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German–Israeli relations, 1949–69
Author: Lorena De Vita

The rapprochement between Germany and Israel in the aftermath of the Holocaust is one of the most striking political developments of the twentieth century. German Chancellor Angela Merkel recently referred to it as a ‘miracle’. But how did this ‘miracle’ come about? Drawing upon sources from both sides of the Iron Curtain and of the Arab–Israeli conflict, Lorena De Vita traces the contradictions and dilemmas that shaped the making of German–Israeli relations at the outset of the global Cold War. Israelpolitik offers new insights not only into the history of German–Israeli relations, but also into the Cold War competition between the two German states, as each attempted to strengthen its position in the Middle East and the international arena while struggling with the legacy of the Nazi past.

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Lorena De Vita

From that year onwards, West German and Israeli football teams began exchanging expertise, with Israeli coaches travelling frequently to Cologne for training purposes. 5 The links between the German Trade Union Confederation (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) and its Israeli counterpart, the Histradut, also grew closer. 6 But Shinnar maintained his focus on high politics for the time being, fixated on his goal of establishing diplomatic relations. The desire for a closer cooperation with the Federal Republic was something that David Ben-Gurion seemed to be ‘possessed

in Israelpolitik
Ahmad H. Sa’di

MUP FINAL PROOF – <STAGE>, 08/19/2013, SPi 1 The formation of a discourse The need for a discourse In the autumn of 1948, while the eventful war was drawing to an end, David Ben-Gurion, who led the organized Jewish community – the Yishuv – to what has been described until recently in the media and history books as a miraculous victory, began his moves for the next stage. At the personal level, he had to reaffirm his leadership through a popular vote. In the international arena, he had to manoeuvre for international recognition of Israel without making

in Thorough surveillance
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Contextualising reconciliation
Lorena De Vita

.), Deutschland und Israel: Solidarität in der Bewährung: Bilanz und Perspektive der deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen (Gerlingen: Bleicher, 1992); G. Lavy, Germany and Israel: Moral Debt and National Interest (London: Frank Cass, 1996); N. Hansen , Aus dem Schatten der Katastrophe. Die deutsch-israelischen Beziehungen in der Ära Adenauer und David Ben Gurion ( Düsseldorf : Droste , 2002 ); Y. A. Jelinek , Deutschland und Israel, 1945–1965. Ein neurotisches Verhältnis ( Munich : Oldenbourg , 2004 ); D. Trimbur , De la Shoah à la Réconciliation? La Question

in Israelpolitik
Constructing security in historical perspective
Jonathan B. Isacoff

; b 1992, estimated. Source : Central Intelligence Agency 2000 . The consolidation of Israeli militarism: David Ben-Gurion v. Moshe Sharett The Ben-Gurion v. the Sharett ‘lines’ During the late

in Redefining security in the Middle East
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Lorena De Vita

Nasser’s increasing popularity in the region, of the spectre of Soviet penetration of the Middle East, and of a possible imminent reduction in the US armed forces stationed in Europe, it was easy for the Chancellor to understand why David Ben-Gurion would justify the Sinai campaign as a pre-emptively defensive, rather than an offensive, act. 47 This, in turn, came close to putting the FRG onto a road to covert defiance of the United States, while the relationship between Adenauer and Ben-Gurion, and the West German and Israeli security establishments, grew ever closer

in Israelpolitik
Arabs, Israelis, and the limits of military force
Author: Jeremy Pressman

The Arab–Israeli conflict has been at the centre of international affairs for decades. Despite repeated political efforts, the confrontation and casualties continue, especially in fighting between Israelis and Palestinians. This new assessment emphasizes the role that military force plays in blocking a diplomatic resolution. Many Arabs and Israelis believe that the only way to survive or to be secure is through the development, threat, and use of military force and violence. This idea is deeply flawed and results in missed diplomatic opportunities and growing insecurity. Coercion cannot force rivals to sign a peace agreement to end a long-running conflict. Sometimes negotiations and mutual concessions are the key to improving the fate of a country or national movement. Using short historical case studies from the 1950s through to today, the book explores and pushes back against the dominant belief that military force leads to triumph while negotiations and concessions lead to defeat and further unwelcome challenges. In The sword is not enough, we learn both what makes this idea so compelling to Arab and Israeli leaders and how it eventually may get dislodged.

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Lorena De Vita

’s neighbours had declared war against it just a few hours after David Ben-Gurion, head of the Jewish Agency and first Prime Minister of Israel, announced its very foundation on 14 May 1948. The war effort left the Israeli economy in disarray. The situation was further complicated by the huge waves of mass immigration that characterised much of the first years of Israel’s existence. While in the run-up to the declaration of independence the immigrants were arriving in large numbers from Europe, either to escape Nazi persecution or after the liberation of the concentration

in Israelpolitik
Jeremy Pressman

opposed to rockets, armed resistance and any kind of fighting against Israel’.11 Decades earlier, Moshe Sharett had gone further and decried the connection between the use of force and escalation. So, Sharett explained, not only did force not make the situation better, it actually made it worse. At the time, Sharett was locked in a leadership struggle with David Ben-Gurion, the serving Israeli prime minister. When Ben-Gurion retired in 1953, 104 Sword.indb 104 25/03/2020 15:11:02 Force, insecurity, and failure Sharett became prime minister and lasted into 1955. Ben

in The sword is not enough
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Living in the shadow
Ronit Lentin

the maltreatment of the Arabs by Jewish settlers, attributing it, as Tom Segev points out (2002: ix), to psychological causes: ‘They were slaves in their land of exile and suddenly they find they have unlimited freedom ... This sudden change has produced in their hearts an inclination towards repressive despotism, as always occurs when “the slave becomes king”.’ David Ben Gurion’s more militant Zionism won over the peace-oriented Brit Shalom, the group headed by the President of the Hebrew University J. L. Magnes and the liberal philosopher Martin Buber. However

in Co-memory and melancholia