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Alanna O’Malley

This American-​led economic crusade against Katanga through 1962 drew criticism from European allies, including Britain, Belgium, France and Germany, who viewed the proposal as interference with European affairs. Belgium in particular undertook a vicious press campaign criticising US policy in the Congo, highlighting American economic interests as a means of discrediting Washington’s aims. German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer even went as far as to claim ‘the US wanted to reduce Europe’s role on the dark continent’.56 There was in fact some truth in this claim, since at

in The diplomacy of decolonisation
Panikos Panayi

/10/2012 14:11 Forgetting and remembering 7 the expellees became a central theme in early West German popular culture.40 Prisoners of war also became a major concern for post-war Germans. This seems unsurprising given the fact many did not return until the second half of the 1940s, while the last of those who found themselves in the Soviet Union did not leave that country until Konrad Adenauer visited it in 1955. In the popular culture and academic literature of the Federal Republic, the term ‘prisoner of war’ has therefore tended to refer to those individuals who faced

in Prisoners of Britain
Anglo-American ironies under Clinton, Blair, and Bush
David Ryan

Washington, Europe, and the Commonwealth. The vision was perhaps a product of illusion as the United States and its allies entered into one of its most significant strategic debacles in the last half-century. Potentially Blair’s pivotal position could also be a lonely position. The ‘special relationship’ perhaps deceived Blair into believing there was a transatlantic alternative to Europe, unlike Guy Mollet, French prime minister after Suez, who took heed of German chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s remark, that ‘Europe will be your revenge.’ 115 Even before Kosovo or 9

in Culture matters
John Lough

remarkable demonstration of Moscow’s willingness to turn the page, a Soviet military band played the West German national anthem when Chancellor Konrad Adenauer visited Moscow in 1955. Victory in war makes it easier to move on, but there are probably additional reasons for this. The first is that Soviet society had experienced what a murderous dictatorship can lead its people to do. Soviet Ukraine, for example, had lived through a vicious civil war followed by the Great Famine. The conquest of Germany and the establishment of the GDR as a monument to the USSR’s victory

in Germany’s Russia problem
Terry Macintyre

things did change and that relations between Britain and Germany varied over the period, and that it was not until much later in the Wilson era that any improvement was achieved, after a low point that has been attributed in part as the consequence of the mutual dislike and misunderstandings of Harold Macmillan and Konrad Adenauer.3 20 Anglo-German relations However, when a detailed appraisal is made of the exchanges between the British and German governments in the months immediately before and after Wilson’s election victory in October 1964, especially those

in Anglo-German relations during the Labour governments 1964–70
Terry Macintyre

argue that, for Germany, the Harmel exercise was potentially of supreme importance and would prove to be a constructive factor in the development of its Ostpolitik. As Brandt was to comment in October 1967, as German Foreign Minister, in an obvious reference to Harmel, ‘we strive for a period of détente in order to establish a firm basis for the security of Europe; we seek to solve the German question too.’37 Bonn’s attitude towards the Harmel exercise was governed by one further important consideration. In January 1963, Konrad Adenauer had signed the Élysée Treaty

in Anglo-German relations during the Labour governments 1964–70
Terry Macintyre

similar assertions made previously by Konrad Adenauer’s administration. Only when the risks of emphasising conventional defence, at a time when both the United States and Britain were looking to nuclear strategy as a means of reducing reliance on personnel, became apparent during the 1950s did Germany adopt a policy of nuclear deterrence. By deciding in 1958 to equip the Bundeswehr with tactical nuclear weapons, albeit with the warheads under American control, and to reduce its conventional capability, Germany hoped to ‘strengthen the American security NATO nuclear

in Anglo-German relations during the Labour governments 1964–70
Terry Macintyre

237 of the Treaty of Rome for membership of the EEC and parallel application for membership of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and EURATOM. In the first of their meetings in April, held when the two leaders were in Bonn for Konrad Adenauer’s funeral, Wilson indicated that he intended to bring matters to a head by gathering members of his Cabinet for a meeting at Chequers to discuss all aspects of EEC membership. In economic terms, membership would involve a consider­able cost, but Wilson believed there would be great benefits 210 Anglo

in Anglo-German relations during the Labour governments 1964–70
Jonathan Colman

British troop commitment. In late April, Wilson and Johnson met briefly in Bonn at the funeral of the former West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer, where the President allegedly told Wilson that if only he would ‘put troops into Vietnam’ then his ‘worries over sterling would be over’. Wilson responded that if he did so he would be ‘finished’. 87 Johnson also asked Wilson if he was ‘going crazy’ by planning to pull troops out

in A ‘special relationship’?
Germany and NATO nuclear weapons cooperation
Stephan Frühling and Andrew O'Neil

in NATO , 1 38 Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO , 4. 39 A. Messemer , ‘ Konrad Adenauer: Defence Diplomat on the Backstage ’, in J. Gaddis , P

in Partners in deterrence