Search results
’ – gained impetus in early 1950, largely because of pressure from across the Atlantic. The minutes of GEN 183 reveal that ministers and senior Whitehall officials were aware of the impact of the Fuchs case and other security lapses on transatlantic relations and were keen to make amends in return for access to American secrets. At a meeting of GEN 183 chaired by the Prime Minister on 5 April, it was agreed that an
. Mungiu-Pippidi, ‘Facing the “Desert of Tartars”. The Eastern Border of Europe’, in Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound , p. 69. 113 J. Van Oudenaren, ‘The Changing Face of Europe: EU Enlargement and Implications for Transatlantic Relations’, Policy Report (The American Institute for
Morton Stanley, the journalist from the New York Herald, had significance for transatlantic relations. Their famously comic encounter in Africa in 1871 had been ‘a fitting symbol of a thaw in Anglo-American relations after all the bitter feeling over the American Civil War’ (see Fig. 4 ). 139 Britain’s tacit support for the Confederate cause, in building ships for
negotiations because, as Kissinger later explained, “We didn’t want to break with our allies or confront the Soviets on it.” 138 Not only were CSCE negotiations consistent with Kissinger’s linkage strategy to obtain Soviet cooperation in other areas, but they could also have helped the United States reaffirm its leadership in transatlantic relations at a moment in which tensions on both sides of the Atlantic were multiplying. After all, Kissinger explained, American allies considered the “European security negotiations as their equivalent to SALT – as the vehicle by which
. Aunesluoma , “ Finlandisation in Reverse: The CSCE and the Rise and Fall of Economic Détente, 1968–1975 ”, in O. Bange and G. Niedhart (eds), Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe ( New York : Berghahn Books , 2008 ), pp. 98 – 113 . 82 J. Renouard , “ No Relief for a Troubled Alliance: Human Rights and Transatlantic Relations in the 1970s ”, in R. Haar and N. Wynn (eds), Transatlantic Conflict and Consensus: Culture, History and Politics ( Cambridge : Cambridge Academic , 2009 ), pp. 145 – 162 ; O. Bange , “ The Greatest Happiness
irritant in transatlantic relations. Truman’s decision still rankles today in Williams Chapter 4 134 23/10/98, 11:39 am 135 Roosevelt’s NWO: Britain many British hearts, but it was a sign that Britain would from now on have to dance to America’s tune, which, most of the time, it dutifully has ever since. The post-war dogma of ‘realism’ in international relations theory was thus not seen as central to the NWO debate during most of the war. Power and its holders were seen as a ‘given’ and all basically in harmony with each other. What mainly changed this was of
-American writer Walter Besant, all pointed to an intense consideration of the possibilities of Anglo-American unity. Indeed, the number of these Anglo-world organizations pointed strongly towards a growing Anglo-American comity in the wake of the ‘great rapprochement’, where commonality, not conflict, guided transatlantic relations.196 Moreover, within this sphere of associational amity, the RSStG in London was by 1900 actively seeking to draw upon the global, not merely North American, frames of reference. This was the age of the Anglo-world, and as mighty as the United States
’s) Irish policies. Patriotic gatherings of Englishmen on St George’s Day were obvious targets for nationalist ire. In 1898, the paper lambasted the ‘Anglomaniacs’, men ‘born on American soil’ who ‘are more English than the English themselves’, who criticise all things American.95 The warmth of transatlantic relations clearly irked a newspaper dedicated to removing the British from Ireland, hopefully with American help. The same theme was picked up in animated fashion again in 1899 when the newspaper attacked the British, what it dubbed the pro-British administration in
model of security policy’, West European Politics, 14 (3), pp. 122–43. Greve, Tim (1973) Haakon VII of Norway. Founder of a New Monarchy, Hurst: London. Häkämies, Jyri (2007) ‘Similar yet different: a Finnish perspective on European security and transatlantic relations’, speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, 6 September. Haskel, Barbara G. (1976) The Scandinavian Option. Opportunities and Opportunity Costs in Post-war Scandinavian Foreign Policies, Universitetsforlaget: Oslo. Hautamäki, Jaakko (2008) ‘Ystävien kesken
initiative was less than ideal given that the US Christmas bombing campaign of North Vietnam had been roundly condemned by Europe’s leaders. This soured Nixon’s opinion towards such critics and, indeed, made him re-assess the nature of the entire NATO alliance.28 As Nixon articulated in conversation, NATO ‘had been an alliance of interest and friendship’; now it was ‘just an alliance of interest’.29 Clearly the president’s personal feelings towards European leaders were less than ideal for re-affirming the solidarity of transatlantic relations, but the exception to this