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. In the initial period of the war, the military landscape was truly confusing. A report of the Hague War Crimes Tribunal summarises the situation accurately: The Croatian Defence Council forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina are supported by the Croatian Army, local Croatian police, volunteer civilians and ‘special forces’ like the military wing of the Croatian Party of Rights (named after the former Ustashas of the Second World War, who also fought against the Serbs in the Krajina area). Other Croatian armed civilian forces operate essentially in local areas. (Report of
depends on the degree of order already achieved, both within and between states. But the influence runs in the opposite direction as well. I agree with the implication of the following remarks by D.H.N. Johnson, responding to the argument that codification of international criminal law is unrealistic because of the lack of a true sense of community at the global level: 13 14 15 Robert Lansing, ‘Notes on World Sovereignty’, American Journal of International Law 15 (1921), 13–27, at p. 14; Lord Wright, ‘War Crimes Under International Law’, Law Quarterly Review 62 (1946
played a role in the country’s evolving relationship with the ICTY. This is an issue that is of great significance to the wider post-conflict rehabilitation of Croatian society, and to the security sector more narrowly. A number of sometimes very senior personnel from the Croatian police and armed forces were implicated in war crimes between 1991–5 and subsequently indicted by the
American campaigners on behalf of stricken Jewry active both during and after the war, represented a riposte to those who wished to see the persecution of Jews universally. If the efforts of this group during war had been directed towards persuading a recalcitrant watching world to rescue Jews, then in its aftermath they were directed towards ensuring that the judgement of both History and war crimes trials recorded Jews as specific victims of Nazi policy as a result of their specific place in the Nazi imagination. As The Black Book stated boldly in its indictment
international treaty law outlining what was not acceptable during war, for much of the modern period the sovereign state, with important exceptions like the Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime trials, remained the sole arbiter in determining who was guilty of violating these laws. This, in turn, raised questions as to the effect that jus in bello laws had on restraining the use of force. In the immediate post
Serbia-Montenegro confronted a formidable series of political level security sector reform challenges in October 2000. The Army, 1 police and intelligence agencies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRJ) had been deeply politicised under the old regime, while many of their most senior personnel were implicated in war crimes, corruption or organised
the enforcement of such provisions in the domestic realm. As one US media commentator put it: ‘American detachment from an international court grants the United States no license for war crimes. The American political process and judicial system build in their own checks.’8 In the same vein, another media commentator emphasised that the US constitution represents the ultimate foundation of jurisdictional legitimacy, while at the same time providing the central point of reference and identification for potential defendants, namely US service personnel: Members of U
of War Crimes , who placed it alongside the Australian publication of Borges’s The Book of Sand , 9 although in terms of overt influence, Carey has declared himself fortunate to have read Borges ‘later rather than earlier’. 10 There has been diverse criticism examining the post-modern playfulness and self-conscious fictionality of Carey’s work. Helen Daniel’s reading of Illywhacker is, in common with the rest of her book Liars , dedicated single-mindedly to the playful strategy of the novelist/narrator as liar and the fabricatory
politics while transitional justice requires a look backward to the past to respond to the conflict (Teitel, 2017 ). In fact, it is through these retrospective models that transitional justice can initiate critical responses. In the Syrian case, the limited international judicial arrangement seems to narrowly focus on war crimes and campaigns against
continued to take a rather restrictive position with respect to the prosecution of war crimes. It argued in favour of a seven-year opt-out provision for the prosecution of war crimes (Economides, 2001: 120).2 The fact that these three European states started out from different and even partially contradictory positions triggers the question of why the legalistic discourse provided the possibility of integration and even convergence on some points, so that it was eventually perceived as a more or less unified European standpoint on the issue of the ICC. Three aspects