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historical issues. At the same time, it was also evident that such efforts were less concerned with rethinking anthropology and history by blurring disciplinary boundaries and more with expressing conventional anthropological considerations by drawing on historical materials and understandings, many of which remained suspect to the professional historians of the time. Also, well into the 1960s, these efforts
innocence and idea, the space and time, of India. 17 Emergences These mid-twentieth-century modernists had arguably anticipated the unraveling of the South Asian nations from the 1960s onwards. If in Pakistan such undoing entailed the central place of authoritarian governments and military regimes, in India the idealism of the past was replaced by a manipulative politics, cynical
prominent paradigms within the social sciences, the former till the 1960s and the latter till the 1970s. 46 The two traditions have understood “structure” differently. Yet both have accorded primacy to the object(s) of structure over the subject(s) of history, emphases that worked in tandem with their privileging of synchrony over diachrony. All of this defined the atemporal predication of human action upon
. Such sensibilities extended from the diverse politics of counter-colonialism and decolonization that began in the 1940s through to the events of the 1960s entailing critiques of imperialism and racism – embodied, for example, in the dramatic moment of 1968 – and the continuation of these struggles into the 1970s across different parts of the world. Together, postcolonial and subaltern studies were
its value monism. A guide to political practices In the essay on utopianism that she wrote in the mid-1980s, Shklar makes clear how much her theorising has changed since the 1950s and 1960s. She is now calling for a normative, even prescriptive, approach to political thought, although one that is opposed to transformative, prophetic utopianism. She says that there has been ‘a revival of normative thought’ in the era after ‘the decline of the great ideologies of the nineteenth century’ (Shklar 1998 [nd1], p. 188). Of great
, but on his own estimate of the real needs of the persons appearing before him and of society as a whole’ (Shklar 1964c , pp. 8–9). When confronted with poverty and racial inequality (as Shklar herself was in 1960s America) there is a moral requirement to do something for the worst off, even if this means doing something wrong. The wrong done is not just to break what are understood to be the rules of justice (to violate people's long-standing, legitimate expectations). There is also the wrong done to those treated paternalistically in order to ensure the
Just as the founding of the first European Communities in the 1950s produced a backlash in the 1960s and 1970s, the second phase of integration has also met with resistance. Recent challenges to the classic narrative have taken a number of forms: the desire of the new member-states from East-Central Europe for recognition of their suffering under communism, the growing economic problems brought about by the Eurozone crisis, and the threat of disintegration posed by Brexit. In the case of European expansion, continental institutions and existing member-states were again confronted by conflicting understandings of the European past. In particular, the states of the east have challenged the central place of the Holocaust and the image of Auschwitz in the classic narrative of integration. The combined monetary, banking, and sovereign debt crisis brought on by the Great Recession of 2008 merely reinforced these cleavages. This was followed by the Brexit vote on 23 June 2016 and is further threatened by the rise of populism and the spectre of additional votes to leave the EU. These proximate challenges have been compounded by rise to power of the first generation of European leaders with no personal memories of Europe’s age of total war.
-century.’ The sixty-eighters changed European memory culture by forcing individuals and the discourses of remembrance in the west to confront the atrocities of industrially organised slaughter. 4 Despite their influence on domestic politics and on the narrative of European integration, the activism of the 1960s and 1970s coincided with the institutional stagnation of the European project. By this period, Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer and much of the rest of the Erfahrungsgeneration (the ‘generation of experience’), who were born in the late nineteenth century and had lived
deepening of the European project into new areas of political life. However, due to the rise of leaders like Charles de Gaulle, who denied that the European rupture of 1945 necessitated new thinking, integration stagnated in the 1960s and 1970s. This period of Eurosclerosis was highlighted by the attempt to change the European Communities into a ‘Europe of the nation-states.’ This return to more traditional modes of politics was followed by what I call the ‘second phase of integration’ (1985–2003), which was driven by a new constellation of leaders that mirrored Monnet
Europe. The result was the foundation of the European Communities in the 1950s. In this early period, the European movement received vocal philosophical support from individuals like Max Horkheimer in Germany and Jean-Paul Sartre in France. Both of these philosophers and public intellectuals believed that the European experience of wartime resistance should play a role in the revival of democratic values on the continent. 20 By the late 1960s this temporal grouping was replaced by the Flakhelfer-Generation (‘anti-aircraft helper generation’), which draws its name