development and stability of EastAsia
by means of “soft power”, namel, through trade and investment, provision
of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and participation in confidencebuilding measures (European Commission, 1994, 1995). It seems that
already in the early 1990s Tokyo was regarded as being sufficiently qualified
to become Brussels’s strategic partner in Asia.
The progress in European integration from the early 1990s on and,
related to it, the EU’s willingness and ability to assume a larger global role
have further stimulated Brussels to seek a deeper
T he security environment in EastAsia is in the process of fundamental change. Core factors are the rise of China as a superpower and its assertive security policy, the North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programme, and territorial conflicts in the East and South China Seas, as well as maritime and energy security. While the US has been the sole security provider for Japan since 1952, beginning with the end of the Cold War and particularly after the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Japanese government has become
Washington’s painful search for a credible China policy
In 2018, one-time members of the Obama administration – Assistant Secretary of State for EastAsian and Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell, and former Deputy National Security Advisor to Vice President Joe Biden, Ely Ratner – noted that, since the end of the Second World War ‘[t]he United States has always had an outsized sense of its ability to determine China’s course. Again and again, its ambitions have come up short.’ Today, they argued, ‘the starting point for a better approach is a new degree of humility about the United States’ ability to
Over more than thirty years of reform and opening, the Chinese Communist Party has pursued the gradual marketization of China’s economy alongside the preservation of a resiliently authoritarian political system, defying long-standing predictions that ‘transition’ to a market economy would catalyse deeper political transformation. In an era of deepening synergy between authoritarian politics and finance capitalism, Communists constructing capitalism offers a novel and important perspective on this central dilemma of contemporary Chinese development. This book challenges existing state–market paradigms of political economy and reveals the Eurocentric assumptions of liberal scepticism towards Chinese authoritarian resilience. It works with an alternative conceptual vocabulary for analysing the political economy of financial development as both the management and exploitation of socio-economic uncertainty. Drawing upon extensive fieldwork and over sixty interviews with policymakers, bankers, and former party and state officials, the book delves into the role of China’s state-owned banking system since 1989. It shows how political control over capital has been central to China’s experience of capitalist development, enabling both rapid economic growth whilst preserving macroeconomic and political stability. Communists constructing capitalism will be of academic interest to scholars and graduate students in the fields of Chinese studies, social studies of finance, and international and comparative political economy. Beyond academia, it will be essential reading for anyone interested in the evolution of Chinese capitalism and its implications for an increasingly central issue in contemporary global politics: the financial foundations of illiberal capitalism.
future role of the US in the EastAsia order, as well as in the global order, and (2) the current and future position of China in this order.
The role of the US
The US is an important common denominator in all the partnerships analysed in this volume, because it is a security or alliance partner for Japan and virtually all of its security partners, is the central player in the security and diplomatic trilaterals between Japan and its partners, and is a strong proponent of these partnerships, because it believes they
Many Chinese, for their part, initially judged the new president as easier to work with than his predecessor. But timing was against the new administration. While the Middle East preoccupied the White House, many Chinese – proud and confident after decades of rapid growth – advocated a more assertive foreign policy as China sought to take its historical place as the leading power in EastAsia. Washington’s alleged containment policy was seen to stand in the way.
A Pacific president: Obama’s Pivot
US–China relations, former Secretary of State Colin Powell declared
By expanding the geographical scope of the history of violence and war, this
volume challenges both Western and state-centric narratives of the decline of
violence and its relationship to modernity. It highlights instead similarities
across early modernity in terms of representations, legitimations, applications
of, and motivations for violence. It seeks to integrate methodologies of the
study of violence into the history of war, thereby extending the historical
significance of both fields of research. Thirteen case studies outline the
myriad ways in which large-scale violence was understood and used by states and
non-state actors throughout the early modern period across Africa, Asia, the
Americas, the Atlantic, and Europe, demonstrating that it was far more complex
than would be suggested by simple narratives of conquest and resistance.
Moreover, key features of imperial violence apply equally to large-scale
violence within societies. As the authors argue, violence was a continuum,
ranging from small-scale, local actions to full-blown war. The latter was
privileged legally and increasingly associated with states during early
modernity, but its legitimacy was frequently contested and many of its violent
forms, such as raiding and destruction of buildings and crops, could be found in
activities not officially classed as war.
Arsenal or Real Madrid [but] it did not happen that way’ (interview, 17 February 2010), he speaks for thousands of gifted African players who come to Europe or South-EastAsia with high hopes and great expectations that are ultimately unfulfilled. As we have shown in this text, for the vast majority who pursue football migration and an imagined but quixotic future as a player in the rarefied echelons of the elite professional game, the outcome is frustrating, crushing immobility or brief, stunted transnational careers at the margins of the industry. At their journey
increased. In South EastAsia warfare sharpened the perceived need. The
US army embarked upon the biggest drug screening project in the history
of malaria chemotherapy, and interest grew in the possibility of a
malaria vaccine. When the US arsenal was exhausted, and American
interest numbed by withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, from nowhere it
seemed Chinese researchers presented the West with qinghaosu. A paper in
Asia, favoring those that include the United States and leading them to take approaches favored by Washington but are neuralgic for Beijing.’ 6 Obama ordered bolder US military moves in the Yellow and South China seas, pressed Beijing to push North Korea to curb its nuclear programmes (to little avail), and advanced US leadership in numerous multilateral organisations, especially ASEAN and the EastAsia Summit. Obama also promoted the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) (which excluded China) as a strategy of “hegemonic ordering” in the tradition of post-1945 US