hand, and in a
network of researchers clustered around the Applied Economics Department
and the ESRC Centre for Business Research at Cambridge University, on the
other. In an historical analysis of different forms of competition, Best argues
that changing forms of competition are the outcome of complex interactions
between industrial divisions and productive organisation, on the one hand,
and formal competition regulatory systems, on the other. Thus, in the USA
the multi-divisional Chandlerian corporation involved a form of competition
in which Big Business mass
Regulatory issues and industrial
policy in football
Jonathan Michie and Christine Oughton
The peculiar economics of professional sports leagues has long been recognised (see Neale, 1964). Traditionally, the essence of the problem was seen
to lie in the fact that sports leagues and the individual clubs that make up the
league provide a joint product that depends on effective co-operation
between competing clubs. Clubs agree to join, and be regulated by, a league
because co-operation in the supply of a joint product increases the economic
technical policy for ‘steering
the economy’ without recognising the broader context of
Keynes’ thinking, especially in The End of Laissez Faire (1926),
about the role of intermediary institutions which are outside
of the state and the market but play important roles in promoting social objectives.
The aim of this chapter is to re-establish the connection
between technical policy and political philosophy which has
(despite spirited challenges) since been ossified by the tripartite
academic division of labour between economics, politics and
2006; Scott-Cato, 2006). In addition, many commentators feel the term does
not sufficiently recognise the role of capitalism in environmental destruction, or
that it is capitalism rather than environmental practice that needs to change (see
Malm, 2016; Sklair, 2016).
Much, but not all, of this critique of neo-
classical economics and its
assumptions of the necessity of growth are explicitly anti-capitalist. Here, Andreas
Malm’s work on ‘fossil capital’ is key. Malm argued that the shift to steam power
took place essentially because it allowed capitalists to better
Keynes, consumer rights and the new thrifty consumers
, home economics,
calls for improved food and drug laws, the cooperative movement, the labour
movement, fledgling consumer organisations and leftist politics. In 1929
democratic and educational theorist John Dewey and progressive economist
Paul Douglas founded a new third party, the League for Independent Political
Action, around the interests of consumers, saying ‘the needs and troubles of
the people are connected with problems of consumption, with problems of the
maintenance of a reasonably decent and secure standard of living’. They felt the
other parties were
At the conclusion of my last book –On the Commodity Trail –I asserted that
consumptive thrift (i.e. that which essentially still encourages spending, but as
part of seeking a ‘bargain’) was, in the current age, the only type of thrift fully
condoned by those in positions of power in the West. Furthermore, I argued,
it was used to obscure the fact that trickle-down economics have failed both
the developed and the developing world. Consumptive thrift, I argued, required
people to consume; insisted upon itself as an activity engaged in, not in
It is in relation to markets that goods are most obviously conceptually
stabilised within economic thought. (For a full discussion of the argument
presented in this section, see Slater, 2002.) In everyday language, we define
markets as markets for particular goods: there are markets for consumer
electronics, or cars, or clothes. Similarly, marketing directors or financial
analysts are concerned with futures markets or housing markets. And this is
fundamental to both conventional economics and critical economic discourses: markets are delineated by virtue of
Bruegel is a European think-tank specializing in economics. Its membership includes
EU member state governments, international corporations and institutions.
2 Jean Pisani-Ferry, André Sapir and Guntram Wolff, EU–IMF Assistance to the
Euro-Area Countries: An Early Assessment, Bruegel, May 2013.
3 Ibid., pp. 44, 54.
4 Ibid., p. 60.
5 Ibid., p. 51.
6 Ibid., p. 51.
7 Ibid., p. 56.
8 Ibid., p. 93.
9 Ibid., p. 65.
10 See pp. 61, 196ff.
11 Pisani-Ferry et al., EU–IMF Assistance to Euro-Area Countries, p. 53.
12 Ibid., p. 118.
13 Ibid., p. 65.
view of the scope and importance
of a kind of invisible economy whose goods and services lie
at the foundation of everyday civilised life.
The singular economy: GDP and knowledge-intensive
The roots of this invisibility lie in the way academic economic
language, and the policymakers who borrow from it, think
and talk about ‘the economy’. They construct a field of the
visible – and as a result make important things invisible.
Although there are many kinds of economics (mainstream
and heterodox) in our time, they generally share a view of
the world in
2 See M. Wolf, ‘Economie’, Le Monde, 24 May 2011, p. 2.
3 FAZ, 20 April 2011, p. 9; see also, N. Economides, Economics section, Kathimerini,
23–24 April 2011 p. 6.
4 ‘Economie’, Le Monde, 10 May 2011, p. 14.
5 See ‘Restructuring a horror scenario’, Kathimerini, 25 May 2011.
6 G. Papaconstantinou, Kathimerini, 5 April 2011, p. 23.
7 Issue 15, 2011, p. 66.
8 Ekthesi gia to etos 2011, Trapeza tis Ellados, April 2012.
9 See Kathimerini, 7 May 2011, p. 4.
10 See Kathimerini, 30 December 2011, p. 16, which refers to a Wall Street