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Sean W. Burges

the US as a strategic partner well disposed to Brazilian development. Castelo Branco’s successor as military president Artur da Costa e Silva consequently redirected his country’s foreign policy to something approximating the política externa independente. In a pattern that has parallels with the PT foreign policy of the 2000s, Brazil moved to a foreign policy of ‘resposible pragmatism’, becoming a Third World country pushing for structural changes in global economic governance and actively campaigning to head the Group of 77. Regional coordination efforts focused

in Brazil in the world
Open Access (free)
An endangered legacy
Matteo Dian

Asia. Yet the rise of China had revolutionised the economic realities of the region, with all of Washington’s main regional allies increasingly dependent on China for trade and investment. Moreover, since the arrival of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Beijing has promoted a comprehensive blueprint of economic governance in Asia, based on Chinese leadership, values and rules. The most evident manifestations of this Chinese attempt to build alternative forms of economic governance have been the promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure

in The United States in the Indo-Pacific
Sean W. Burges

that Southern countries were in fact capable of endogenously managing their own economic affairs. This, combined with the dramatic economic improvements under the Lula presidency – which saw Brazil go from owing the IMF $50 billion in 2002 to loaning it $10 billion in 2009 – opened the space for Brazil’s legitimate inclusion in key economic governance institutions such as the G20 Finance and the quieter, but possibly more significant Financial Stability Forum (Armijo and Katada, 2014 ). Indeed, IMF confidence in former Brazilian macro-economic officials is such that

in Brazil in the world
Abstract only
Charles T. Hunt

security, rule of law, humanitarian, economic, governance, political, developmental, and human rights spheres. The relations within each of these pillars are extensive, but the increasingly comprehensive or integrated nature of programmes – such as protection of civilians (PoC), security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), or arranging and securing elections – has led to a proliferation of linkages and interdependencies across these functional areas. These efforts are often guided or supported through bilateral relations with

in United Nations peace operations and International Relations theory
Balancing, accommodation or driver of change?
María J. García

economy is to encourage liberalising reforms abroad that are compatible with their own economic governance preferences. Both the EU and US hoped to extend the disciplines covered at the WTO in terms of trade in services, government procurement (the EU) and rules governing IPR. However, concerted action by emerging and developing countries thwarted their ambitious agenda in the Doha Round at the WTO (see Narlikar and Van Hputen 2010 ; Hopewell 2016 ). Turning to bilateral agreements, the US Trade Representative at the time, Robert Zoellick, was forthright in declaring

in Latin America–European Union relations in the twenty-first century
Impact of structural tensions and thresholds
Eşref Aksu

recipes for ‘governability’. On one side, ‘liberal’ recipes for political governance – whether through bilateral arrangements or through such organisations as the EU and the CSCE (now OSCE) 114 – were offered to, often imposed on, the South. 115 On the other side, ‘capitalist’ recipes for economic governance were exported – whether through bilateral programmes or through such organisations as

in The United Nations, intra-state peacekeeping and normative change
Sean W. Burges

about global economic governance, but present venues where the actual decision making on daily questions is not dominated by the North. International multilateral action The BRICS also stand as a key example of how Brazil has used its expanded engagement with the Global South to magnify its international voice. A constant refrain in Brazilian speeches and statements was that the relative distribution of global power contained implicit and embedded inequities that threatened sustainable development (for example, survey the documents collected in Guimarães, 2006

in Brazil in the world
Abstract only
Sean W. Burges

as of writing had yet to be implemented. A more forward reaching attempt to shift global economic governance came from Brazil, with the idea that the BRICS countries might provide balance of payments support to floundering members of the Euro (Leahy, 2011 ). Implicit in the idea of a BRICS rescue fund was an apparent assumption that China would provide the major part of the capital, something which Beijing quietly decided against, leaving Dilma on her own to publicly muse about the possibilities of Brazilian financial aid for former colonial master, Portugal

in Brazil in the world
Abstract only
The politics and purpose of United Arab Emirates economic statecraft in the Horn of Africa
Karen E. Young and Taimur Khan

use of oil and gas products as aid in kind; the targeting of construction and real estate as both investment vehicles (for state and private sector firms) and employment strategies; the deployment of infrastructure development, particularly in ports; and the manipulation of central banks as quick fixes to a depreciating currency, all of these strategies relate to Gulf practices in economic governance. 20 The strategic aid priorities originating in the Gulf are generally quite

in The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa