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European political, social, and cultural life. By providing what Mannheim calls ‘fundamental integrative attitudes and formative principles,’ the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School pushed individuals to interpret the events of the interwar years and the Second World War as a historical rupture. 49 Using the theoretical tools provided by Benjamin, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas, subsequent generations were more likely to see the events of the early twentieth century as a ‘Benjaminian moment’ of rupture. The resources of collective remembrance Although none of
itself to non-Europeans.’ More specifically, they pointed out that the ‘bellicose past [that] entangled all European nations in bloody conflicts’ had led the continent to integrate based on a number of differences from other parts of the world – even from other parts of the developed west, such as the United States. These characteristics include the secular nature of European politics, the continental faith in government, a preference for the welfare state, a suspicion of under-supervised markets, an aversion to the use of force, and a desire for multilateral diplomacy
greater European political control over international market forces are already visible in the emergence of two differing models of globalisation in the post-Cold War world. The first, American path is driven by bilateral agreements, limited planning, and the idea that the power of multinational corporations and other economic interests should predominate ‘without organizing or even supervising, markets.’ 32 This approach builds on the United States’ hegemonic position in global politics to support its vision of globalisation based on market liberalisation. In
European integration in the first two chapters of Part I showed how the leaders of Europe built on the cognitive, motivational, and justificatory resources of collective memory to create a European political community over the course of the second half of the twentieth century. In the previous chapter I then traced how the project has started to sputter with the passing of the generations that had experienced the rupture of 1945 first-hand. Since the turn of the millennium these new leaders have found it difficult to resolve the interlocking economic and political
earlier. Mudde has made clear in his subsequent prolific work that his focus has been the classification of the rising, predominantly European, political parties and ‘party families’ broadly identified as populist. Such taxonomies were certainly another of Sartori's interests. 7 Indeed, empirical ‘party-centrism’ is a core feature of the hegemonic political science literature on populism. Mudde's earliest work addressed ‘extreme right’ parties and he subsequently sought to distinguish his position
picture, which when read alongside Foucault’s thought on the matter proves to be a highly productive way of describing the origins and characteristics of modern Statehood. For now, it suffices to note that these two analogies exist and have generally informed attempts to understand or define the State through to the present day, and that indeed the “political imagination” of modern Statehood is itself constituted by the tension between them. About this, Oakeshott is very firm: “my contention is that the modern European political consciousness is a polarised
.socialeurope.eu/migration-and-forgetting-in-central-europe (accessed 20 December 2018); S. Benhabib , ‘ The Return of Fascism ,’ The New Republic (29 September 2017 ). 7 Z. Bauman and C. Bordoni , State of Crisis ( Cambridge : Polity , 2014 ), 7 ; R. J. Holton , ‘ The Idea of Crisis in Modern Society ,’ The British Journal of Sociology , 38 : 4 ( 1987 ), 504 ; S. N. Kalyvas , ‘ The Intellectual Impact of the Euro Crisis ,’ European Politics and Society Newsletter , Summer ( 2012 ), 11 . 8 P. J. Verovšek , ‘ Critical Theory as Medicine? On the Diagnosis and Treatment of Social Pathology
European political life. The next three sections recount the origins and early history of the ECSC in order to demonstrate the role the constructive resources of the past played in helping Monnet, Schuman, and Adenauer to imagine, stick with, and argue for a supranational European community. The failed rupture of the Great War In the previous chapter I argued that while the First World War was a calamity that shook European society, it was not a rupture that destroyed the existing narrative threads of the past. Instead of enabling a rethinking of the continent
–120 . Miller , David 2014 . “ Debatable Lands .” International Theory 6 : 104–121 . Miller , David 2016 . Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press . Miller David and Sundas Ali . 2014 . “ Testing the National Identity Argument .” European Political Science Review 6
ethnopolitics and European geopolitics, however, both existed within a deeper framework of global coloniality in a fin-de-siècle when, Dušan Bjelić ( 2009 : 286) observes, south-east European intellectual elites routinely attended the universities of their ‘geopolitical allies’. European colonial imagination directly entered south-east European politics through these routes, translated through whatever identified one's own nation with ‘Europe’. Bjelić, indeed, arguably does most to set early-twentieth-century south-east European politics of identity in