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The media and international intervention
Author: Philip Hammond

The first major post-Cold War conflict, the 1991 Gulf war, indicated how much had already changed. Saddam Hussein had enjoyed Western support in Iraq's war against Iran in the 1980s, but was abruptly cast as the 'new Hitler' after his invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. This book is about how the media have interpreted conflict and international intervention in the years after the Cold War. By comparing press coverage of a number of different wars and crises, it seeks to establish which have been the dominant themes in explaining the post-Cold War international order and to discover how far the patterns established prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks have subsequently changed. The key concern is with the legitimacy of Western intervention: the aim is to investigate the extent to which Western military action is represented in news reporting as justifiable and necessary. The book presents a study that looks at UK press coverage of six conflicts and the international response to them: two instances of 'humanitarian military intervention' (Somalia and Kosovo); two cases in which the international community was criticised for not intervening (Bosnia and Rwanda); and two post-9/11 interventions (Afghanistan and Iraq). There were a number of overlapping UN and US interventions in Somalia in the early 1990s. Operation Restore Hope was the first major instance of post-Cold War humanitarian military intervention, following the precedent set by the establishment of 'safe havens' for Iraqi Kurds and other minorities at the end of the 1991 Gulf war.

Propaganda and subversion, 1945–48
Daniel W. B. Lomas

Britain to start a Cold War offensive involving subversion and special operations in the Eastern Bloc, believing such action, if enacted, would ‘endanger the position’ of allies and unnecessarily provoke the Soviets for little gain. 3 Although this opposition was gradually eroded, largely because of Soviet actions and attempts by officials to force a rethink, the moratorium on anti-Soviet activities

in Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51
Ministers, subversion and special operations, 1948–51
Daniel W. B. Lomas

Beyond Bevin, any wider ministerial reluctance to engage in covert activities started to erode as the Cold War began, particularly following the Berlin Crisis of 1948–49. 4 Other than Valuable, Bevin also approved subversive activities inside the Soviet zone of Germany aimed at undermining relations between East German officials and Soviet forces, leading to recommendations that such

in Intelligence, security and the Attlee governments, 1945–51
Mark Webber

In a volume intended to have a contemporary bearing, it may seem idiosyncratic to devote an entire chapter to the Cold War. There are, after all, other more recent episodes which could be said to have shaped international politics and to which connections can be drawn with the book’s central concerns of inclusion/exclusion and security. Yet security relations in Europe

in Inclusion, exclusion and the governance of European Security
Paul Latawski and Martin A. Smith

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been significantly reoriented and retooled across the board. This process of change has been captured under two main labels. Internal adaptation is NATO-speak for looking at how the institution works, and whether it can be made to work better and more effectively. The process has embraced the possibility of creating procedures and structures whereby European member

in The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European security

The conflict in Kosovo represents a significant watershed in post-Cold War international security. Interpreting its political and operational significance should reveal important clues for understanding international security in the new millennium. This text analyses the international response to the crisis in Kosovo and its broader implications, by examining its diplomatic, military and humanitarian features. Despite the widely held perception that the conflict in Kosovo has implications for international security, unravelling them can be challenging, as it remains an event replete with paradoxes. There are many such paradoxes. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) entered into the conflict ostensibly to head off a humanitarian catastrophe, only to accelerate the catastrophe by engaging in a bombing campaign; the political aims of all the major players contradicted the military means chosen by them in the conflict. The Russian role in the diplomatic efforts demonstrated that NATO did not want Russia to be involved but in the end needed its involvement. Russia opposed the bombing campaign but ultimately did not have enough power or influence to rise above a role as NATO's messenger; the doctrinal hurdles to achieving ‘immaculate coercion’ by use of air power alone seemed to tumble in the face of apparent success; it is ultimately unclear how or why NATO succeeded.

From Truman to Eisenhower (1948– 53)
Joseph Heller

turn the Middle East into a Cold War arena. Thus the State Department sought an alternative to partition, along the lines of an international trusteeship or federal state. 4 The Zionists responded that US–Soviet relations had never been perfect. 5 US forces outnumbered Soviet forces and there was no real danger of Soviet penetration. Canceling contracts with American oil companies would be suicidal for the Arab countries

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
Testing the Memorandum of Understanding (1965–67)
Joseph Heller

could not attack. 14 At the same time, the escalating Vietnam War cast its shadow over the Cold War. Johnson needed to be persuaded, Israel suggested, that trust between the two countries had to be restored, perhaps in the form of the sale of Intruder planes. 15 Rodger Davies, Talbot’s deputy, admitted that only assurances of Israel’s security, with Egyptian acceptance, could persuade Israel to agree to

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
Joseph Heller

take care of itself and that there was no proof the balance of power had tilted against Israel, which led the Jewish leaders to realize they had no real influence in Washington. In addition, Abba Eban, now minister of education and culture, warned the Israeli cabinet against illusions that Kennedy’s election meant the Cold War had ended. Ben-Gurion feared the defense budget for the coming three to four

in The United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab– Israeli conflict, 1948– 67
An uneasy relationship?

Drawing extensively on recently released documents and private papers, this is the first extensive book-length study to examine the intimate relationship between the Attlee government and Britain’s intelligence and security services. Often praised for the formation of the modern-day ‘welfare state’, Attlee’s government also played a significant, if little understood, role in combatting communism at home and overseas, often in the face of vocal, sustained, opposition from their own backbenches. Beneath Attlee’s calm exterior lay a dedicated, if at times cautious, Cold War warrior, dedicated to combatting communism at home and overseas. This study tells the story of Attlee’s Cold War. At home, the Labour government implemented vetting to protect Whitehall and other areas of the Cold War state from communists, while, overseas, Attlee and his Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin authorised a series of highly secret special operations in Eastern Europe, designed to erode Soviet influence, told here for the first time in significant detail. More widely, Ministers also strengthened Imperial and Commonwealth security and, responding to a series of embarrassing spy scandals, tried to revive Britain’s vital nuclear transatlantic ‘special relationship’ with Washington. This study is essential reading for anyone interested in the Labour Party, intelligence, security and Britain’s foreign and defence policy at the start of the Cold War.