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Introduction Rainer Bauböck's “Democratic Inclusion: A Pluralistic Theory of Citizenship” is characteristically incisive. In this essay and elsewhere (e.g. Bauböck 2003, 2007 ), he has liberated normative political theory from the girdle of territorial boundary conditions. If ever it was, it is obviously no longer possible to posit a world of perfectly segmented national communities. For normative theory to remain
This book addresses the major theoretical and practical issues of the forms of citizenship and access to citizenship in different types of polity, and the specification and justification of rights of non-citizen immigrants as well as non-resident citizens. It also addresses the conditions under which norms governing citizenship can legitimately vary. The book discusses the principles of including all affected interests (AAI), all subject to coercion (ASC) and all citizenship stakeholders (ACS). They complement each other because they serve distinct purposes of democratic inclusion. The book proposes that democratic inclusion principles specify a relation between an individual or group that has an inclusion claim and a political community that aims to achieve democratic legitimacy for its political decisions and institutions. It contextualizes the principle of stakeholder inclusion, which provides the best answer to the question of democratic boundaries of membership, by applying it to polities of different types. The book distinguishes state, local and regional polities and argues that they differ in their membership character. It examines how a principle of stakeholder inclusion applies to polities of different types. The book illustrates the difference between consensual and automatic modes of inclusion by considering the contrast between birthright acquisition of citizenship, which is generally automatic, and naturalization, which requires an application.
of polities with different principles of inclusion, and that the appropriate principles for inclusion at one level depend in part on the principles operative at other levels. Birthright citizenship at the national level, for example, makes possible both residency-based citizenship at the local level and derivative or nested citizenship at the federal level, just as the latter two modes of citizenship help to correct potential injustices or
Rainer Bauböck's work on popular sovereignty, citizenship and the demos problem is an important touchstone for contemporary political, and especially democratic, theory. Grounded in attention to both the theoretical and empirical circumstances of individual and collective political agency, Bauböck offers a highly sophisticated and, in many ways, compelling approach to thinking through the philosophical and political
combines arguments associated with membership of the demos with others concerning the grounds for citizenship. Bauböck proposes that ACS is better able than two other principles advanced in democratic theory – the all affected interests (AAI) and all subject to coercion (ASC) principles – to subsume a range of justified claims to membership. Those norms are depicted not so much as wrong but as incomplete to cover all claims for
demonstrating that they fail to answer to the democratic membership question. My main concern was to pave the ground for my multilevel theory of stakeholder citizenship in section 4 . Ideally, in a book-length discussion, I should have devoted as much space to further working out the normative implications and real-world applications of the principles of including AAI and ASC. Miller's sharp comments provide a welcome occasion for adding some more
political boundaries and the powers of nation-states to determine themselves who their citizens are. To be sure, most contemporary political theorists have added some critiques of current state practices or suggestions why some categories of individuals cannot be legitimately excluded from citizenship. Yet they often have done so starting from the premise that the context within which the question needs to be addressed is the international system of states as we
, empirical researchers and policy-makers alike. Those gifts are clearly on display here as Bauböck explores the virtues and limitations of three different principles of democratic inclusion: all affected interests (AAI), all subject to coercion (ASC) and all citizenship stakeholders (ACS). Bauböck argues that the three principles complement one another, with each providing legitimation for a different set of democratic institutions and practices
the utopian dimension of Rousseau's thinking. And one of his utopian arguments is that, insofar as we live together in a true republic, like his Spartan utopian ideal, then coercion will be unnecessary when we are forced to be free. This is the case because, as Shklar says, Sparta represents for Rousseau ‘a picture of the public education of perfectly socialized men – who do not suffer the miseries of actual men’: Because citizenship is a matter of self -repression, Spartan man is also free, in
many people present on their territory at any moment should qualify for full rights of citizenship, as well as who among those currently outside the territory might also qualify. How, then, should we think about these two interrelated boundary problems? Can the same principles guide us towards solutions to both, or do they have to be addressed independently? And which needs to be tackled first? You might think that jurisdiction is the more