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Ireland, German reunification and remaking Europe
Mervyn O’Driscoll

retained control over the necessary policies to promote national economic wellbeing in a global economy.50 The ‘Celtic Tiger’ phenomenon and Dublin’s (un) conscious blending of Boston and Berlin’s socio-​economic models had produced a unique perspective on the EU in at least some Irish quarters, and it also fuelled a sense of economic and national confidence. This was epitomised by the Irish electorate’s rejection of both the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty in Irish referenda in 2001 and 2008, which led to reruns in 2002 and 2009. Both the first Nice (Nice I) and

in Ireland, West Germany and the New Europe, 1949– 73
Inter-regionalism in a new era
Julie Gilson

1992 signed the Maastricht Treaty, which established the three-pillar structure of Europe, thereby ensuring that a significant amount of European business (under the “European Community” pillar) would henceforth be conducted at supranational level under the auspices of the Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice. It also led to the creation of the euro zone, a common currency for the majority of EU states. Since that time, additional treaties have further consolidated the legal character of the EU, and in 2009 the Lisbon Treaty increased the number of issue areas

in The European Union in the Asia-Pacific
Suetyi Lai and Li Zhang

160 government officials, journalists and leaders from NGOs and trade unions on a five-to-eight day visit to the EU involving meetings with EU officials every year (Rasmussen, 2009). No EU document clearly states which EU institutions should take the public diplomacy role, as the Council, the Parliament and the Commission can all act for public diplomacy. In practice, the European Commission has been a chief actor, particularly its external directorate-general (DG RELEX). After the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, it is the European External Action Service (EEAS

in The European Union in the Asia-Pacific
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis

engagement with East Asia and Japan. The Union has sought to enhance its credibility as an international actor by establishing in 1992 a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and by developing since 1999 the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), later called the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) under the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. The Union has also sought to make its “external” face more visible through the creation of the position of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, currently 166 Selected countries and groups held by Federica

in The European Union in the Asia-Pacific
Luca Raineri and Francesco Strazzari

Lisbon Treaty issued in those same years, recalled the importance of fostering policy coherence for development. More recent strategies, by contrast, overturn the nexus, and exhort to make development aid functional to EU migration goals, first and foremost the curbing of irregular migration. For instance, the 2016 Partnership Framework on Migration – which builds on the Agenda on Migration and shapes

in The EU and crisis response
The limits of the EU’s external dimension of migration in Africa
Tine Van Criekinge

(European Union, 2009). With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, m ­ igration policy has become even further communitarised. All EU decisions on asylum, immigration and integration will now be subject to qualified majority voting in the Council, and the European Parliament has been given joint decision-­making power, potentially strengthening the EU’s capacity to offer further labour market access towards migrants. The EU has also encouraged the implementation of circular migration schemes, to ensure that regular labour migration remains temporary. In 2008

in The European Union in Africa
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The social dimension of EU–Africa relations
Jan Orbie

-­front. Given their nature as horizontal external policy objectives, social objectives would need to be mainstreamed into EU trade and development-­related initiatives. In fact, the Lisbon Treaty introduces a ‘horizontal social clause’ which can be seen as an attempt to mainstream social policies in the all areas of EU policy (Bruun et al., 2012: 4). However, given the limited institutionalisation of strong pro-­social forces in EU external relations, we expect that the social dimension of EU–Africa relations will be limited. Taking these conceptual and theoretical

in The European Union in Africa
(Re)evaluating the EU–Africa relationship
Michael Smith

threads through which EU development policy has evolved, but it did not resolve some of the key institutional problems relating to EU–Africa relations. The Lisbon Treaty has more recently generated a further set of institutional challenges, not least (Re)evaluating the EU–Africa relationship309 through the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which has taken responsibility for policy formation in the development field (and in EU–Africa relations). This has been a disruptive influence, at least in the short term, since it has required the

in The European Union in Africa
British European discourses 2007–10
Oliver Daddow

connections and the pragmatic, hard-headed calculations out of which he formed British thinking on the single currency and the Lisbon Treaty (Brown 1999e; Brown 1999f; Brown 2000b; Brown 2002b; Brown 2002d; Brown 2005i; Brown 2006d). Brown was a self-confessed fan of the ‘special relationship’ and believed ‘no power on earth can drive us apart’ (Brown 2008a). He was committed not just to ‘celebrating but deepening’ Anglo-American relations, on the commercial as well as the political level (Brown 2003f). Brown’s affection for the US and its history prompted commentators

in New Labour and the European Union
Tom Gallagher

(UACES), he offered Commission staff to speak to students, either by visiting their universities or by hosting meetings in London, about topics central to the activity of the EU such as climate change and the Lisbon Treaty. The communications strategy of the EU is clear about the Commission having the role of ‘build[ing] up support for the European Union’s policies and its objectives’. But Open Europe saw this as ‘a completely unacceptable use of public money’, especially since ‘the EU has no mandate for education policy’. 41 Much scholarship has been devoted to

in Europe’s path to crisis