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. A significant lacuna in discussion of the EU external relations is any serious consideration of these from a non-European perspective. (Moxon-Browne 2015 : 276) Therefore I argue that there is a need to define the role and limits of multilateralism (Álvarez 2000 ), taking into account different perceptions of the process beyond Latin American or European “eyes”. The chapter divides into three sections which study the European political dialogue from
-originated expatriates play in European politics has encouraged the Turkish state to harness them as a political asset. In Germany, as of 2021, there are three Turkey-originated members of the European Parliament, sixteen members of the Bundestag, forty-eight members of state parliaments and 423 members of municipality councils. 106 Since the 2000s, an increasing number of French Turks have also begun to play an increased role in local and
(Luciano 2017 ). Thirdly, the drivers of the political behaviour of the Latin American and the European components are quite diverse. Due to its own institutional development over time, the EP has internally configured alongside political-ideological rather than national cleavages (Hix et al. 2006 ). Thus the European political groups have played a key role in EP's voting and decision-making processes in time. Meanwhile, Latin American regional parliaments have not developed substantial transnational ideological linkages since their constitutions
Risse , ‘From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction’ , West European Politics , 35 : 1 ( 2012 ), 7 . 5 Steven Lukes , Power: A Radical View ( London : Macmillan , 1974 ). 6
’s prime minister. 10 Erdoğan addressed emigrants from Turkey in other European countries as well. At a rally held in Paris in 2010, the first of its kind in France, he once again reminded the diaspora how important they were and encouraged them to actively and assertively participate in French and European politics without forgetting their national identity and roots: ‘Becoming a French citizen wouldn
–100. 6 G. Noutcheva and S. Aydın-Düzgit, ‘Lost in Europeanisation: The Western Balkans and Turkey’, West European Politics 35:1 (2012), 59–78. 7 Y. Gürsoy, ‘The impact of EU-driven reforms on the political autonomy of the Turkish military’, South European Society and
, Neophytos Loizides , Nukhet A. Sandal , and Alexandros Lordos . 2014 . “ Winning peace frames: intra-ethnic outbidding in Northern Ireland and Cyprus .” West European Politics 37 ( 1 ): 159–181 . Necatigil , Zaim M. 1993 . The
Community of States (CELAC) between thirty-three countries of the region (Ruano 2018 ). The EU held regular political consultations with all three partners: the San José peace conferences on Central America with the Contadora Group, ministerial meetings with the Rio Group and since 2013 summits with CELAC. From a Latin American perspective, European political engagement from the 1980s onwards meant two things. Firstly, a diversification of external relations previously centred on the two superpowers, and particularly the US; and, secondly, the chance
origins of the Thirty Years War and the structure of European politics ’, The English Historical Review 107 : 587 – 625 . Thomas , P. ( 2003 ). ‘ Piracy, privateering, and the United States of the Netherlands ’, Revue Internationale des droits de l’Antiquit é
concerns. Alongside maritime security, two other issues are thrusting the Horn into Europe's political orbit. First is violent extremism, especially the Somali militant group al-Shabaab, which not only is considered a threat to the people of the region but is feared to have a long reach beyond. The next issue of priority is migration. Indeed, behind Syrians and Afghans, Eritreans fleeing their despotic government are the third-largest group of refugees arriving in Europe today. As de Waal writes: ‘Out of desperation, the EU has started to overcome its scruples and