In this chapter, we argue that
economics has not done enough to prioritise democracy or
self-determination in economic development.
This builds on our argument in the last chapter , that globalisation has
for many countries prescribed a single predetermined pathway from
‘poor’ to ‘developed’, rather than
supporting countries to chart their own
leaves room for interminable Marxist controversialising on the state in general and on the state in relation to monetary affairs in particular. This section uses the historical examples primarily to identify the essential role of states and inter-state relations in monetary relations and thence in economic development more generally. The examples are focused on Europe but it is implicit from the start that money should be understood ‘globally’; if Europe took the lead some time in the first half of the last millennium, it drew on the rest of the world. As above, value
construct. The question that is posed here is whether developments
that lower transaction costs and alleviate the problems of
asymmetric information in markets will lead to a decline in
financial intermediation. There is evidence that large companies are
moving away from intermediated finance through banks towards raising
funds directly from capital markets. This phenomenon is referred to
). The first Earth Day, celebrated on 21 March 1970, marked the emergence
of an environmental movement in the United States that reasserted the need
for a frugality ethos in order to protect the planet from pollution and other
afflictions (Fritsch, 1974). All these essentially introduced the concept of gradual
but profound environmental destruction by industry.
By 1983, the United Nations had established the World Commission on
Environment and Development (WCED), better known as the Brundtland
commission after its chairwoman, Gro Harlem Brundtland. The Brundtland
The well-being of Europe’s citizens depends less on individual consumption and more on their social consumption of essential goods and services – from water and retail banking to schools and care homes – in what we call the foundational economy. Individual consumption depends on market income, while foundational consumption depends on social infrastructure and delivery systems of networks and branches, which are neither created nor renewed automatically, even as incomes increase. This historically created foundational economy has been wrecked in the last generation by privatisation, outsourcing, franchising and the widespread penetration of opportunistic and predatory business models. The distinctive, primary role of public policy should therefore be to secure the supply of basic services for all citizens (not a quantum of economic growth and jobs). Reconstructing the foundational has to start with a vision of citizenship that identifies foundational entitlements as the conditions for dignified human development, and likewise has to depend on treating the business enterprises central to the foundational economy as juridical persons with claims to entitlements but also with responsibilities and duties. If the aim is citizen well-being and flourishing for the many not the few, then European politics at regional, national and EU level needs to be refocused on foundational consumption and securing universal minimum access and quality. If/when government is unresponsive, the impetus for change has to come from engaging citizens locally and regionally in actions which break with the top down politics of ‘vote for us and we will do this for you’.
have had that status without the developments in the
markets that began in the 1960s and accelerated in the 1970s.
This chapter will trace both market developments and the
macro-economic and regulatory environment in which the transition
from the informal to the formal use of LIBOR as a universal benchmark
took place. Its purpose is to explain why both the establishment of
LIBOR and its oversight by the BBA seemed entirely logical at the time,
when its informal use was so well established, owing in part to the
dominant and colourful market participants who
light on whether or not price is the only measure of value, or if value remains when the price fluctuates. The purpose of this chapter is to set out the difficulties of valuing both complex financial instruments and real estate, and especially commercial real estate and development land. These are issues which economists do not take into account in developing theories of value. Such theories may also be detached from developments in financial instruments and the markets themselves. The chapter describes the methodologies used to value commercial real estate and
public is blurred and
fluid because individuals are much more engaged in different parts
of government. This means that policy problems are not only the
domain of an elite, but of much wider parts of the population.
Systems, making use of advances in technology, could be set up to
collate knowledge and experience which could inform the development of policy. This kind of state is smarter, more efficient and a
better problem solver.
A turn towards broad democracy is a turn away from the technocratic consensus that has dominated both the left and right of
politics in the
Likewise, economic research and education about
globalisation, a process by which the economies of countries become
more integrated, often frames it as an increase in voluntary
exchange for mutual benefit and increased prosperity. This glosses
over the many historical examples of powerful countries using real
or threatened violence to coerce others into becoming more
affected by geopolitical
and other events of all kinds, such as wars and rumours of wars,
macro-economic developments and fears of recession.
The gold and silver markets have long been plagued with rumours
of manipulation, whether by central banks or particular banks, states
or wealthy individuals. However, in the context of the financial crisis
and the discovery of extensive manipulation of LIBOR and the foreign
exchange market, it was essential that regulators conducted thorough
investigations, even when, in the case of the UK’s FCA, they had no regu