This book explores the reasons and justifications for the Chinese state’s campaign to erase Uyghur identity, focusing, in particular, on how China’s manipulation of the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) has facilitated this cultural genocide. It is the first book to address this issue in depth, and serves as an important rebuttal to Chinese state claims that this campaign is a benign effort to combat an existential extremist threat. While the book suggests that the motivation for this state-led campaign is primarily China’s gradual settler colonization of the Uyghur homeland, the text focuses on the narrative of the Uyghur terrorist threat that has provided international cover and justification for the campaign and has shaped its ‘biopolitical’ nature. It describes how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was able to successfully implicate Uyghurs in GWOT and, despite a lack of evidence, brand them internationally as a serious terrorist threat within the first year of the war. In recounting these developments, the book offers a critique of existing literature on the Uyghur terrorist threat and questions the extent of this threat to the PRC. Finding no evidence for the existence of such a threat when the Chinese state first declared its existence in 2001, the book argues that a nominal Uyghur militant threat only emerged after over a decade of PRC suppression of Uyghur dissent in the name of counterterrorism, facilitating a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ that has served to justify further state repression and ultimately cultural genocide.
Mobilising the concept of strategic culture, this study develops a framework for understanding developments in German security policy between 1990 and 2003. Germany's contemporary security policies are characterised by a peculiar mix of continuity and change. From abstention in the first Gulf war, to early peacekeeping missions in Bosnia in the early 1990s and a full combat role in Kosovo in 1999, the pace of change in German security policy since the end of the Cold War has been breathtaking. The extent of this change has recently, however, been questioned, as seen most vividly in Berlin's response to ‘9/11’ and its subsequent stalwart opposition to the US-led war on terrorism in Iraq in 2003. Beginning with a consideration of the notion of strategic culture, the study refines and adapts the concept to the case of Germany through a consideration of aspects of the rearmament of West Germany. It then critically evaluates the transformation of the role of the Bundeswehr up to and including the war on terrorism, together with Germany's troubled efforts to enact defence reforms, as well as the complex politics surrounding the policy of conscription. By focusing on both the ‘domestics’ of security policy decision making as well as the changing and often contradictory expectations of Germany's allies, this book provides a comprehensive analysis of the role played by Germany's particular strategic culture in shaping policy choices. It concludes by pointing to the vibrancy of Germany's strategic culture.
Until relatively recently, democratic Spain has been plagued with serious campaigns of political violence. Between the end of the Francoist regime in 1975 and the announcement of a ceasefire in 2010, the Basque separatist group ETA (Euskadi (e)Ta Askatasuna, Basque Country and Freedom) unquestionably played a central part in this deadly process. In response to ETA’s increasingly violent actions, Spain adopted a determined counter-terrorist stance, establishing one of the most formidable anti-terrorist arsenals among Western democracies. Less well known were the extra-judicial strategies Spain used to eradicate ETA. In the 1980s, initiatives to reopen channels to ETA by the Spanish government were twinned with an astute strategy of enhanced police and judicial co-operation with France on the one hand and a covert campaign of assassination of ETA members on the other. Between 1983 and 1987, mercenaries adopting the pseudonym GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación, Antiterrorist Liberation Groups) paid by the Spanish treasury and relying upon national intelligence support were at war with ETA. This establishment of unofficial counter-terrorist squads in a liberal democracy was a blatant detour from legality. More than thirty years later, the campaign of covered-up assassinations continues to grip Spain. Counter-terror by Proxy assesses the political and institutional context of the inception of Spain’s resort to covert and illegal counter-terrorist strategies, which predate the current global fight against terrorism by decades, going on to examine the wider implications of the use of such strategies in a liberal democracy.
The war on terror has shaped and defined the first decade of the twenty-first century, yet analyses of Britain's involvement remain limited and fragmentary. This book provides a comprehensive, detailed and critical analysis of these developments. It argues that New Labour's support for a militaristic campaign was driven by a desire to elevate Britain's influence on the world stage, and to assist the United States in a new imperialist project of global reordering. This included participation in the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, support for extra-legal measures and a diminution of civil liberties through punitive anti-terror legislation. Ostensibly set within a political framework of promoting humanitarian values, the government's conduct in the war on terror also proved to be largely counter-productive, eroding trust between the citizenry and the state, putting the armed forces under increasing strain, reducing Britain's global position and ultimately exacerbating the threat from radical Islamic terrorism. While new imperialism is typically treated as either an ‘economic’, ‘political’, ‘militaristic’ or ‘humanitarian’ endeavour, this study seeks to enhance current scholarly accounts by setting the events and dynamics of the war on terror within a more holistic and multi-dimensional account of new imperialist forces.
