: TransatlanticRelations and Global Governance. London : Springer , pp. 1–18 .
Pinheiro , L.
Gaio , G.
( 2014 ). “ Cooperation for development, Brazilian regional leadership and global protagonism ”, Brazilian Political Science Review
8 ( 2 ), 8–30 . Epub September.
Christopher called “the problem from hell.” 50
Transatlanticrelations over Bosnia policy were also troubled by the fact that the United States saw and understood the conflict largely as one involving an aggressor—the Bosnian Serbs, supported by Serbia—against the much weaker Bosnian Muslims. The Europeans, for the most part, believed the conflict should be seen as a civil war in which all parties were to blame. These two different interpretations of the conflict produced divergent policy preferences. The approach to the conflict favored by many members of the US Congress
the face of congressional skepticism. The United States and France continued through much of the alliance’s first 70 years to pursue different visions for the future of transatlanticrelations, but into the second decade of the twenty-first century new leaders in Washington (President Barack Obama) and Paris (Presidents Nicolas Sarkozy and then François Hollande) narrowed the gap between American and French attitudes. In Europe, France still worries about Germany, but now it is a reunited Germany’s “soft” power and its pacifistic tendencies that trouble Paris the
The language of the European Union’s ‘fight against terrorism’
64 Kim Eling, ‘The EU, Terrorism and Effective Multilateralism’, in David Spence
(ed.), The European Union and Terrorism (London: John Harper Publishing,
2007), pp. 105–123.
The European Union’s fight against terrorism
65 Wyn Rees, Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: The New Imperative
(London and New York: Routledge, 2006).
66 For further discussion of European and American counter-terrorism cooperation, see Karin von Hippel, Europe Confronts Terrorism (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005); Fraser Cameron, ‘TransatlanticRelations and
American segregationists and international racism after civil
), The U.S. South and Europe: TransatlanticRelations in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2013), 243–64.
13 See, for example, Daniel Geary and Jennie Sutton, “Resisting the Wind of Change: The Citizens’ Councils and European Decolonization”, in van Minnen and Berg (eds), The U.S. South and Europe , 265–82; Stephanie R. Rolph, “The Citizens’ Council and Africa: White Supremacy in Global Perspective”, Journal of Southern History 82.3 (2016): 617–50; Clive Webb. “Jim Crow and Union Jack: Southern Segregationists
flighty to launch out on this campaign while their position
is still very delicate regarding the European Union’.23 There were some fears
that France would retaliate against Romania for spurning its line on an issue
which would gravely impair transatlanticrelations for nearly the remainder
of Bush’s time in the White House. But Năstase may have calculated that the
advantages particularly in the economic sphere which Western European
states would quickly obtain as Romania drew closer to the EU would deflect
any backlash even by a member as powerful as France. Besides
1990), pp. 47–67; and Gary Goertz, Contexts of International Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 75–81.
Eurasian security governance
22 See Jervis, ‘Theories of War’; and John Duffield, ‘TransatlanticRelations after the
Cold War: Theory, Evidence, and the Future’, International Studies Perspectives,
2:1 (2001), pp. 93–115.
23 Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 30:2
(1978), pp. 167–214.
24 Cited in Duncan Snidal, ‘Relative Gains and the Pattern of
P. G. Wodehouse, transatlantic romances in fiction, and the Anglo-American
fictions exploring Anglo-American interactions went apparently unnoticed. And there were contrary experiences. Not all were enamored of the centennial celebrations. The two nations were no longer likely to go to war, but nor was formal alliance close, and the United States hedged when war broke out. Foreign Secretary Grey’s remark in his memoir on transatlanticrelations that ‘in the years from 1905 to 1912 there was not much in the handling of public affairs … that retains sufficient interest to be described here’ might speak for a continued reserve as much as a special
narrative as being substantially
qualified by the European fixation with consensus. This opens a critique that the
Global citizen and European Republic
European Union is a necessarily weak international actor and that despite (or
indeed because of) the scale of its ambitions, caution needs to be exercised so
that transatlanticrelations are not undermined. Thus, according to a Sunday Tribune
newspaper editorial, because ‘each and every country in Europe has its own
special relationship with the US … we must strive to build a transatlantic partnership based on
’ (FitzGerald, 3 June 1984). However, Irish official
discourse to American audiences on transatlanticrelations often contains implicitly unfavourable comparisons with European co-operation:
our own relations with your great country are based first on human considerations – on people – rather than on the cold concerns of policy. It is on that
human dimension, on such old, enduring and unquenchable friendships,
that the hope of our world can best rely today. (FitzGerald, 3 June 1984)
An unfavourable comparison with the US has also come to the fore at
times of unease in EU