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It is possible to conceive of international law in Europe 700–1200. By exploring the content of treaties and by comparing this to domestic law and customs, it is possible to see a framework of international rules that reflects the interactions and issues arising from those interactions across centuries of practice. Peaceful relations between entities was a goal that could
a guiding practical ideal, one requiring that international law, just like law tout court, so far from standing above or apart from the morality of the community it governs, should be shaped by it. It is an ideal that ought to be congenial to everyone who believes in the possibility of moral progress. For progress as a concept embodies the aim, simply put, of creating a better world than the world we have, and international humanitarian law is designed to hold the primary subjects of international law – sovereign states – to 1 2 Alain Finkielkraut, Remembering
The just war doctrine The original just war doctrine was not concerned with intervening in other states for humanitarian reasons, but with providing just reasons for resorting to an inter-state war. It was only by the sixteenth century, coinciding with the birth of international law, then known as jus gentium or law of nations, under the sway of natural law, that support for those suffering from tyranny and maltreatment was seen as one of the
of the peace. 47 Systemic oppression of women has not, however, been regarded as a comparable threat to international peace. What is the content of the idea of ‘collective security’ in international law? The term ‘collective security’ is not actually used in the Charter although the idea of collective measures is given some substance in chapter VII. First, the concept of
international customary practices or taking action against foreign entities, groups of people, or individuals without justifying this in a legal context. As highlighted by Dixon: ‘This is powerful evidence that states follow rules of international law as a matter of obligation, not simply as a matter of choice or morality. If this were not so, there would be no need for states to justify their action in legal
puise sa sagesse dans la science qui a dénoncé les péril, son dynamisme dans la necessite de fair vite. Elle est tout à la fois coutume savante et alertante. 1 In a well-known 1974 piece, from which the words above have been extracted, René-Jean Dupuy sheds light on many aspects of importance for the present discussion about the role of international organisations in the formation of customary international law, specifically, in the formation of opinio juris , in the present times. Dupuy starts by affirming a tension between fact and mind, and by highlighting the
formal structure of international law. It not only claims a ‘soft’ influence over states to take human rights into account but, in some instances, to demand compliance and declare a duty to obey. The norms of international law function as a higher law vis-à-vis that of states and there is an increasing number of treaty-based norms that obligate all states, whether or not they have signed the treaty in question. These include prohibition on genocide, as well as
(This article was originally published on ‘Normblog’, 27 August 2013) The signs are now clear that Washington * and other Western powers, † including Britain, are considering military action against Syria on account of the regime’s apparent use of chemical weapons against Syrian civilians. ‡ Would such action be justified? In the debate about this at least three types of issue are centrally involved: (1) whether there is a basis in international law for military intervention; (2) whether it is likely to do any good; and (3) whether it might be merited in
States also enter into international investment agreements (IIAs) to protect foreign investment. These agreements may be required to be made in accordance with relevant rules of contract law, public international law and private international law. Municipal law may equally place significant requirements on the conclusion of such agreements, the object of which may be to protect
, jointly deployed realist arguments to discredit the League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Versailles peace settlement. Our discussion focusses on the American isolationist lawyer Edwin M. Borchard (1884–1951) who already in the early 1930s propagated ‘realism’ as an approach to the study of IR, semantically opposed to the ‘evangelism’ of the Wilsonian internationalists. 2 In the historiography of IR and international law, Borchard’s work has been almost completely neglected. Only Hidemi Suganami seems to have recognised the importance of Borchard