This book is about the transformation of Germany's security and defence policy in the time between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 war against Iraq. It traces and explains the reaction of Europe's biggest and potentially most powerful country to the ethnic wars of the 1990s, the emergence of large-scale terrorism, and the new US emphasis on pre-emptive strikes. Based on an analysis of Germany's strategic culture, it portrays Germany as a security actor and indicates the conditions and limits of the new German willingness to participate in international military crisis management that developed over the 1990s. The book debates the implications of Germany's transformation for Germany's partners and neighbours, and explains why Germany said ‘yes’ to the war in Afghanistan, but ‘no’ to the Iraq War. Based on a comprehensive study of the debates of the German Bundestag and actual German policy responses to the international crises between 1991 and 2003, it provides insights into the causes and results of Germany's transformation.
The language of the European Union’s ‘fight against terrorism’
Introduction: the language of the European
Union’s ‘fight against terrorism’
Perhaps even more insidious than the threat to our lives, is the threat that
terrorism poses to the very nature of our societies. Terrorism can strike
anywhere, anytime, anyone. It is frightening in its unpredictability and
unsettling by its random nature … For all of us, the fight against international terrorism is a growth area. And because terrorism is a global
phenomenon, we need a global response. (Javier Solana, 2005)1
I would say that the threat has changed a lot not only since
No Solution uncovers the transition from a point in the Northern Ireland conflict where British governments’ sought a quick-fix solution to one where key ministers and civil servants had accepted that attrition would continue for many years. A number of other accounts have tended to assume that the British state, enjoying more resources than other parties to the conflict, had the capacity to impose a solution in Northern Ireland but lacked the insight to do so. This book reveals that such resources could not overcome political conditions in Northern Ireland during these key years. Those who have argued that the Good Friday Agreement could have been achieved twenty years earlier are shown to have failed to appreciate the context of the 1970s. Utilising a wide range of archival correspondence and diaries, this monograph covers the collapse of power-sharing in May 1974, the secret dialogue with the Provisional IRA during the 1975 ceasefire, the acquiescence of Labour ministers in continuing indefinite direct rule from Westminster, efforts to mitigate conflict through industrial investment, a major shift in security policy emphasizing the police over the army, the adaptation of republicans to the threat of these new measures and their own adoption of a ‘Long War’ strategy. It sheds light on the challenges faced by British ministers, civil servants, soldiers and policemen and the reasons why the conflict lasted so long. It will be a key text for researchers and students of both British and Northern Irish politics.
A ‘new’ and ‘evolving’ threat to the European Union
Constructing the ‘terrorist’ other: a ‘new’
and ‘evolving’ threat to the European Union
This chapter builds on the genealogy of the European Union’s (EU) terrorism as threat discourse that was conducted in Chapter 2, attempting to
extend our understanding of the way in which the ‘fight against terrorism’
has been constructed. It does this by analysing four of the discourse strands
in a detailed and thematic manner. This is done for four reasons. First, to
explore how the four discourse strands contribute to a specific EU understanding of the threat
The ‘fight against terrorism’ discourse and the EU’s emerging role as a holistic security actor
Conclusion: the ‘fight against terrorism’
discourse and the EU’s emerging role as
a holistic security actor
The reason that I undertook this study was to make the argument that an
in-depth analysis of the language of European Union (EU) counter-terrorism
policy, the ‘fight against terrorism’, is essential if we are to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the processes through which security practices
at the European level are made possible. In doing so I have sought to draw
attention to the important role that the concept of identity plays in
The European Commission had become one of the more contentious actors during both Irish referenda on the Lisbon Treaty. This book discusses the role of the European Commission and institutions more generally, as well as the policy area of justice and home affairs. It argues that it is important to evaluate the role of EU institutions for the process of European integration. The book suggests a reconceptualisation of the framework of supranational policy entrepreneurs (SPEs), which is often referred to by the academic literature that discusses the role of agency in European integration. It focuses on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) at the policy and treaty levels; primarily on four grounds: academic literature, SPE behaviour, EU's policymaking, and the interplay between treaty negotiations and policy-making. To analyse the role of the European institutions, the book combines an analysis of the Lisbon Treaty in relation to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice with an analysis of the policy-making in the same area. The public policy model by John Kingdon with constructivist international relations literature is also outlined. The external dimension of counter-terrorism in the EU; the role of the EU institutions in EU asylum and migration; and the role of he Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is discussed. The book also analyses the role of the EU institutions in the communitarisation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, and thus subsequently in the Lisbon Treaty.