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Gaulle’s resistance was reinforced by the first expansion of the European Communities. When the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland were finally allowed to join the European Communities in 1973, the anti-community movement de Gaulle had spurred gained further allies who viewed the European project through a decidedly economic lens. This was especially true of the British, who did not share the collective memory of Nazi occupation with continental Europe. As a result of these differences, leaders in the UK were thus more willing to continue to believe in the
are more complex than that between Italian fascism and Modernism. Romantic folkloricism in particular shares much with the thematic motifs of populism, especially those identified by Shils in the US tradition, notably ‘the virtues of uncorrupted, simple common folk’ that is manifest in respect for ‘authenticity’ . 3 In the British tradition, the Romantic poets Wordsworth and Coleridge adopted the folk ballad form but also laid the ground for mass/minority culture framing in Wordsworth's critical
theory. To offer a new poststructuralist interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology at this late stage, after Foucault and Arendt, is like saying that Hegel was really a poststructuralist all along. But surely this is to contribute to a ‘politics of confusion’, given the way Hegel has traditionally been interpreted, and given also that if we are to start over again it would surely be better to do so through Foucault and Nietzsche, and/or Arendt, who were trying to achieve such an alternative complexity approach to politics all along. 18 The British Hegelians and the
. His swipe against the English was not a total dismissal of the British constitution. Indeed, he praised the Westminster system in Lettres écrites de la montagne (III: 848). What he merely wanted to show was that Britain – at that time the only major power to hold elections – was not an ideal polity. In developing a model of constitutionalism, Rousseau stressed that the people should be entitled to veto legislation lest the enactments of the representatives should be in contravention of the General Will, i.e. represent the Particular as opposed to the General Will
together as he suggests – and with an eye out for radical breaks with what came before – Forst’s neglect of the British colonies of North America is particularly strange. The various ‘experiments’ with toleration (and persecution) conducted there took place in the face of ‘deep’ religious, cultural and linguistic differences, in which many of his dramatis personae were personally and actively involved. Forget Hobbes and Locke’s armchair involvement with the colonies of Virginia and Carolina! When Forst discusses Penn and Williams (the founders of Pennsylvania and Rhode
Caribbean and in Britain. At the intellectual level, I have become preoccupied by a number of issues, explored here, that colonial and postcolonial studies have ignored or find difficulty in including in their grander analyses. A commonplace of postcolonial studies is the supposed subversiveness of the colonial/postcolonial subject, through the tropes of mimicry, cultural hybridity, and writing or speaking
parliament buildings in Barbados are the third oldest in the Commonwealth after Britain and Bermuda. Barbados is proud of its tradition of political stability. Apart from the nips of a few mosquitoes; some sunburn; and the drawn Test cricket series achieved when the England team visited St Kitts, Grenada and Barbados, 1 their supporters, the so-called ‘Barmy Army’, are unlikely to have been otherwise much
is either open or it is closed – though closure may take a while. The implication for St Vincent then is that once British hegemony was established the frontier was closed. Caribbean historians appear to agree with this perspective and have mostly consigned frontier analysis to the past. For example, Gordon Lewis, bemoaning the lack of scholarship in the region based on the concept of the frontier
reinvigorating older tropes of collective memory dating back to before Europe’s age of total war. This is most visible in the United Kingdom in the aftermath of its vote to leave the EU on 23 June 2016. The neo-imperial dream of a ‘global Britain’ deployed by the Brexiteers, in which Britain can make up for the loss of its customs union with the EU by negotiating closer ties with erstwhile colonies, including the United States, India, and Australia, is a reflection of a return to a dark past that is remembered fondly by a certain segment of the predominately white population
cultural racism rather than following older European and US racisms' biological essentialism. ‘Cultural racism’ also helps Julija Sardelić explain rising post-Yugoslav antiziganism, which regarded Roma as not even capable of forming their own territorial nation. Sardelić ( 2014 : 208–9) links this form of racism into wider contexts of 1990s European racisms via perspectives from Britain (Gilroy), France (Pierre-André Taguieff) and Italy (Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri) which argue there are multiple racisms that mobilise ‘constructed cultural difference’ to legitimise