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provided in Menon’s resolution’. Eden agreed that the British could not either, but he stressed the importance of not changing Menon’s resolution so much that Menon might be unable to vote for it himself. When Acheson warned Eden that he might have to choose between ‘our vote or the Indian vote’, the Foreign Secretary replied ‘that in that case he wanted ours’. This led Acheson to speculate to Truman: ‘I think we may be able to work this out.’ It was clear that a General Assembly resolution would have to be based on the Menon draft, ‘but I believe we shall be able to get
, ratification and 50 CBOW in the twentieth century accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989 (1996), www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm. (accessed 25.9. 2015). 126 ‘Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child’. 127 UN, ‘The Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, 1948 G.A.res. 217 (III), www. un.org/en/documents/udhr/. (accessed 2.1.2016). 128 UN, ‘Declaration of the Rights of the Child’, 1959. G.A. res. 1386 (XIV), 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (no. 16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354, www.humanium.org/en/childr ens
signatories. However, even though the declarations made by the executive at the time gave too much weight to the shift created by the resolutions, it would be mistaken to underestimate their importance. They constituted a key milestone in the emergence of a global consensus on humanitarian intervention by allowing the UN General Assembly to debate the idea. They also led France to play a central role in the adoption of other resolutions such as UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 on the “Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency
challenges. While abolition of the practice has been on the upswing internationally since the end of the Second World War, and has been upheld in a variety of interstate treaties and protocols including two General Assembly resolutions, the practice remains widely used by several UN heavyweights including the United States, something that gives political cover to other retentionist hold-outs, as is the case in China. Because the death penalty is fundamentally a matter of domestic criminal policies, binding rules or sanctions have been slow to develop around the practice
, Togo, and Zimbabwe, among other African countries, voted against UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Iran's human rights record. 83 However, between 2010 and 2013, Comoros, Gambia, Malawi, and Senegal changed their previous positions by voting for such resolutions. 84 As indicated later, in the cases of Gambia and Senegal, this decision coincided with their cutting of diplomatic ties with the IRI in response to its alleged arming of local rebels
Nations … I would put my trust in the United Nations before any European Rapid Reaction Force’ (Seanad 173: 1299–300). What is also sometimes argued to be draining away is Ireland’s own commitment to long-established policies at the UN on issues such as disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. Ireland’s 1994 abstention on a UN General Assembly resolution asking the International Court of Justice to review the legality of nuclear weapons is a case in point. While all other EU member states voted against the resolution, Ireland abstained. This vote caused ‘great
. For years, the Phnom Penh regime had not been seated in the UN. ASEAN-sponsored General Assembly resolutions had associated the Phnom Penh regime with the Vietnamese invasion, and steadfastly refused to confer official legitimacy to it. Vietnam, on the other hand, was widely considered an aggressor. Security Council action against Hanoi and Phnom Penh had been averted only by dedicated Soviet efforts. 53 As a
countries including 147 heads of state and government, and were further endorsed by member states at the 2005 UN World Summit (UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/). They identified separate goals and targets for eight particular policy areas (Box 1 ), but these were meant to be seen as an interrelated whole. The MDGs were also intended to be based upon a partnership between countries from the so-called global North and South, ‘to create an
Convention on Human Rights. 46 See General Assembly Resolution 95(I) (1946) and the International Law Commission’s formulation of the Nuremberg Principles (1950). 47 See G. Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity (London: Penguin, 2000). 48 See D. Turns and C. Byron, ‘The preparatory commission for the international criminal court’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 50 (2001), 420–34. 49 H. Kelsen, ‘Will the judgment at Nuremberg constitute a precedent?’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1 (1947), 153–71; G. Lawrence (President of the IMT), ‘The Nuremberg
unrealistic they might be’.79 The actions of newly independent nations on the Committee of 24 in implementing General Assembly Resolution 1514 from 1961 onwards increased the impression among British Foreign Office officials of the UN as an unwieldy and unpredictable organisation that had been converted into ‘an organ of the anti-colonial movement, a kind of Holy Alliance in reverse’.80 The embittered rhetoric from imperial internationalists, such as one of the leading British scholars of International Relations in the 1960s, Martin Wight, about the dismantling of the