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European Union in the second half of 2011, at a time when the crisis raged particularly strongly, and assumed a critical role in the design of policies which reformed the Eurozone. The governing PO party took this opportunity to mould the EU’s response to the crisis in the image of the centre-right PO’s conservative economic philosophy. The EU economic governance ‘six pack’, designed at the time of the Polish presidency, incorporated points related to debt brakes and the importance of debt levels which reflected long-standing PO concerns. The broader dispositions of PO
overlook both the benefits and costs associated with spatial change. Economic governance as we know it is ill-equipped to help decision-makers in the private and public sectors manage space better, which has become imperative. The image of the dynamo came to symbolize the importance of electricity and other services in the modern city. These invisible services, a form of modern labor-saving magic, run virtually automatically, or at least without the need for those who use them to intervene in their production: we do not haul water or wood, put coal in furnaces, carry out
) enforcement mechanisms are also proposed by the policy document Wealth for the World (Liberal Democrats, 2004b). Some Liberal Democrats were obviously more radical than others in regard to global economic governance. As expected, arguments about ‘universal rights’ and ‘global problems’ intermingled in Liberal Democrats’ national policy documents in relation to these reforms. More interesting is how the nature of institutions such as the UN was conceived by the Liberal Democrats. The UN, in theory and practice, is a multilateral organisation. New Labour seemed to be fairly
privatisation remains as a key strategy in installing a liberal peace, both guiding and operational actors within the DSI initially took a very cautious approach to privatising in Kosovo. However, such cautiousness was not a function of a limited commitment to liberal ideology, but rather a fear of the legal and personal ramifications for operational staff. Once legal concerns were addressed, the commitment to free market ideologies and technologies of economic governance was revived and implemented at rapid pace. The renewed commitment to this cornerstone of neo
that Southern countries were in fact capable of endogenously managing their own economic affairs. This, combined with the dramatic economic improvements under the Lula presidency – which saw Brazil go from owing the IMF $50 billion in 2002 to loaning it $10 billion in 2009 – opened the space for Brazil’s legitimate inclusion in key economic governance institutions such as the G20 Finance and the quieter, but possibly more significant Financial Stability Forum (Armijo and Katada, 2014 ). Indeed, IMF confidence in former Brazilian macro-economic officials is such that
of pan-European solutions, was dragging its feet because it wished to exempt many of its own banks from such a regime. 11 EU anti-crisis measures have lacked substance. Often their purpose appears to be to provide sound-bites for the crisis summits held at regular intervals since the spring of 2010, or else position beleaguered leaders to overcome electoral challenges (such as the contest Angela Merkel faced in September 2013). Plans for economic governance of the EU contain bold intentions but they are invariably vague on detail. There is no architecture in place
Lecture on Global Economic Governance, delivered at the London School of Economics and Political Science on 6 June 2002. Address by Kofi Annan at the ceremony of adherence to the Global Compact, delivered in Madrid on 1 April 2002. J.G. Ruggie, Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: The Corporate Connection. Institute for International Law and Justice, New York University School of Law (2003), pp. 93–129, quote on p. 122. K.A. Annan, ‘The Quiet Revolution’, Global Governance, 4:2 (1998), 123–38, quote on p. 124. K.A. Annan, Interventions, p. 221. United Nations Millennium
guarantee bondholders that they will be paid back whatever the circumstances (De Grauwe, 2012 ). The shrinking discretion of European governments became crystal clear during the sovereign debt crisis (Ferrera, 2017 ; Ladi and Graziano, 2014 ; Streeck, 2014 ), a period of ‘coercive Europeanisation’ (Ladi and Graziano, 2014 ). As described in the introductory chapter, European economic governance rules were modified over this period, and the new instruments increased the EU's surveillance and enforcement capacity regarding the implementation of
security, rule of law, humanitarian, economic, governance, political, developmental, and human rights spheres. The relations within each of these pillars are extensive, but the increasingly comprehensive or integrated nature of programmes – such as protection of civilians (PoC), security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), or arranging and securing elections – has led to a proliferation of linkages and interdependencies across these functional areas. These efforts are often guided or supported through bilateral relations with
relationship between democracy and development as seamless, combining democratic political processes – governance or “soft infrastructures” – with socio-economic arrangements, including “social and physical infrastructures”. These processes and arrangements are designed to protect and promote the freedoms and rights of citizens, as well as advance human development and security through broad-based, state-led allocation and distribution of social surpluses.While the thematic focus on economic governance and management, corporate governance, and socio-economic development