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direct western European political engagement with the Muslim world and the Near East. Bonaparte’s Egyptian and Syrian campaign of 1798–99 was the first western invasion of the Levant since Louis IX’s in 1248–50. Although bizarrely portrayed as a war of liberation, an attempt to create a new brotherhood of man on the Nile, the French foray stimulated new fascination not only with the suitably distant and hence apolitical Ancient Egypt, but also in the scenes of the crusades, not least as Bonaparte led his troops to besiege Acre, and in colonisation. While Bonaparte
INTRODUCTION Introduction The nineteenth century saw the rise of modern nations in Europe, the ‘imagined communities’ of those who shared the same culture and recognised each other as fellow members.1 When cultural conceptions of the nation merged with the liberal idea of representative government, nationalism became one of the most important mobilising forces in European politics.2 Nationalists strove to establish states for their nations, or, if these existed already, to turn them into true nation states. In order to achieve this goal they tried to bring
’s troubles 1603–1702’, in R.M. Smuts (ed.), The Stuart court and Europe: essays in politics and political culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 20–38; S. Taylor, ‘An English dissenter and the crisis of European Protestantism: Roger Morrice’s perception of European politics in the 1680s’, in D. Onnekink (ed.), War and religion after Westphalia, 1648–1713 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pp
), Citizenship, nationality and migration in Europe (pp. 146–158). London and New York: Routledge. Taguieff, P. (1991). Le Force du préjugé. Paris: La Découverte. Wihtol de Wenden, C. (1994). Immigrants as political actors in France. West European Politics, 17(2), 91–110. Wihtol de Wenden, C. (2014). Second-generation immigrants: Citizenship and transnationalism. Araucaria, 16(31), 147–170.
aspect of European politics, to chair the debate. Like the umpire described by Clifford Geertz in his account of the melodrama of the Balinese cockfight, it seemed ‘only exceptionally well-​trusted, solid, and, given the complexity of the code, knowledgeable citizens perform this job’ (Geertz 1993: 424). And, as Geertz described, the role of this apparently ‘neutral’ figure turned out to be pivotal to the enactment of this melodrama. In a plummy English accent, Professor Chair’s opening remarks drew attention to the visual dynamics of performance and surveillance in
Review, 4:3 (2008), 298.   3 Thomas Quinn, ‘Elections in context, choosing the least-worst government: the British general election of 2005’, West European Politics, 29:1 (2006), 175.   4 Abdus Salique is a businessman with several business establishments in the Brick Lane area. He hails from the Sylhet region. He is a Labour Party activist (personal interview, London, 19 July 2007). Mr Salique was the chairman of Brick Lane Traders’ Association at the time of the interview. He is the founder chairman of Banglatown Restaurants Association and owner MUP
-Zionist compromise that the WZO reconstituted itself after upheavals surrounding the Uganda Plan. As Zalkind came to see it, this compromise came at the expense of core Zionist principles. Operating within a European political context, he considered Zionist diplomacy to be inconsistent with the cultural revolution the movement was supposed to foment (see my discussion of shtadlanus below). Focusing on Palestine to the exclusion of other suitable places of refuge meant ignoring ever worsening conditions for Jews residing in the Pale of Settlement. In other words, attempts to
claims. Instead, they understood the European political chessboard in millenarian terms, trying to make sense of the wars opposing Protestant and Catholic nations as signs of an imminent Doomsday, in a more explicit but Enthusiasm, blasphemy and toleration 189 nonetheless similar fashion to eminent mystico-scientists such as Isaac Newton and his successor, William Whiston.120 As an ecumenical movement consisting of at least seven denominations, the question of the Prophets’ political allegiance proves thorny at best and inextricable at worst. It may be tempting to
proved abortive in the face of European politics, notably the Hundred Years’ War (1337–1453) and the papal schism (1378–1417). Prospects for a mass crusade – in the 1360s, 1390s, 1450s and 1460s – were hopelessly compromised by divisions, rivalries, self-interest and inadequate finance. The difficulties of planning any such major campaign were now well understood. Within the traditional genre of crusade writing, the theoretical treatises of the early fourteenth century gave way to two contrasting types. On the one hand, in visionary tracts from the eastern
European politics of this new type, and especially on the processes of democratisation, turned out to be significantly less constructive. Political scientists called this a devotee party 2 and its main features included mobilisation around extremist ideologies, chiefly communism and fascism, and the unconditional commitment of party members to the partisan apparatus and often to the leader as well. By means of devotee parties, fascist and communist ideologies succeeded in changing human history in the first half of the twentieth century, often leading countries far