: ‘No one here knows what is going on in Korea or which side is benefiting in strength from the bombing and grimaces at Panmunjom. We must try to penetrate the American mind and purpose. We may find this out when we are at Washington. Nobody knows it