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. Their entry was – as often is the case – more based on their readiness to supply rather than meet Afghanistan’s needs ( Peters et al ., 2018 ). When the United States increased deployment around 2006, moreover, the EU faced a dilemma: not sending any forces (and damaging transatlantic relations) or launching a civilian EU mission ( Peters et al ., 2018 ). Member
power. The post-September 11 world is one which has revealed a serious chasm in transatlantic relations. Much has been made of the differences between the Bush Administration and the EU, with many urging the transformation of the EU into a global actor that can either counter US hegemony or at least balance it or influence it in a positive manner. US unilateralism has serious implications for the
Christopher called “the problem from hell.” 50 Transatlantic relations over Bosnia policy were also troubled by the fact that the United States saw and understood the conflict largely as one involving an aggressor—the Bosnian Serbs, supported by Serbia—against the much weaker Bosnian Muslims. The Europeans, for the most part, believed the conflict should be seen as a civil war in which all parties were to blame. These two different interpretations of the conflict produced divergent policy preferences. The approach to the conflict favored by many members of the US Congress
this is the case, it is vital to be able to identify such areas in order better to understand past disputes, and foresee possible future crises, in transatlantic relations. It is useful to know precisely on which fundamental issues individual European leaderships have tended to agree and disagree in the recent past. It might be expected that the actors will diverge on a number of important standpoints
flighty to launch out on this campaign while their position is still very delicate regarding the European Union’.23 There were some fears that France would retaliate against Romania for spurning its line on an issue which would gravely impair transatlantic relations for nearly the remainder of Bush’s time in the White House. But Năstase may have calculated that the advantages particularly in the economic sphere which Western European states would quickly obtain as Romania drew closer to the EU would deflect any backlash even by a member as powerful as France. Besides
the face of congressional skepticism. The United States and France continued through much of the alliance’s first 70 years to pursue different visions for the future of transatlantic relations, but into the second decade of the twenty-first century new leaders in Washington (President Barack Obama) and Paris (Presidents Nicolas Sarkozy and then François Hollande) narrowed the gap between American and French attitudes. In Europe, France still worries about Germany, but now it is a reunited Germany’s “soft” power and its pacifistic tendencies that trouble Paris the
–873. 64 Kim Eling, ‘The EU, Terrorism and Effective Multilateralism’, in David Spence (ed.), The European Union and Terrorism (London: John Harper Publishing, 2007), pp. 105–123. 26 The European Union’s fight against terrorism 65 Wyn Rees, Transatlantic Counter-Terrorism Cooperation: The New Imperative (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). 66 For further discussion of European and American counter-terrorism cooperation, see Karin von Hippel, Europe Confronts Terrorism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Fraser Cameron, ‘Transatlantic Relations and
ongoing eurozone crisis, the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, the migration crisis as well as the uncertain development of European integration and transatlantic relations after ‘Brexit’ and the Trump presidency have pushed ‘German foreign policy into an international leadership role’, although Germany had not ‘actively sought such a role’. 97 Germany did not seek ‘greater responsibility in Europe after reunification’; rather, it emerged as a central player ‘by remaining stable as the world around it changed’. 98 However, the growing international demands on German
critical mechanism for the advancement of other aspects of the EU–Latin American relations agenda, and a cornerstone defining the evolution of transatlantic relations. Context of negotiations: geo-economic balancing President Obama's administration (2008–16) pursued an intense trade agreement policy, with a particular focus on setting the rules of trade through ambitious mega-regional agreement negotiations: the TPP with eleven other states in the Americas, Asia and Australasia, and the TTIP with the European Union. Billed as game
Transatlantic Relations: 1956–1963 ’, Diplomacy and Statecraft , 17 : 2 ( 2006 ), 369 – 370 . 143 Department of State, ‘Circular Telegram from the Department of State to Certain Missions, Washington DC, 9 May 1962’, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963 , Vol. 13: Western